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ANTITRUST, INSTITUTIONS, AND MERGER CONTROL
D. Daniel Sokor
INTRODUCTION
The dynamic interrelationship of a number of institutions shape anti-
trust's ability to reduce anticompetitive distortions on economic activity.
Complexity affects institutional quality, and antitrust institutions respond to
this complexity.' Institutions work in complex ways akin to an ecosystem.2
Post-World War 11, brown snakes found their way to Guam. The snakes
threatened Guam's bird population, which was not accustomed to the pre-
dators. To combat the snakes, the government introduced mongooses to
eliminate the snake threat. Instead, the mongoose developed a taste for bird
and bird eggs.' Similarly, change the relative power of one institution with-
in the antitrust institutional ecosystem, and unforeseen results may occur.
Assistant Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I want to thank Tom Arthur,
Jon Baker, David Balto, Chris Bruner, Stu Cohn, Dan Crane, Jeff Harrison, Steve Houck, Barak Orbach,
Bill Page, and Mike Weiner for their suggestions; participants at the NYU Next Generation of Antitrust
Scholarship Conference; and a summer research grant from the University of Florida Levin College of
Law. Many thanks also to my excellent research assistants Nakku Chung and Josh Mize. All errors
remain my own.
1 Antitrust is not alone among complex areas of regulation that confront these problems. Areas as
distinct as corporate/securities law and environmental law must address institutional complexity. Other
fields seem to have similar problems in terms of tackling issues of complexity in multiple levels. My
sense is that much of this work tends to focus on some sub-issues rather than addressing all the com-
parative institutions. This may be a function of works being article length rather than book length. For
how some authors address various institutional issues across fields, see Chris Brummer, Corporate Law
Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1067-68 (2008) (noting the
importance of international rather than federalism concerns in contemporary corporate law); Stephen J.
Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 598, 600-01 (2007) (explaining the effects of legislative changes on securities litigation); Victor B.
Flatt, Act Locally, Affect Globally: How Changing Social Norms to Influence the Private Sector Shows a
Path to Using Local Government to Control Environmental Harms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 455,
455-457 (2008) (providing an institutional analysis for state level public and private environmental
enforcement); J.B. Ruhl, Keeping the Endangered Species Act Relevant, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
275, 275, 293 (2009) (noting the limitations of expanding the Endangered Species Act to combat cli-
mate change); Michael D. Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions 'Supplemental' to SEC Enforcement?
An Empirical Analysis 3-4, 43-44 (4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Working Paper,
2009) (on file with the George Mason Law Review) (suggesting that public and private rights are not
compliments in securities litigation).
2 See generally Craig A. Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and
Multimodal, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2010).
3 See History of the Brown Treesnake Invasion on Guam, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
http://www.fort.usgs.gov/resources/education/bts/invasion/history.asp (last visited July 25, 2010). The
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Institutional complexity is such that a "fix" to one institutional prob-
lem may merely shift the problem to another institution. For example, to fix
the problem of generalist judges adjudicating complex antitrust cases, a
jurisdiction might introduce a specialized court.4 However, a specialized
court might itself rule in suboptimal ways or may be limited in its adjudica-
tion based upon a higher-level court overturning it.5 A specialized court also
might result in more forum shopping across jurisdictions to get substantive
remedies but in friendlier venues.6
In spite of the complex interconnection of institutions, antitrust scho-
larship has suffered from a lack of more rigorous comparative institutional
analysis-one that analyzes the relative strengths and weaknesses of all
these institutions to better determine an optimal institutional design.7 Anti-
trust scholarship on comparative institutional analysis has been lacking.
This article makes two primary contributions to the antitrust literature. First,
it identifies the dynamic interrelationship across antitrust institutions.
Second, it provides new empirical evidence from practitioner surveys to
explore how the dynamic institutional interrelationship plays out in the area
of merger control.
Antitrust scholars primarily focus on case analysis and the theoretical
and empirical economics underlying these cases.' Therefore it is not sur-
prising that antitrust institutional analysis is generally limited to courts and
Simpsons television show illustrates the problem of unintended changes in the ecosystem in The Simp-
sons: Bart the Mother, (FOX television broadcast Sept. 27, 1998).
4 See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 383-89 (2000).
5 Elina Cruz & Sebastian Zarate, Building Trust in Antitrust: The Chilean Case, in COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 157, 161-63 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009)
(discussing the Chilean Supreme Court's ability to overrule the Chilean Competition Tribunal, a specia-
lized competition tribunal); Aldo Gonzilez, Quality of Evidence and Cartel Prosecution: The Case of
Chile, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra, at 189, 196-99 (discussing how the
Chilean Competition Tribunal rulings leave collusion in a grey area between per se and rule of reason
analysis).
6 Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust and the
Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 210-11 (2009) (lamenting that
competitors will push for action in the most restrictive jurisdictions for dominant firms).
7 A number of other works examine institutional design and comparative institutional analysis,
but do so outside of antitrust. See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 3 (2001); THRAINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF
REFORM 1-6 (2005); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994); Eric Maskin, Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social
Goals, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 567, 567 (2008); Jonathan B. Wiener & Barak D. Richman, Mechanism
Choice, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., forth-
coming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1408163. These works take a somewhat different
approach than the present Article, in part because the complexity of antitrust requires a somewhat dif-
ferent set of institutional responses than some other substantive fields of law.
8 E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 257, 336-37; Arthur, supra note 4, at 337.
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agencies. It is hard for law professors to undertake institutional analysis
when they are themselves embedded in institutions. As courts and agencies
are the two antitrust institutions that academics and practitioners are likely
to experience, these are the focus of institutional analysis. However, an
analysis limited merely to these institutions is incomplete. Similarly, insti-
tutional issues are generally not of interest to antitrust industrial organiza-
tion ("10") economists. Often antitrust 1O economists simply assume the
institutions for their models in both theory and data-driven articles.9
This Article does not intend to denigrate the nature of most antitrust
scholarship.'° Instead, it claims that an analysis of cases and of agency deci-
sion making underemphasizes the important role that other institutional
actors play in shaping the dynamics of the antitrust system. The meaning of
"institutions" varies." In the context of this Article, I am concerned with
designing institutions that apply to all facets of antitrust. Although this
comparative analysis is global (e.g., one can undertake a comparative anal-
ysis of European or Japanese antitrust institutions), I focus the institutional
analysis in this Article on the United States' experience. Nevertheless, I do
include insights from other jurisdictions to illustrate alternative institutional
designs to the U.S. system.
This Article's major claim is that scholars have not undertaken a truly
comparative institutional analysis of antitrust institutions. My normative
claim is that only by undertaking this sort of analysis can we properly struc-
ture the institutional design of antitrust. In many cases, scholars are acci-
dental institutionalists. They focus on a particular institution (such as courts
through an analysis of a particular antitrust doctrine's shortcomings) with-
out placing it within a larger antitrust interinstitutional context. 2 Absent a
comparative analysis, scholars may inadvertently be introducing the equiva-
lent of a mongoose into the antitrust institutional ecosystem.
9 See David J. Gerber, Competition Law and the Institutional Embeddedness of Economics, in
ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW 20, 20-23 (Josef Drexel, Laurence Idot & Joel Moneger
eds., 2009).
10 Indeed, I have been guilty of this sin as much as the next scholar.
11 There are many overlapping and conflicting meanings to both the terms "institutions" and
"comparative institutional analysis." For purposes of this Article, I use North's conceptualization of
institutions. Institutions under this framework are the various governance structures based upon formal
rules, informal norms, their organization, and the ways in which these structures enforce governance.
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). By
comparative institutional analysis, I utilize Williamson's conceptualization as "an examination of the
comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance
structures.' OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985).
12 E.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 3-10 (1980) (focusing on the FTC); SUZANNE WEAVER,
DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 4-5 (1977)
(focusing on the DOJ); Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1036-38 (suggesting a rethink of the potential competition doctrine).
2010] 1057
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This Article explores the various dynamic interrelationships using qua-
litative analysis across antitrust generally, with an emphasis on descriptive
analysis and categorization. It does so to better identify and conceptualize
the institutions that constitute a necessary part of an antitrust comparative
institutional analysis. First, it explains why there is a need for using a com-
parative institutional analysis in antitrust. It then identifies the various insti-
tutions in the antitrust system--the market, courts, agencies, the interaction
between public and private rights of action, the legislature, sector regula-
tors, state versus federal government enforcement, and national versus in-
ternational enforcement.
Institutions are complex. A vast literature in law, economics, and polit-
ical science explores each individual institution. This article does not
present a comprehensive view of the various antitrust institutions. 3 Instead
it provides a broad, descriptive, analytical overview of the various institu-
tions to better frame the larger institutional interrelations for a comparative
institutional analysis. In the next Part, it examines mergers as a case study
of how one might apply antitrust institutional analysis across these different
kinds and levels of antitrust institutions. The Article utilizes both quantita-
tive and qualitative methods based on survey data of antitrust practitioners
on merger issues to better understand institutional choice and the decision-
making process. The surveys reveal results that run counter to the popular
antitrust discourse about the level of merger enforcement under President
George W. Bush. Slightly more than half of all practitioners surveyed found
no change in merger enforcement under Bush in their own practice, and the
vast majority of the other practitioners found a change in enforcement
merely at the margins. The Article concludes with observations from the
case study and appeals for more theoretical and empirical work in antitrust
institutional analysis.
I. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Institutions matter, as they affect outcomes in society and the ability to
create economic growth.' 4 A focus on better institutional design has become
an antitrust agency priority around the world. However, as a recent report
by antitrust agencies on agency effectiveness notes, "[r]elatively little em-
phasis has been placed on the institutions and operational considerations
13 See generally DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE Ii (2003) (providing an extensive literature
review of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches as well as administrative agencies and other
institutional arrangements).
14 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
3(1990).
1058 [VOL. 17:4
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through which competition law and policy are implemented."' 5 This is sur-
prising because the quality of institutions plays such an integral role in var-
ious antitrust outcomes.
Institutional change is a product, in part, of path dependence." Prior
institutional structures shape the current framework's ability to respond to
issues as they emerge. 7 Institutions also evolve. Over time, competition
eliminates weaker organizational structures. 8 Given how institutions react
to changing circumstances, any institutional analysis without a robust com-
parative element that advocates substantial changes or minor modifications
to the existing institutional structure of antitrust risks making faulty sugges-
tions.' 9 A comparative institutional analysis enables a more thorough ex-
amination of the comparative costs and benefits of existing and potential
antitrust institutions. Such work would provide a sense of the costs and
benefits of any given institutional design."
Let us begin with an explanation of what it means to obtain the best
institutional outcome at the lowest cost. In short, it is a system that is admi-
nistrable and reduces societal cost by effectively using various institutions
to promote better outcomes. 2' Antitrust measures institutional success in
terms of the institution's ability to improve consumer welfare. It could be
possible, in some sense, to formally model what the comparative costs and
benefits of a particular institution might be. In practice, however, it proves
quite difficult to quantify the advantages and disadvantages of a particular
institutional structure. How much of this analysis is country-specific, based
on the 10, stages of economic development, and strength of political institu-
tions, may vary. It is perhaps easier to understand institutional tradeoffs
15 COMPETITION POL'Y IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP: SUB GROUP 1, INT'L COMPETITION
NETWORK, AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT 3 (2008).
16 Path dependence is a term that "posits that the evolution of institutions is based on past expe-
rience." Susan Adler Channick, Will Americans Embrace Single-Payer Health Insurance: The Intracta-
ble Barrier of lnertia, Free Market, and Culture, 28 LAW & INEQ. 1, 33 (2010).
17 See Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'?: Path Dependence and the
Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, in 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON.
DYNAMICS 205, 217-19 (1994).
18 Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 213-
14(1950).
19 This does not mean that good work has not been done regarding antitrust agency institutional
design. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Designing Competition Law Institutions,
25 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 361, 393-94 (2002). However, many of the articles on insti-
tutional design focus almost exclusively on agencies and courts, rather than on a broader institutional
analysis as advocated by this Article.
20 This is particularly important because existing institutions suffer from inertia. See RONALD
N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF
BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 4-9 (1994); Mark Seiden-
feld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 429, 451-52 (1999).
21 KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 8.
2010] 1059
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with a case study, which this Article does by examining U.S. merger con-
trol.
Institutional effectiveness plays a role in the decision making of the
various actors who must navigate the legal and regulatory institutions, pri-
marily companies and the lawyers that represent them.2 How institutions
affect the decision-making process is a critical issue, as decision making is
a function of institutional effectiveness.23 The decision-making process by
lawyers and companies is somewhat murky. In part, this is because antitrust
always operates in a world of uncertainty, which makes predictions about
future behavior of firms and markets difficult. 4 Despite this, antitrust policy
should improve its management of uncertainty by creating a better institu-
tional design for any given jurisdiction-and also worldwide-by properly
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional alternatives.
However, the complex web of antitrust institutions makes this task difficult.
Institutional alternatives span across, at least in the United States, three
jurisdictional levels-state, federal, and international-as well as across
public and private rights of action. Moreover, overlapping institutional ac-
tors exist at each of these levels.
In terms of institutional design, should one focus on the goals first? If
so, how do the goals of antitrust shape the design (or revision) of institu-
tions to achieve these goals? Some antitrust scholars suggest that without
identifying the goals, it is difficult to measure agency effectiveness.25 This
is certainly true. However, at a certain point the goals are a function of ex-
isting institutional capabilities. Current institutional constraints shape the
goals of antitrust to the same extent as the broader goal-setting process. For
example, we cannot expect a brand-new antitrust agency with no previous
experience to undertake enforcement in the area of bundled discounts. This
task challenges even the most experienced antitrust agencies and antitrust
systems.26 For a new antitrust system, a focus on a difficult issue like bun-
dling would overwhelm the system. This could lead to public apprehension
about the abilities of antitrust more broadly.
22 See Philip J. Weiser, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Toward an International Dialogue on the Institutional Side of Antitrust 8 (Feb. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255363.pdf,
23 Id. at 1.
24 Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 379 (2005) ("In dealing with antitrust issues, even economic theory does not have
all the answers and probably never will.").
25 See William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Perfor-
mance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 907-09 (2009).
26 See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 399-402 (2009); see also Patrick Greenlee et al., An Antitrust Analysis
of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1132, 1134-35 (2008); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling
as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 159 (2004).
[VOL. 17:41060
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A better way to conceptualize institutional choice is to consider a link
between goals and capabilities. How to determine the best mix of these
factors, given institutional limits, is a job for comparative institutional anal-
ysis. This Article includes certain assumptions of sequential design into
institutional construction in a cross-country setting. Without certain prere-
quisites, antitrust will not be effective, regardless of the country's antitrust
system. These necessary requirements include: high levels of financial and
human resources for the antitrust agency; a lack of government over-
intervention and regulation; low-level country corruption; strong physical
infrastructure for the country in critical sectors (e.g., electricity, telecom);
an independent judiciary; and a strong legal infrastructure that includes
property and contractual rights to promote private-sector growth. 7 This
Article also presumes that there is an academic community that continues to
undertake important theoretical and empirical work on antitrust issues and
that the various antitrust institutions can absorb this learning into their deci-
sion-making processes.28 Finally, an effective antitrust system requires ad-
ministrability of legal rules and standards.29
Institutional design represents only one factor in the success of the an-
titrust system. Outputs also matter. This leads to a critical question. What
should agencies do and how does one measure the type of outputs that anti-
trust produces? This Article does not address issues of quality versus quan-
tity of enforcement. On the one hand, ignoring quality can lead to mislead-
ing inferences about antitrust enforcement. Without looking at the quality
of a case, one might suggest that percentage wins of total cases brought or
total number of cases brought might be good measures of institutional suc-
cess. On the other hand, not all cases the enforcement agencies pursue are
equally meritorious, and too many "bad" cases, even if won by the enforc-
ers, would constitute losses for the antitrust system.3"
On the other hand, a discussion about quality assumes that there is an
appropriate measure of quality. Rather, an absence of good measures of
"quality" outcomes exists. We cannot effectively quantify business deci-
sions not taken as a result of antitrust court decisions.3" Nor can we easily
quantify the effects of decisions taken.
27 CYNTHIA L. CLEMENT ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL REFORM & THE INFORMAL SECTOR,
COMPETITION POLICIES FOR GROWTH: LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SSA COUNTRIES 4
(2001).
28 D. Daniel Sokol, The Development of Human Capital in Latin American Competition Policy, in
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 13, 13-14.
29 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 7-10 (2005)
(explaining the importance ofadministrability in antitrust).
30 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984) ("For a number of
reasons, errors on the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable.").
31 But in the environmental realm, see Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Erin T. Mansur & Andrey Voynov,
Averting Enforcement: Strategic Response to the Threat of Environmental Regulation, 1 (Ctr. for the
20101 1061
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II. THE ANTITRUST INSTITUTIONS
This Article analyzes the antitrust institutions that make up the U.S.
antitrust enforcement arena, while also touching on the relevant global as-
pects. This Part identifies the relevant institutions-the market, the judi-
ciary, agencies, public and private rights of action, the legislature, sector
regulators, state enforcement, and international enforcement-to facilitate
further discussion.
A. Market
The first order question for antitrust is to determine the optimal
amount of antitrust. Put differently, in an antitrust context, how much anti-
trust through formal institutions is necessary as opposed to using the free
market as the default institution? There are three types of institutional de-
signs for antitrust. One is to keep the current antitrust system as it is. As this
Article will demonstrate, such an institutional structure creates significant
redundancies and other costs that outweigh the relative benefits of the cur-
rent system. One alternative is to create an institutional system designed for
more aggressive antitrust enforcement. The other alternative is to optimize
the antitrust institutional system for less enforcement if the belief is that less
enforcement will yield better outcomes. This Article is a review and initial
critique of the existing institutional alternatives. I leave to a future article
how to best design U.S. antitrust institutions.
A related concern to establishing the ideal amount of enforcement is
determining which is more costly from an institutional standpoint-false
positives (over-enforcement) or false negatives (under-enforcement). The
basis for antitrust enforcement is the belief that markets work.32 Choosing
formal institutions in antitrust involves understanding the nature of the
market failure, identifying the possible antitrust institutional responses, and
creating an optimal set of institutions or instruments to correct this failure.33
Intervention, given the institutional realities of formal antitrust institutions
(the market is informal in its organization), must be shown to outweigh the
costs of such intervention. Judge Easterbrook in his seminal work provided
Study of Energy Markets, Working Paper No. 160, 2006), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/6c79b2bl ("We find that the threat of action did have a significant effect on emissions .... ).
32 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 7 ("Those administering the antitrust laws are generally more
aware that antitrust is a form of regulation-a type of market intervention in an economy whose nucleus
is private markets.").
33 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 8-9 (1982); MICHAEL C. MUNGER,
ANALYZING POLICY: CHOICES, CONFLICTS, AND PRACTICES 6-11 (2000); Oliver E. Williamson, Public
and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306,
306-08 (1999).
1062 [VOL. 17:4
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an error/cost framework based on the different types of costs associated
with false positives and negatives.34 Even if one begins with the opposite set
of assumptions about which set of errors are more costly, one still needs to
determine when formal institutions, with all of their defects, outweigh the
market and its defects.
B. Judiciary
The judiciary is a key player in the antitrust system via judicial evalua-
tion of antitrust cases. In the U.S. context, generalized courts have evolved
over time as a result of shifts in judicial interpretation, economic thinking,
and government policies and priorities.35 As Congress enacted purposely
vague antitrust statutes,36 courts have developed and refined antitrust juri-
sprudence through the common law rather than through agency rulemak-
ing.37 This is the case even for the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
which, although an independent agency, lacks the rulemaking functions of
other independent agencies, such as the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC").38
Since the mid-1970s and the Chicago antitrust revolution (which some
argue is better understood as a Chicago/Harvard revolution,39 or some mere-
ly a Harvard revolution4), the Supreme Court has shifted to a pro-defendant
34 Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 2-3.
35 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 7-9.
36 William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661,663 n.8 (1982).
37 Id. at 663 ("The antitrust laws were written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct
and with the knowledge that the detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable conduct
would lack the flexibility needed to encourage (and at times even permit) desirable conduct. To provide
this flexibility, Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-
law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory direc-
tions."); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) ("The
statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize
courts to create new lines of common law."); William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Com-
petition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 380 (2003) ("[Antitrust] enforcement
programs are shaped by the evolution of antitrust 'norms'-consensus views of what public competition
authorities ought to do.").
38 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy andAntitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1199 (2008).
39 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 37-38 (referring to this fusion as the "new Harvard" position);
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Con-
duct. The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (arguing the comple-
mentary nature of contributions of the Chicago and Harvard views); William H. Page, Areeda, Chicago,
and Antitrust Injury: Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909, 909-11 (1996)
(explaining the Chicago roots of Areeda's antitrust).
40 See I PtILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 11 12d (3d ed. 2006)
(offering a summary of the doctrinal differences between and the analytical assumptions of the Chicago
and Harvard Schools); Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent
2010] 1063
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view. The shift in case law has accelerated since the mid-2000s with an
increased Supreme Court antitrust docket. 4' The Chicago/Harvard School
has had a substantial impact on both procedural and substantive antitrust
decisions.
The impact of the Chicago/Harvard view on the judiciary is illustrated
by a lower level of antitrust enforcement measured by cases filed, as com-
pared to the 1960s or 1970s.42 At its core, the Chicago School is about price
theory and advocates legal rules based on an error cost framework. 3 Har-
vard focuses on administrability concerns for both antitrust agencies and
courts and draws its roots from the Harvard legal process tradition.' The
Chicago/Harvard approach did not go unanswered. A post-Chicago School
developed, which questioned some of Chicago's assumptions that certain
business practices could not be inefficient or anticompetitive.45 For the most
part, however, courts have not accepted these post-Chicago claims.
4 6
Even the debates surrounding which view has the better set of theories
and assumptions (Chicago, Harvard, or post-Chicago), though seemingly
fundamental, are not actually so important. The idea that big is bad has
been superseded by an informed analysis of the latest economic theory,
which posits efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust.47 The debate over which
economic theory provides superior explanatory value persists at the margins
Supreme Court Decisions, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 59, 59-60 (2007) (suggesting a Harvard victory
in recent Supreme Court decisions); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the
Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 109, 109-10 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) [hereinafter How
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK] (arguing that Harvard won in the courts on unilateral
conduct).
41 Elhauge, supra note 40, at 59-60; Daniel J. Gifford & E. Thomas Sullivan, The Roberts Anti-
trust Court: A Transformative Beginning, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 435, 435-36 (2007); Joshua D. Wright,
The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, 3 COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L 24, 25-27 (2007).
42 See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 55-58 (2000); Wright, supra note 41, at 25-27.
43 William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Anti-
trust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228-43 (1989) (explaining the emer-
gence of the Chicago School); Wright, supra note 41, at 33.
44 Page, supra note 39, at 911 (providing a treatment of Harvard's roots and its interplay with the
Chicago School).
45 Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 258 (providing an overview of the changes in post-Chicago analy-
sis); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 1, 7-9, 16-19 (Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi & Roger Van
den Bergh eds., 2002); Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 109; Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 211-
13 (1986); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 837-40
(1990) (discussing the complexities of tying arrangements in modem antitrust law).
46 Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 109-10.
47 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV.
685, 696-97 (2009) (explaining the convergence of goals and rules in antitrust).
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of antitrust, even though it remains very contentious. 48 At the core of mod-
ern antitrust lawand policy is an understanding that economics as a discip-
line has triumphed and shapes antitrust analysis.49
The adoption of economic analysis has had a pronounced effect on
both the number and type of antitrust cases filed and decided. Decided cas-
es impact future cases. These dispositions matter because potential future
plaintiffs are emboldened or chastened depending on the successes or fail-
ures of other cases.
Let us examine the standards for summary judgment and for dismissal
as examples of changes at the Supreme Court level. Both have had an im-
pact on subsequent cases. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp. ° and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5" concerned the costs of
litigation and the possibility that juries might not understand antitrust's
complexity. 2 Hence, the Supreme Court has increased the antitrust thre-
shold for reaching juries to prevent juries from addressing difficult issues.53
Matsushita made it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive a summary
judgment motion challenge.' In Twombly, the Court pushed the inquiry to
an earlier point in the docket-to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.5 Courts may not have confined Section 2 of the
Sherman Act so tightly if the scope for private actions in the United States
were not so great. That is, if the combination of treble damages and distor-
tions in the class action system did not exist, courts would have been less
48 See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911,
1912-14 (2009).
49 Id.
'0 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
51 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
52 See id. at 559-60, 573; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 ("Mistaken inferences in cases such as this
one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to pro-
tect.").
53 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) ("The civil antitrust
jury is a particularly suboptimal manifestation of antitrust antifederalism, first because juries are usually
not competent to decide the highly technical issues that modem civil antitrust law involves and secondly
because, fearing what will happen if a case reaches the jury, courts contort the rules of civil antitrust
procedure to avoid jury trials.").
54 Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161,
174 ("We will not just let juries flip coins: if the plaintiff can't do more than just assert agreement, if the
plaintiff can't with evidence exclude the possibility that the defendants were acting independently, the
plaintiff loses, and indeed, the judge must not let the case go to the jury."); E. Thomas Sullivan & Ro-
bert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and
Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1608-10 (2004) (exploring empirically the impact of Matsushita on
summary judgment motions).
55 William H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action
Under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439, 468 (2009) ("The Supreme
Court's decision in Twombly has imposed a new, more challenging standard of plausibility for alleging
agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.").
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likely to create procedural hurdles to prevent what courts perceive as sub-
optimal outcomes. 5 6
Procedural issues account for only one part of the institutional analysis
of the judiciary. Agencies might not like the way that generalist judges rule
on substantive issues. Therefore, through their administrative adjudication,
agencies may try to circumvent judicial review in the first place. The vari-
ous mechanisms available to agencies include guidelines, agency adjudica-
tion, and rulemaking, among other tools.57 Using such tools requires a tra-
deoff between their effectiveness (and the agency's cost of using them) on
the one hand, and the cost/likelihood of judicial review on the other. Thus,
agencies might create burdensome regulatory instruments to reduce judicial
reversal. 8
Another factor that shapes the judiciary is the quality of judges. It is
not clear that generalized judges do a good job (or indeed a better job than
ten or twenty years ago) distilling the complex economics of antitrust into
well-reasoned decisions in substantive antitrust cases. A forthcoming article
by Professors Michael Baye and Joshua Wright finds that judges face con-
siderable problems with technically-difficult antitrust issues.59 Their results
suggest that economics training improves outcomes in simple cases (in
terms of appeal and reversal rates, which they argue are an acceptable
proxy for quality), but not in economically-complex cases.' Their evidence
supports the claim that generalist federal judges do not perform particularly
well in complex antitrust cases. However, neither do "specialists," who in
their sample are judges with economics training.6 1
Judicial quality is only a part of the total litigation equation. Statisti-
cally, more than 90 percent of antitrust cases involve the potential use of
juries for criminal cartel cases or private actions.62 The institutional dilem-
mas involving juries differ from those involving judges. Juries, like judges,
are randomly selected. However, juries and judges possess different capa-
bilities. Over time, judges may develop expertise in antitrust as they see a
significant caseload in the area. Juries have no such realistic possibility.
56 Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrat-
ing Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1119-23 (1986).
57 F. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Analysis
of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 539 (2000).
58 Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political
Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 349-51, 369-70 (1999); see Joseph L. Smith
& Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
61,61 (2002) (providing evidence of how this works in the environmental regulatory context).
59 See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?
The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 21-23), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=1 319888.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Crane, supra note 38, at 1182 & n.92.
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Most antitrust issues that confront juries are highly technical, and expertise
is unlikely in areas such as predatory pricing or bundling.63
With all of these potential concerns about juries, it may be surprising
to learn that juries actually play a very limited role in the antitrust system.
Perhaps because of the weaknesses of juries in antitrust cases, only 1 per-
cent of all private federal antitrust cases reach a jury trial.' 4 Most criminal
cases result in a plea bargain, and most private cases either do not survive
motions for summary judgment or dismissal, or settle.6" Over time, courts
have removed as much decision making as possible from juries in antitrust
cases in part because of the fear that juries will be overwhelmed by infor-
mation.' What a jury actually decides, such as conflicting opinions by ex-
perts on the economic issues, is a function of how much courts are willing
to restrict the testimony that parties present to juries.67
Because of antitrust's complexity, general courts may be over-
whelmed. One possibility is to use clear standards to limit judicial imple-
mentation of antitrust doctrine. 68 Alternatively, antitrust could become more
like other areas of complex regulation in the United States. Antitrust could
entrust its adjudication to specialized courts in an administrative law set-
ting.69 In a number of ways, such specialization would solve the problem of
general courts and their limited ability to properly integrate antitrust think-
ing into careful and accurate decision making.
The solution of specialized antitrust adjudication through administra-
tive law has its own problems. Specialized adjudication thus far has not
been effective in the U.S. antitrust context. The record of the Administra-
tive Law Judges ("ALJs") at the FTC has been mixed. The ALJs did not
come to their positions with an antitrust background. Though they may
have gained knowledge over time with repeat exposure to antitrust,70 there
are reasons to believe that the antitrust capabilities of FTC ALJs are not
63 Id. at 1184 ("[I]n modern antitrust there are few, if any, nontechnical questions to cabin. Juries,
to the extent that they are performing any function in antitrust cases, are usually performing a highly
technical one.").
64 Id. at 1184.
65 Id.; Crane, supra note 53, at 37.
66 Crane, supra note 53, at 37.
67 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Anti-
trust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 618-21 (2005) (calling courts "gatekeepers" of economic infor-
mation forjuries).
68 Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 1163, 1235-36 (1988) ("Nearly one thousand federal judges cannot be expected to produce pre-
dictable and consistent policy, let alone results, in concrete cases without statutory guidance.").
69 Arthur, supra note 4, at 3 88-89 (advocating for use of the FTC to adjudicate antitrust disputes
outside of mergers and cartels because of better relative institutional capabilities to generalized courts).
70 J. Robert Robertson, FTC Part III Litigation: Lessons from Chicago Bridge and Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare, ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 12, 15; Mark Whitener, Assessing Part III Ad-
ministrative Litigation: Interview with Timothy J. Muris, ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 6, 7.
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particularly high.7' Indeed, one problem ALJ litigation may present is that
some of the issues argued before the ALJs may overwhelm their limited
resources.
72
What might the alternative be? Oftentimes, when faced with genera-
lized courts of highly-variable abilities, commentators suggest the creation
of a specialized court. In many ways Chile is the best example of the limita-
tions of an antitrust specialist court. Since 2003, Chile has had a competi-
tion tribunal, the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia ("TDLC"),
which has direct appeal to the Chilean Supreme Court. The TDLC has five
judges.73 According to the law, two of the five judges must have an eco-
nomics background.74 The two current economists who serve as Judges
have PhDs in economics. 75 The three lawyer-members of the Tribunal have
advanced law degrees, and two had antitrust backgrounds prior to their ap-
pointment.76  The pay for this part-time position is approximately
$120,000. 71 While not as high as a private-sector job, the salary is sufficient
to attract high-quality judges. TDLC members are permitted to have addi-
tional income from other sources, including law practice. This salary com-
pares favorably to the United States where the top Department of Justice
("DOJ") antitrust enforcer makes $153,200 for a full-time job78 and where
the cost of living in Washington, DC is much higher than Santiago, Chile.
The TDLC integrates recent economic thinking into its decisions. It
has addressed a number of complex issues. Three cases stand out for being
particularly interesting on the facts and analysis. In merger analysis, the
TDLC judgment in Falabella/D&S79 rejected a merger using the concept of
"integrated retail" to determine that the merger would reduce competition.80
Chiletabacos/Phillip Morris81 involved an abuse of dominance through dis-
counting, exclusivity, and other practices.82 A third case, Guerra del Plas-
71 Whitener, supra note 70, at 7.
72 id.
73 Law No. 20361, Julio 13, 2009 (Chile), available at
http://www.leychile.cVNavegar?idLey-20361.
74 Id.
75 Telephone Interview with Radoslav Depolo, Minister (Judge) of the TDLC (Feb. 20, 2010).
76 Id.
77 Law. No. 20361, supra note 73.
78 Salary data was provided by the Executive Office of the Department of Justice Antitrust Divi-
sion. Telephone Interview with Executive Office, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice (Jan. 2010); see also
Salaries, Promotions, and Benefits, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/oarm/arm/hp/hpsalary.htm (last visited July 25, 2010).
79 Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [T.D.L.C.] [Defense of Free Competition Tribun-
al], 31 enero 2008, "Falabella/D&S," Rol de la causa: 199-07, Resoluci6n No. 24-2008 (Chile).
80 id.
81 Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [T.D.L.C.] [Defense of Free Competition Tribun-
al], 5 agosto 2005, "Chiletabacos/Phillip Morris," Sentencia No. 26-2005 (Chile).
82 Id.
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ma,83 was a joint abuse of dominance/collusion case involving retail
stores.'
The problem with the Chilean system is that the issue of a generalized
judiciary lacking antitrust expertise has not disappeared. Rather, the mal-
function has only moved from a lower judicial level to the Chilean Supreme
Court. In two cases involving tacit collusion, the Chilean Supreme Court
overturned the TDLC, despite the validity of the TDLC's economic analy-
sis.85 That the generalist Chilean Supreme Court has overruled the TDLC on
highly procedural grounds has chilled the TDLC in its own decision mak-
ing. The TDLC has changed the way it decides cases when the possibility
exists for the Chilean Supreme Court to overrule its decision, even when
the application of economics to the law suggests an alternative outcome.6
In the United States, the best analogy to a specialized antitrust court is
the Federal Circuit. Congress established the Federal Circuit in 1982 in an
attempt to bring uniformity, predictability, expertise, and better decision
making to patent law.87 Some academics suggest that the Federal Circuit
succeeded in these regards.8" However, another strand of writing suggests
that the institutional design of the Federal Circuit is fundamentally flawed
because of the lack of judicial diversity, which creates an absence of juri-
sprudential diversity.89 Whether judicial diversity is important seems to be
in part a function of whether a scholar believes the court reaches the "right"
result in its decisions.'
In the United States, the judiciary as an antitrust institution has a num-
ber of different components. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the judi-
ciary involves generalist judges deciding complex antitrust cases. One poss-
83 Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [T.D.L.C.] [Defense of Free Competition Tribun-
al], 10 abril 2008, "Guerra del Plasma," Sentencia No. 63-2008 (Chile).
84 Id.
85 E.g., Cruz & Zarate, supra note 5, at 171; Gonzilez, supra note 5, at 199-201.
86 Cruz & Zarate, supra note 5, at 187.
87 S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5-6 (1981).
88 E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes
of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788-89 (2008); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:
A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 800 (2004); Lee Petherbridge
& R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of
Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2084 (2007); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal
Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1156
(2004).
89 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1619, 1627 (2007) ("[Slupporters of the creation of the Federal Circuit made a key mistake in
too easily concluding that if having thirteen appellate courts with jurisdiction over patent appeals created
too much inconsistency and diversity, then the correct solution was to centralize all authority into one
court.").
90 See Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 464 (2009) (find-
ing that the Federal Circuit has a diversity ofjurisprudence).
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ible solution to this problem is to implement specialized antitrust courts, but
these courts in turn have their own strengths and weaknesses.
C. Antitrust Agencies
1. Agency Capacity
A well-functioning antitrust agency can effectively combat anticompe-
titive conduct. However, such an outcome assumes that an antitrust agency
has the ability to identify anticompetitive conduct and to bring both en-
forcement and non-enforcement (such as competition advocacy) actions. A
number of factors affect the ability of an agency to do so. These include the
legal structure of antitrust, human resources within the agency, and an
agency's capacities within the larger, country-wide regulatory system.9
It is important to measure the impact of an antitrust agency.92 Ulti-
mately, the institution must have a coherent system for setting priorities.
One way to set priorities is to perform a self-diagnostic or self-study to re-
view past successes and failures.93 In a sports context, this would be akin to
reviewing a video of how a hitter approaches each at-bat to analyze any
flaws in mechanics of the swing or strategy against each pitcher. Without
these self-studies, an agency will not understand its own strengths and
weaknesses or its ability to successfully undertake certain types of work."4
Yet self-studies are costly. They require significant time and resources,
which would be diverted away from enforcement and advocacy. In the short
term, such self-study does not result in quick "wins" for the agency. In the
short term, self-studies are politically and financially costly, even if the
long-term benefits prove substantial.
While there has been an increased push towards performance bench-
marks in antitrust,95 such benchmarks are more difficult to quantify in anti-
trust than in other regulatory fields. This difficulty stems from endogeneity
concerns. Those issues in which antitrust enforcement or advocacy may
91 William Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Econo-
mies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 301-02
(2001); D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable
Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 Ct-i.-KENT L. REV. 231,242 (2008).
92 Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165,
165-66 (2005).
93 Kovacic, supra note 25, at 923-24.
94 Id. at 905-06.
95 THE COMPETITION POL'Y IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
REPORT ON THE AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT SECOND PHASE-EFFECTIVENESS OF DECISIONS 7
(2009).
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play a role also may be affected by sector regulation, trade agreements, or
new legislation.' Determining causality is very difficult.'
One way to measure the success of a country's antitrust system might
be to benchmark the system globally against peers. In college football, there
are polls to determine which teams are better. Does such indexing make
sense in the global antitrust context? Creating an effective rating is diffi-
cult.9" One reason that indexing effectiveness presents challenges is that
such a measurement portends a single "right" way in which to prioritize and
enforce antitrust law. Competition enforcement simply does not fit easily
into this framework.
Antitrust enforcement contains nothing akin to the win-loss record,
strength of conference opponents, and the margin of victory methods of
comparison found in games. One recent DOJ official stated, "[a]nti-cartel
enforcement is our top priority at the Department of Justice, and we believe
it should be a top priority for every antitrust agency."" Despite the allure of
such a strong and clear position, it is not obvious that cartel enforcement
should be the priority for every antitrust agency."° That is, the allocation of
scarce resources towards enforcement vis-d-vis the payoff is likely to differ
across nations and regions. Detection and litigation costs are not the same
in every jurisdiction.' Merger control is almost always situation-specific,
and it changes in response to technical advances, political shifts, and eco-
nomic growth. Agency priorities are also a function of the local conditions
in a particular countty.
96 Omar Licandro & Antonio Navas-Ruiz, Trade Liberalization, Competition and Growth 2-3
(Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille, Working Paper No. 2007-18,
2007), available at http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Licandro/navasl 10907.pdf.
97 See D. Daniel Sokol, Law and Development-The Way Forward or Just Stuck in the Same
Place?, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 238,240 (2010).
98 D. Daniel Sokol, Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust
Can Learn from Restaurant Guides, 41 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 577, 578 (2010).
99 Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks
on Antitrust Enforcement Priorities and Efforts Towards International Cooperation at the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 2 (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/208479.pdf,
see also Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address
on Cartel Enforcement in the United States (and Beyond) 9-10 (Feb. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speechesl221868.pdf. There is an institutional element to such claims.
The DOJ pushes cartel enforcement because it undertakes such enforcement, whereas the FTC does not
undertake criminal cartel enforcement. Similarly, FTC officials tend to focus on the strength of competi-
tion advocacy, which they undertake, but DOJ does not. See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd
J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1091-
92 (2005); Kovacic, supra note 25, at 920-2 1.
100 Frederic Jenny, Cartels and Collusion in Developing Countries: Lessons from Empirical Evi-
dence, 29 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 109, 109 (2006).
101 See Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International Car-
tels Though Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 7), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1291844.
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For the most part, changes in antitrust enforcement are incremental. 102
There is also an element of path dependence to agencies.' 3 However, as an
agency's needs shift, the changes the agency must make to achieve its goals
increase significantly."° In times of crisis, larger-scale change is possible.
Yet agencies still require constant tinkering, even after significant change in
institutional design, because outside events cause institutions to evolve. In a
business context, firms innovate or they fail. They fail either through takeo-
ver or through bankruptcy. Institutional design within the firm will change
based on the organization's internal and external needs. °5 Government is
different. Agencies, for the most part, tend to grow in scope and size.'"
Rather than reduce the number of agencies, bureaucracy often creates new
layers to existing agencies or creates new agencies altogether to move
beyond the current limitations and malfunctions in the existing institutional
design and practice.0 7 This, however, does not solve the problem in the
long term. It merely adds to the patchwork of overlapping authority and
creates the potential for problems to reemerge in the future.
2. Antitrust Agency Public Choice Concerns
Public choice affects antitrust agencies as it does other facets of gov-
ernment. That is, antitrust is not immune from political concerns.0 8 Public
choice considerations limit the role that agencies can play to reduce or elim-
inate government-created and facilitated anticompetitive restraints."° These
limits are based on the capacity of an antitrust agency and the agency's
ability to use its political capital. For example, there is a flip side to compe-
tition advocacy. Competition advocacy can be used to limit government-
created anticompetitive distortions. In this sense, competition advocacy
may be politically controversial and risky. Competition advocacy exposes
102 Kovacic, supra note 25, at 925.
103 Fabrizio Gilardi, The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7
Sectors, I I SWISS POL. SC. REV. 139, 143 (2005).
104 Michael Krakowski, Competition Policy Works: The Effect of Competition Policy on the Inten-
sity of Competition-An International Cross-Country Comparison 13-14 (Hamburg Inst. of Int'l Econ.,
HWWA Discussion Paper No. 332, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=854908.
105 See MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN & CHARLES A. O'REILLY III, WINNING THROUGH INNOVATION: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEADING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND RENEWAL 46-47 (1997).
106 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 41 (1971).
107 MUELLER, supra note 13, at 359-85.
108 See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Transatlantic Economic Governance: The Domains and Dimensions
of Competition Law, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AMID
DISCORD, 81, 93 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2005) ("The assumption that antitrust
officials are strongly influenced by political considerations is encouraged by US antitrust history.").
109 D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special
Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 127 (2009).
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antitrust agencies to criticism and potential retribution from interest groups,
captured legislators, and other governmental actors."'
Both antitrust's statutory authority and each country's current policy
outlook are functions of policy choice discretion. Antitrust agencies must
take into account their political capital and how to expend it vis-a-vis other
government actors, states, and privately-owned enterprises that wield sig-
nificant political power."' These public choice calculations color how
agencies order their enforcement priorities. Agency discretion through
agency inaction illustrates the limits of competition advocacy and other
forms of antitrust enforcement against public restraints.
The history of U.S. antitrust enforcement illustrates public choice con-
cerns. In 1890, Congress enacted antitrust legislation at the federal level." 2
At its very roots, antitrust emerged in part as a result of political bargaining.
Some of the rationale behind the Sherman Act was to protect producer in-
terests against more efficient large-scale operations. "' To think that anti-
trust is not influenced by political interests naively suggests that public
choice theory applies in other regulatory settings but not antitrust.
In some instances, antitrust enforcers may be subject to capture. "' An-
titrust agencies may act politically in a number of ways. Agencies are polit-
ical players that attempt to increase their size and power. "' Agencies may
110 See Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, supra note 99, at 1103.
111 Donald 1. Baker, Antitrust and Politics at the Justice Department, 9 J.L. & POL. 291, 291
(1993) ("Antitrust and politics are inevitably intertwined, not only in the United States but in any coun-
try having an effective antitrust program.").
112 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). Though Canada enacted its national competition law
one year prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act, there was no corresponding subfederal Canadian
legislation analogous to state antitrust laws in the United States that preceded the national law.
113 RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992 15 (1996) (Sherman's
faction had greater concern with "industrial liberty" than consumer welfare); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The
Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 73, 75 (1985); Thomas
W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 263, 273-74
(1992); Fred S. McChesney, Economics Versus Politics in Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 133,
136 (1999); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1985). Richard
Hofstadter suggests that the enactment of the Sherman Act was based on some political economy con-
cers but that some of the goals of the drafters of the Sherman Act were political, moral, social, and
based on notions of "competition" and populism. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust
Movement, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1965), reprinted in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 23-24 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed.,
1991). Other scholars who have extensively studied the early period of U.S. antitrust also suggest that
public choice is not a complete explanation for the motivations of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., WILLIAM
LETWlN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT 53-100 (1981); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1955).
114 Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 & n.90
(1997) (recounting that Reagan asked the DOJ to drop an investigation of British Airways as a favor to
Prime Minister Thatcher).
115 MUELLER, supra note 13, at 523.
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act politically in case selection. The more high profile the case successfully
brought, the greater the potential rewards are for antitrust lawyers going
forward as they advance within government or exit government for private
practice. "' Cases not brought are equally important. Agencies may choose
not to bring difficult cases because they could result in a defeat. A decision
against the agency may affect the future budget of the agency and the quali-
ty of its staff."7 Antitrust agencies also may be chilled from bringing a case,
if in doing so they threaten the interests of government officials that have
budgetary or oversight authority over the agency." 8 For example, when an
enforcer rules the "wrong" way because she looks to efficiency rather than
industrial policy concerns, political repercussions may ensue." 9
Both the executive and the legislative branches may push the antitrust
agencies toward certain goals. Antitrust agencies face potential cuts in
funding if their enforcement and non-enforcement priorities are inconsistent
with Congressional wishes. Such threats limit the potential scope of agency
decision making.' Similarly, the executive branch may try to influence the
DOJ Antitrust Division to push an enforcement agenda based on its own
policy agenda.' 2 ' The antitrust bar may also influence the antitrust agen-
cies.2 Prestige in the eyes of the practitioner community and potential pri-
vate firm opportunities after government service may shape some agency
decision making at both staff and leadership levels of the antitrust agen-
cies. '23
3. How Many Antitrust Agencies Are Optimal?
Most antitrust systems around the world have one agency, and in many
countries that agency is independent. Overall, the literature on agencies
suggests that independent agencies are better suited to dealing with both
116 McChesney, supra note 113, at 140-41.
117 Sokol, supra note 109, at 146.
118 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
Do IT 181-85 (1989) (discussing how government executives protect their "turf'). The DOJ/FTC had to
drop a proposed Memorandum of Agreement on merger enforcement when Senator Ernest Hollings,
because of interest group pressure, threatened budget cuts to DOJ/FTC if the two did not drop the
agreement.
119 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust
Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 623-25 (1982).
120 Baker,supra note IlI, at291.
121 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1375, 1448-50 (2009) (providing details of Nixon's political use of the Antitrust Division).
122 D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 12-18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracti 624956.
123 Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2000) (explaining the "revolving door" between public admin-
istration and private industry more broadly).
1074 [VOL. 17:4
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1074 2009-2010
2010] ANTITRUST, INSTITUTIONS, AND MERGER CONTROL 1075
time consistency and credible commitment problems. 24 Such advantages
exist because independent agencies are more insulated from political pres-
sures and less likely to succumb to the majoritarian impulse of unpopular
decisions. 125 Legislatures reduce decision-making costs by creating an ex-
pert agency that has specific knowledge of regulation. Independent agencies
also enhance the credibility of policy commitments because they are better
shielded from political influence than executive agencies. 26 The political
pressures from which independence shields an agency are both majoritarian
pressure (i.e., populist pressure) 127 and public choice/capture pressure from
interest groups regulated by the agency.
21
Majoritarianism arises when majority parties cannot precommit to
policies post-election.' 29 Moreover, it occurs when the majority party fails
to include the preferences of the minority party in policymaking.'30 In an
antitrust context, majoritarian anticompetitive restraints may result in legis-
lation that creates price controls.' It also may push executive agencies to
respond to predatory pricing allegations suboptimally by punishing firms
124 See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A
Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201, 231-32 (1994)
(discussing the success of independent regulators in the U.K. versus other countries).
125 Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian
Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POL. 1, 4 (2002). But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of
the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REv. 53, 55 (2008) ("[A] moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation
alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymak-
ing.").
126 E.g., St~phane Jacobzone, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Designing Independent and
Accountable Regulatory Authorities: A Comparative Overview Across OECD Countries, in DESIGNING
INDEPENDENT AND ACCOUNTABLE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES FOR HIGH QUALITY REGULATION 33,
33 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/I5/28/35028836.pdf Giandomenico Majone, The
Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. POL. 77, 84 (1994); Antonio Estache & David Mar-
timort, Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions 2 (World Bank Econ. Dev.
Inst., Pol'y Research Working Paper No. 2073, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=620512.
127 For this reason, the Supreme Court has shown concern about the excesses of majoritarianism.
William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political
Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373, 399 (1988) ("The Court is
correct in its concern to police legislative infringements of the political rights of minorities, because
there is nothing inherent in the legislative or representative process that prevents such infringement.").
128 Jon Stern & Stuart Holder, Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of
Regulatory Systems 8 (London Bus. Sch. Reg. Initiative, Regulation Initiative Discussion Paper No. 20,
1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=321421.
129 Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q.
J. ECON. 1239, 1265 (2005) (discussing the majoritarian bias that results when national parties cannot
precommit to a policy).
130 Id. at 1265-66.
131 See, e.g., Claudio Monteiro Considera & Paulo Corra, The Political Economy of Antitrust in
Brazil: From Price Control to Competition Policy, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY:
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW 2001 (Barry Hawk ed., 2001).
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that charge low prices.'32 Yet low prices are exactly what one wants in the
market because they likely result from fierce competition.
The United States operates differently in terms of agency structure
than most antitrust systems. There are two federal agencies: the DOJ and
the FTC. The former is an executive agency, and the latter is an indepen-
dent agency with both competition and consumer protection missions.
There is much overlap and some differences between the two agencies. The
FTC undertakes competition advocacy.'33 It also focuses enforcement on
certain industries (e.g., supermarkets, oil and gas), whereas the DOJ has an
antitrust cartel unit and focuses enforcement on other industries (e.g., air-
lines, banking)." Agency overlap has always been an issue in the United
States. However, two recent developments have exacerbated tensions be-
tween the two agencies. These developments support a need for a compara-
tive institutional analysis. The first issue relates to a divergence in practice
for merger standards between Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and Section 7
of the Clayton Act. The second development is in the area of single-firm
conduct and the differences between Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act.
The potential for divergence between the FTC and the DOJ on mergers
has always existed.'35 Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, to meet the bur-
den for a preliminary injunction, the enforcers must show that the merger
"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopo-
ly."'36 Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC has a lower burden of
proof. 137 This is the "serious and substantial" standard. 138 The recent Federal
Trade Commission v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.'39 decision changed the
standard for granting a preliminary injunction in noting that the FTC should
be able to get injunctive relief more easily under 13(b)."' As explained by
the D.C. Circuit, the FTC can readily meet this lower standard and likely
132 William J. Baumol, Principles Relevant to Predatory Pricing, in THE PROS AND CONS OF Low
PRICES 15, 15 (2003).
133 Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, supra note 99, at 1091.
134 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP
GUIDE TO U.S. AND FOREIGN MERGER REVIEW apps. 9-1 to -13 (3d ed. 2006) (providing a list of sectors
of agency expertise).
135 See generally FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("This court and
others have suggested that the standard for likelihood of success on the merits is met if the FTC 'has
raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair
ground for thorough investigation ....' (quoting FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co., 587 F.2d 1225, 1229
(D.C. Cir. 1978))); D. Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past,
Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 320-25 (2003) (providing a historical analysis of the
development of administrative litigation at the FTC).
136 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
137 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
138 Id. at 1049.
139 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
'40 Id. at 1034-35.
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block most deals with a preliminary injunction, or even the threat of prelim-
inary injunction.'4
Courts apply a four-part preliminary injunction test under Section 15
of the Clayton Act, the most important of which is the likelihood of success
on the merits.'42 Whole Foods signaled a change from this approach for the
FTC. Under the D.C. Circuit's analysis from Whole Foods, the FTC must
demonstrate that a merger presents "questions going to the merits so se-
rious, substantial, difficult[,] and doubtful as to make them fair grounds for
thorough investigation [by the FTC]" to reach the preliminary injunction
threshold.'43 FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc.'" reaffirmed this lower threshold
for the FTC. 14 It stated the "precedents irrefutably teach that [for the FTC]
'likelihood of success on the merits' has a less substantial meaning than in
other preliminary injunction cases."'"
The preliminary injunction decisions must be read in conjunction with
FTC v. Inova Health System Foundation,47 a case that demonstrates the
agency's institutional move of pushing merger challenges out of the court
system and into FTC adjudication.' The switch to increased use of Part 3
adjudication, 49 considering the time involved from the ALJ to the Commis-
sion and then to the Court of Appeals, reduces the appetite of firms to liti-
gate merger challenges. 5 ° These recent decisions have given the FTC sig-
nificant leverage to dictate their merger terms to potentially merging firms.
These divergent outcomes across agencies affect the business planning and
the merging parties' bargaining positions with the agencies in terms of
possible divestitures or other concessions that parties might offer in ex-
change for merger approval."'
141 Transcript of Responses to Qualitative Survey (on file with author).
142 United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D.D.C. 1993).
143 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035 (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009).
145 Id. at 35.
146 Id.at36 n.l.
147 No. 1:08CV460-CMH/JFA (E.D. Va. May 12, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610166/080513complaint.pdf.
148 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Reflections on Procedure at the Federal
Trade Commission (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080925rosch
reflections.pdf (discussing developments at the FTC to litigate cases in administrative courts and not
federal courts).
149 Part 3 adjudication allows the FTC to pursue an enforcement action within the FTC's own
adjudicatory structure, which involves an ALJ issuing an initial decision and then an appeal to the
Commission for de novo review. See Hoffman & Royall, supra note 135, at 322-25.
150 Transcript of Responses to Qualitative Survey (on file with author).
151 Transactions abandoned by the parties, in the past year, in the face of FTC opposition or merely
full-investigation include: (1) Newpark and CCS (oil-drilling waste disposal services; abandoned after
lawsuit filed by FTC); Herff Jones/AAC (class rings; abandoned in the face of challenge);
CRH/Pavestone (concrete hardscape products; abandoned in the face of challenge); CCC/Mitchell (auto-
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Timing is an important factor in whether or not a deal will be con-
summated from a business perspective. Delay can be fatal to a deal because
it creates uncertainty.' This distracts the merging parties' managers from
their day-to-day operations. Delay also presents problems for customers, as
they are less willing to sign additional contracts without knowledge of a
potentially significant change for a company in the long term.'53 Competi-
tors may try to poach customers or managers because of the uncertainty.' 4
By undermining business planning, different substantive standards pose a
threat to the antitrust system. Timing also plays into clearance battles be-
tween the agencies. For example, the DOJ may ask for a secondary request,
when it might not have otherwise done so if it had not fought with the FTC
over which agency should get clearance for most of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
("HSR") review's thirty-day window. As the Antitrust Modernization
Commission observed, divergent standards also decrease public confidence
in the U.S. antitrust system."' This Article does not address what the ap-
repair databases and software; abandoned after FTC wins in court); CSLITalecris (blood plasma; aban-
doned in the face of challenge); Thoratec/HeartWare (ventricular assist devices; abandoned in face of
challenge); Utz/Snyder (salty snacks; abandoned during investigation); Endocare/Galil (prostate and
renal cancer treatment; abandoned during investigation); and Carilion Clinic (medical clinics; agreement
to divest already-acquired outpatient center). See Press Release, Newpark Res., Inc., Newpark Re-
sources and CCS, Inc. Mutually Agree to Terminate the Sale of Newpark's U.S. Environmental Services
Business (Nov. 24, 2008) (on file with the George Mason Law Review) (Newpark and CCS); Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of FTC's Bureau of Competition Regarding Announcement
that Herff Jones and American Achievement Group Have Terminated Their Acquisition Agreement
(Dec. 8, 2008) (on file with the George Mason Law Review) (Herff Jones/AAC); Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Statement of the FTC's Bureau of Competition Regarding the Announcement that
Oldcastle Architectural, Inc. Will Not Proceed with its Proposed Acquisition of the Pavestone Compa-
nies (Jan. 15, 2009) (on file with the George Mason Law Review) (CRH/Pavestone); Press Release,
Mitchell Int'l, Inc., CCC-Mitchell Mutually Agree to Terminate Merger (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with
the George Mason Law Review) (CCC-Mitchell); Press Release, CSL Ltd., CSL and Talecris Biothera-
peutics Agree to Terminate Merger Agreement (Sept. 6, 2009) (on file with the George Mason Law
Review) (CSL/Talecris); Press Release, Thoratec Corp., Thoratec Corporation and HeartWare Interna-
tional, Inc. Announce Termination of Proposed Transaction (July 31, 2009) (on file with the George
Mason Law Review) (Thoratec/HeartWare); Snyder's and Utz Throw in the Chips: Pa. Companies
Point to FTC Review as Merger Talks End, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 6, 2009, at 14A (Utz/Snyder); Press
Release, Galil Med. Ltd., Endocare and Galil Medical Announce Settlement of Litigation (July 7, 2009)
(on file with the George Mason Law Review) (Endocare/Galil); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Commission Order Restores Competition Eliminated by Carilion Clinic's Acquisition of Two Outpa-
tient Clinics (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with the George Mason Law Review) (Carilion Clinic). Thanks to
Ken Glazer for pointing me to these transactions.
152 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 139 (2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/reportrecommendation/amcfinal report.pdf [hereinaf-
ter AMC REPORT].
153 See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, The
International Competition Network Guiding Principles for Merger Review 3 (Sept. 20, 2002), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200234.pdf.
154 See id.
155 AMC REPORT, supra note 152, at 13 1.
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propriate standard should be as a normative question. It merely notes that
there is room to debate what the appropriate unified preliminary injunction
standard for merger review ought to be. This Article, however, does make
the normative claim that a split-level system of standards creates an unsus-
tainable institutional framework in the long term.'56
A similar unsustainable institutional issue exists with regard to single-
firm conduct. The standards under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 2
of the Sherman Act are distinct. 57 This Article does not suggest that Section
5 cannot be construed to cover conduct that is not covered under Section 2.
Case law and legislative history suggest that such an interpretation is possi-
ble. ' This Article merely points to the fact that-just as with merger con-
duct-having two agencies with two separate standards for firm conduct is
not a long-term, sustainable equilibrium.
An expansive reading of Section 5 allows the FTC to prohibit conduct
that the DOJ cannot. It does so with language that might take on non-
economic justifications, as in prohibiting conduct that is "unjust," "oppres-
sive," or "immoral."'59 Under Section 5, there is the institutional bias that
favors the Commission's position in administrative litigation. ' 6 For in-
stance, in cases with disputed facts, the FTC won all Sherman Act cases in
administrative adjudication. 6' Moreover, when taken in its totality, the
Commission has a winning record of 95 percent.162 The dynamics of FTC
administrative litigation and the potential pressure on parties to settle are
functions of the Commission's success rate.
The divergence between the DOJ and the FTC leads to a basic ques-
tion. Why should the United States have two agencies? The current agency
structure is a function of historical accident and path dependency. The two
agencies have certain redundancies.'63 If one were to design U.S. antitrust
156 Additional developments have changed the nature of merger review between the two agencies.
The FTC made revisions to its Part 3 rules that changed the playing field regarding preliminary injunc-
tions. Now the Commission will be more aggressive, even as the Inova case suggests, because of the
procedural changes that increase its power in its adjudicatory role. See Jeffrey W. Brennan & Sean P.
Pugh, Inova andthe FTC's Revamped Merger Litigation Model, ANTITRUST, Fall 2008, at 28, 28.
157 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Wading Into Pandora's Box: Thoughts On
Unanswered Questions Concerning the Scope and Application of Section 2 & Some Further Observa-
tions on Section 5 19 (Oct. 3, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091003roschlecg
speech.pdf.
158 Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 244-47 (1979).
159 Robert H. Lande, Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Using 'Consumer Choice' Analysis,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, February 2009, at 1,2.
160 Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative
State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 707 (2009).
161 A. DOUGLAS MELAMUD, COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
WORKSHOP CONCERNING SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT 19 (2008).
162 Id.
163 AMC REPORT, supra note 152, at 132.
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from scratch, very few would suggest replicating the current structure. Gen-
erally, such a reevaluation is very difficult politically. For example, the
Antitrust Modernization Commission stated, "[t]he Commission recom-
mends no comprehensive change to the existing system in which both the
FTC and the DOJ enforce the antitrust laws."' 64
There are a number of different alternatives to the existing structure.
One option involves creating a single antitrust agency. For example, the
FTC could undertake all competition functions, and the DOJ could continue
to conduct criminal enforcement, but with the abolition of the Antitrust
Division.' 5 A number of countries separate criminal functions from other,
more technical antitrust enforcement functions in their institutional de-
sign." Another alternative structure would look like that of energy regula-
tion in the United States between the Department of Energy and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission.'67 In such a model, the DOJ would under-
take distinct activity, and the FTC would become an independent agency
housed within the DOJ. Another alternative would be to abolish the FTC
and move its competition functions to the DOJ, keeping the FTC as a stand-
alone consumer protection agency with a policy/advocacy arm and a re-
search arm.
Antitrust agencies are integral to the success of the enforcement re-
gime. Agency efficacy is difficult to evaluate, and institutional change typi-
cally occurs slowly over time. Like other government entities, antitrust
agencies face public choice constraints. The United States maintains two
antitrust agencies, which creates confusion due to differing substantive
standards and also creates certain redundancies. Alternatives to the current
system include dividing enforcement responsibilities between the two agen-
cies or housing the FTC within the DOJ.
D. Public Versus Private Rights ofAction
Most litigation to enforce federal statutes in the United States is done
through private rights rather than by government action.'68 This general
'64 Id. at 129.
165 This also might have repercussions as to whether or not there would be private rights.
166 This occurs in both common law (e.g., Canada, U.K.) and civil law (e.g., Japan, Chile) circums-
tances. See Competition Act, R.S.C. 2010, c. C-34 (Can.); Harry First & Tadashi Shiraishi, Concen-
trated Power: The Paradox ofAntitrust in Japan 7 (N. Y. Univ. School of Law, N. Y. Univ. L. & Econ.
Working Papers No. 11, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.orgcgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1013&context-nyulewp (discussing how public prosecutors prosecute criminal acts under
Japan's Antimonopoly Act).
167 42 U.S.C. § 7134 (2006).
168 Scan Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers
System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 823 (2008).
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observation holds for antitrust as well. 69 Agencies may be resource-limited
or under-aggressive in enforcement.'70 In a private rights system, an agency
may not need to spend as many resources to remedy certain types of anti-
competitive conduct because private litigants may serve as a substitute for
any non-enforcement by the antitrust agency.' 7 This complementary role of
public and private rights may be by design. The legislative intent of private
rights might be to shift the cost of enforcement from government to private
parties. '72
There are a number of different theoretical approaches to private rights
in antitrust that address the pros and cons of such a system. Richard Posner
makes the case that private damages in antitrust could result in antitrust
over-enforcement."' More generally, private rights might be overly costly
and distort the sort of norms that government-based enforcement creates. '
Dan Crane argues that the structure of private enforcement in the United
States is ineffective on both compensation and deterrence grounds."' The
alternative case is that public and private antitrust should work together to
address anticompetitive conduct because dual enforcement leads to better
outcomes. '76
A number of theoretical articles suggest that private enforcement is
neutral for the antitrust system.' Others argue that private enforcement
may lead to increased social welfare if there is a sufficiently large damage
multiple.'78 Some theoretical reasons support private rights in antitrust.
These include making the plaintiff whole, preventing unjust enrichment,
169 Institutional analysis would be different in countries without private rights.
170 On the make-up of antitrust laws across legal systems and what they include, see Keith N.
Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition
Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 272-73 (2007).
171 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis
of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 905 (2008).
172 Farhang, supra note 168, at 827; see Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Bridging the Gap Be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and the Erosion of the American Rule Govern-
ing Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 38 W. POL. Q. 238, 240 (1985); see also ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 45-46 (2001) (discussing private individuals
bearing the costs of civil rights enforcement).
173 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 35 (1976).
174 See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1193, 1320-21 (1982).
175 Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 678-98
(2010).
176 Spencer Weber Waller, Towards a Constructive Public-Private Partnership to Enforce Compe-
tition Law, 29 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 367, 368 (2006).
177 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Private Information and the Deterrent Effect ofAntitrust Damage
Remedies, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 386 (1988); Stephen W. Salant, Treble Damage Awards in Private
Lawsuits for Price Fixing, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1326, 1330 (1987).
178 See David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium
and Private Antitrust Enforcement, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 870, 883 (1990).
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and creating incentives for private plaintiffs to bring cases when they pos-
sess better information than the government.'79 However, there are also
costs to the private rights system. These include, but are not limited to,
whether to allow recovery by indirect purchasers as a result of Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois,'" and using treble damages as an incentive to bring meritless
claims that can be settled for profit.'8 '
There may be substitutability between private and public enforcement.
In McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon's recent theoretical article, a firm is initial-
ly better informed than the government about its competitor's possible anti-
trust violations, but the government's incentives are better aligned with
those of society, as compared to the firm, since the firm may be incenti-
vized to strategically abuse the antitrust laws."' They assume that the gov-
ernment chooses whether to litigate before the firm does.'83 In this context,
when private and public enforcement are potentially both in play, public
enforcement tends to give way to private enforcement. 8" In most cases,
firms have sufficient incentive to sue if they learn that their rivals have ac-
tually violated the antitrust laws. Knowing this, the government has little
reason to sue, since it can expect that most worthy suits have already been
privately initiated.'85
Private rights of action create a dynamic interplay between public and
private antitrust enforcement. Given the importance and potential conse-
quences of public and private litigation, the lack of systematic empirical
study of the interaction between public and private litigation is remarkable.
In 1985, an important set of empirical articles emerged from the George-
town conference on private antitrust litigation.'86 Data collected from all
private antitrust actions filed from 1973 to 1983 in five federal district
179 Franklin M. Fisher, Economic Analysis and Antitrust Damages, 29 WORLD COMPETITION L. &
ECON. REV. 383, 383 (2006).
180 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
181 Fisher, supra note 179, at 383, 391-92.
182 R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Private v. Public Antitrust Enforce-
ment: A Strategic Analysis, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1863, 1864 (2008).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special Atten-
tion to Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW
EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 185 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988); Kenneth G. Elzinga & William C.
Wood, The Costs of the Legal System in Private Antitrust Enforcement, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING, supra, at 107; Jeffrey M. Perloff& Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING, supra, at 149; Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: Introduc-
tion and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING, supra, at 3;
see also Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plain-
tiff, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 551 (1991).
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courts formed the empirical basis of the articles. To date, this has been the
most important set of empirical studies on private rights.'
Since that study, empirical work on private rights has been limited
primarily to case studies.'88 A number of quantitative articles study DOJ
enforcement.189 These studies are incomplete because they do not examine
the interplay of public and private antitrust. However, no robust empirical
work has been done to answer questions related to whether public and pri-
vate litigation primarily act as complements (broadly defined) or substi-
tutes.
Given the limitations of empirical work in this area, how does one as-
sess the strengths and weaknesses of private rights to better refine theory?
Let us consider the following question at a broad overview level in the area
of monopolization. If public antitrust monopolization litigation decreases,
does this lead to an increase or decrease in private monopolization litiga-
tion? The answer is ambiguous in general. One scenario is that a decrease in
public actions results in a decrease in total private litigation due to a decline
in private follow-on litigation. In this scenario, public and private monopo-
lization litigation would be viewed as complements. A second scenario is
that as public antitrust actions decrease, the total private actions increase
due to an increase in independent private actions. In this scenario, public
and private litigation are substitutes.'9g
187 See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 186, at 554 & n.15.
188 See, e.g., Lande & Davis, supra note 171, at 879.
189 See, e.g., Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An
Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 76 (2000); Vivek Ghosal & Joseph Gallo, The Cyclical
Behavior of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Enforcement Activity, 19 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 27, 30
(2001); Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 365
(1970); Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust 21-22 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No.
5460, 2007), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5460/1/MPRA paper_5460.pdf.
190 Private and public enforcement are likely to be complements with regard to private suits piggy-
backing on public suits. Even if follow-on suits are excluded from the analysis, perhaps private and
public enforcement may still be either complements or substitutes. In a model where the government
moves before private parties, public enforcement might tend to give way to private enforcement, as
mentioned above. But in a model where private parties, who initially have superior information, move
before the government, an increase in private actions may be a signal of possible violations to the gov-
ernment, which may lead the government to increase scrutiny, which may in turn eventually increase
public actions. So, in the end, it is really an empirical issue whether private and public enforcement are
complements or substitutes. What exactly is meant by substitution is that private enforcement could
substitute for government enforcement, not that it would. For example, the Solicitor General wrote
amicus briefs in all of the three big unilateral conduct Supreme Court cases of recent vintage. Pac. Bell
Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1122 n.4 (2009); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 400 (2004). In all three cases, the Solicitor General wrote an
amicus brief for the defendant. Clearly the Solicitor General did not regard these private actions as
"complements," but it is not entirely clear that they should be thought of as substitutes either-if they
are, then they are highly-imperfect substitutes. The cases functioned as substitutes in the sense that
private parties were bringing them and not the government, but the government would not have brought
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Scholars have not undertaken an institutional analysis on whether a re-
duction in government enforcement results in substitution to other types of
enforcement, namely, private litigation. What is difficult to find is an ex-
ogenous shock to public enforcement to test the impact of reduced public
enforcement on the overall composition of antitrust actions. On the one
hand, it is not clear that Supreme Court case law is exogenous. After all, the
cases that are decided depend on what types of cases are being brought. For
example, Twombly appears very concerned with the costs associated with
low-quality private enforcement actions. 9' On the other hand, exogenous
shocks might affect Supreme Court case law. Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.92 serves as an example of a lawsuit bringing
case law in line with existing empirical economic studies.'93 To what end?
Might Leegin result in more private litigation over resale price maintenance
("RPM") relative to government enforcement? It is unclear. It may reduce
both public and private RPM litigation. Furthermore, there might be an
important effect from a disproportionate reduction in either private or pub-
lic enforcement changing the overall composition.
Along the same lines, how the FTC and the DOJ respond to significant
losses may play an important role in understanding why agencies bring few
cases. Some speculate that the DOJ was concerned about bringing, but not
winning, a merger case post-United States v. Oracle Corp.s"' The same
theory could hold for unilateral conduct. Unfortunately, there is probably
not enough "post" data to test the decline of public enforcement under the
Bush years as a causal dynamic. However, historically one might think that
a significant FTC/DOJ loss in a monopolization case might impact public
enforcement and provide a test for its impact on private enforcement. Such
empirical work has yet to be undertaken.
One of the biggest empirical challenges in understanding the dynamic
behavior between public and private rights of action is that firm behavior
and litigation decisions are not exogenous.'95 With respect to the latter, the
types of cases that the government or private actors chooses to bring will
presumably vary with their expectations about the likely rulings. So while
them at all in any event. When examining whether private and public suits are substitutes or comple-
ments, it is not clear for what they might be substitutes or complements. One question to ask is: will
more public suits crowd out or encourage private suits? That is of some interest, but more important is
the question of whether they are substitutes or complements for the purpose of optimally enforcing the
antitrust laws. Of course, this is a much harder question to answer.
191 See id. at 559.
192 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
193 See, e.g., James C. Cooper et al., A Comparative Study of United States and European Union
Approaches to Vertical Policy, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 289, 294 (2005).
'94 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 40,
at 235, 248-5 1.
'9' Idat257-58.
1084 [VOL. 17:4
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1084 2009-2010
ANTITRUST, INSTITUTIONS, AND MERGER CONTROL
more Democrat-appointed judges might mean that for a given case the
plaintiff is more likely to win, this might lead plaintiffs of all types to file
weaker cases.' 9 Even more importantly, the types of actions that a domi-
nant firm might undertake will be affected by anticipated litigation out-
comes. That is, they will be more likely to engage in behavior that is prob-
lematic under antitrust laws if they anticipate a more favorable Republican
judiciary. The relationship between public and private rights constitutes an
integral component of antitrust's institutional design, but the area suffers
from a dearth of empirical analysis.
E. Legislature
While the U.S. antitrust institutions---courts, agencies at both state and
federal levels, Congress, and the market-are mature, in recent years, im-
portant developments have created a need to reconsider the optimal institu-
tional structure of antitrust. Congress might try to overturn antitrust deci-
sions by the Supreme Court. Such may be the case with RPM post-Leegin.
Congress may provide explicit statutory exemptions from antitrust law. For
example, the government does not need to file antitrust HSR notification
when it acquires businesses.' As the government has taken an ownership
stake in financial institutions,'98 it seems odd that the government should
not be subject to the same antitrust review for competitive effects as private
firms.
To examine antitrust merely through antitrust law omits an important
variable-larger competition policy. In the United States, competition is-
sues in the financial and healthcare sectors, and potential legislation in
those areas, are important issues that cover the front pages of every news-
paper. Antitrust has a role both in understanding competition in these sec-
tors and in shaping legislative responses.9
196 See Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Advantage Defendant: Why Sinking Litiga-
tion Costs Makes Negative Expected- Value-Defenses but Not Negative-Expected- Value Suits Credible,
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2009) (explaining the calculations involved in plaintiff suits).
197 In 2008, the U.S. government gained control of numerous financial institutions, including a
near-80 percent stake in AIG without an HSR filing. One reason the government may not be required to
file is because it structures temporary acquisitions such as these in the form of loans and not permanent
acquisitions. See Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed's $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/businessl17insure.html (discussing various government
takeovers through loans).
198 E.g., J.W. Verret, Implications and Analysis of Government Shareholding in the Financial
Sector, MERCATUS ON POL'Y, Apr. 2009, at 1, available at http://mercatus.org/publication/implications-
and-analysis-govemment-shareholding-financial-sector.
199 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC
DRUG COMPETITION: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT passim (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
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One way to improve the legislative process to make it friendlier to
competition is through competition advocacy. Competition advocacy is the
process through which an agency produces speeches, testimony, and reports
to increase transparency in the legislative process.2 °" Antitrust agencies use
competition advocacy to influence legislation and regulation in an effort to
limit their potential anticompetitive effects.2"'
This process provides a more accurate estimate of the costs of regula-
tion for the general public. Competition advocacy thereby reduces the par-
ticipation costs of complex legislation... and also overcomes the public-
choice problem of legislative capture. 3 Competition advocacy may be a
cheaper solution than enforcement of antitrust laws in comparing resources
expended to results achieved.20" Increased transparency and interest in anti-
trust issues may force politicians to focus on competition. Because competi-
tion issues become important news items, interest groups will be more like-
ly to mobilize due to lower information costs. As an antitrust agency be-
comes more influential and increases its political legitimacy, consumers
will be increasingly likely to trust the agency and gather information for
possible cases."'
Liberalization across large parts of the economy involves an increase
in both legislation and rulemaking by administrative agencies to create a
more market-oriented regulatory regime. Competition advocacy allows for
an antitrust agency to influence the mechanisms and dynamics of govern-
ment regulation. In some situations, the intervention may be prior to the
enactment of a law or regulation. Competition advocacy as a tool to fight
unjustified government restraints is particularly important in the early stag-
es of government economic policies because of policy-choice path depen-
dence.2" Through advocacy, antitrust agencies may intervene in law and
regulation-making processes ex ante, when the cost of participation in the
process to create a procompetitive result is lower. Advocacy helps to over-
COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS: KEY FINDINGS passim (2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/22/43067294.pdf.
200 Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, supra note 99, at 1091 (providing an overview of competition
advocacy theory and practice).
201 See id. at 1105.
202 See id. at ll l l.
203 Advocacy is not limited merely to legislative interventions. Effective advocacy extends to
sector regulation, the judiciary, and in creating a "competition culture" for society.
204 Cooper, Pautler &Zywicki,supra note 99, at 1110-11.
205 See JOHN W. CLARK, COMPETITION ADVOCACY: CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
10 (2004), available at http://iadb.org/res/publications/pubfilestpubS-208.pdf ("[A] competition agen-
cy's reputation will be built largely upon its record in enforcing the competition law, and this reputation
will significantly affect its influence as an advocate in other forums.").
206 On path dependence generally, see EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC IDEAS:
PAST AND PRESENT (Pierre Garrouste & Stavros loannides eds., 2001).
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come legislative and administrative agency failure to create procompetitive
rules of play.2 °7
Competition advocacy may attempt to mitigate or eliminate existing
government restraints. In combating existing legislation and regulations,
competition advocacy allows for antitrust agencies to help countries transi-
tion from "temporary" policies.2 8 Without competition advocacy, such
measures become permanent and a hindrance to a competitive market.29 It
is more difficult to remove a law or regulation once it is in place.2"0 Howev-
er, competition advocacy that produces outputs, such as a report or a hear-
ing on anticompetitive regulation, increases the transparency of such regu-
lation and reveals the societal cost. This may reduce the costs of limiting
the legislation's reach as citizens may become mobilized to fight against
special interests.
The legislature interacts with agencies in complex ways.2 "' According
to one model, the legislature creates constraints upon agencies so that the
agencies create outcomes in policy that are palatable to the legislature.
12
Legislatures do so because by creating constraints to "lock in" agency be-
havior, the legislature can respond more effectively than by responding to
agency decisions that are inconsistent with Congress's position. 23 Empiri-
cal work that studies the FTC shows that this applies in the antitrust set-
ting.214 The President can play the same game with executive agencies.2 5
207 Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, supra note 99, at 1091-92.
208 Sokol, supra note 109, at 144-45.
209 CAPACITY BLDG. & COMPETITION POL'Y IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP: SUBGROUP 4,
INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION ADVOCACY IN REGULATED SECTORS: EXAMPLES OF
SUCCESS 48, 48-49 (2004).
210 See DAVID CURRIE & JOHN CUBBIN, REGULATORY CREEP AND REGULATORY WITHDRAWAL:
WHY REGULATORY WITHDRAWAL IS FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY 2 (2002), available at
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/-sm340/Consulting&Policy/Regulatory%20Withdrawal%2Report%2OO2O3
17.pdf ("More generally, there is a prevalent view that regulatory creep is inevitable; that regulators will
be unwilling to let go and indeed will be inclined to increase over time the range and scope of what they
control.").
211 See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 13, at 386-91. See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND
CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005) (analyzing the complexity
of the administrative state).
212 Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
432 (1989).
213 Id. at 441-43; see also Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
739,756 (1984) (explaining organization based upon a principal-agent model).
214 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The
Extent of Congressional Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 884, 884 (1986); William F. Shughart II, Jon D.
Silverman & Robert D. Tollison, Antitrust Enforcement and Foreign Competition, in THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 179, 183 (Fred S. McChesney &
William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); see also Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discre-
tion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL.
ECON. 765, 792-93 (1983) (concluding that the FTC was responsive to Congressional demands).
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Overall, the legislature has a key role in formulating antitrust institutional
design, and the antitrust agencies interact with the legislature in a number
of ways, including exerting influence over the legislators with competition
advocacy.
F. State Versus Federal Enforcement
Issues of federalism are at play in the U.S. antitrust system. What role,
if any, is there for state antitrust enforcement? The history of federal versus
state antitrust illustrates the complementarity of the two systems.2"6 Yet,
given the reinvigoration of state antitrust enforcement since the mid- 1990s,
the questions remain whether resource-poor state attorneys general ("AGs")
are merely "barnacles on the ship of federal antitrust,"2 7 as Posner claims,
or whether an important role for state antitrust enforcement exists? States
also differ in their capabilities across states and across legislation. Some
states allow for indirect purchaser suits under Illinois Brick, while others do
not.
2t 8
Professor Harry First has identified a number of different institutional
possibilities for state-level involvement in antitrust. 19 The first involves
stripping the states of their power to bring parens patriae suits. 20 The
second involves creating allocation rules between federal and state institu-
tions. 221 This is not as easy as it might appear, as the distinction between
local and national is not always clear. Similarly, allocation could be by type
of case.222 Yet a third option would involve first refusal rights by federal
215 Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1260 (2008); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2277-84 (2001); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1,3-7 (1995).
216 Andrew 1. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 658-60 (1993).
217 Douglas C. Nelson, Consumer News, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 123 (2004) (quoting
Jaret Seiberg, Checks and Imbalances, DAILY DEAL, July 26, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001) ("1
would like to see, first, the states stripped of their authority to bring antitrust suits, federal or state,
except under circumstances in which a private firm would be able to sue, as where the state is suing
firms that are fixing the prices of goods or services that they sell to the state.").
218 Andrew I. Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 167-68 (2009).
219 Harry First, Modernizing State Antitrust Enforcement: Making the Best of a Good Situation, 54
ANTITRUST BULL. 281, 286 (2009).
220 Id. at 286.
221 Id. at 287.
222 Id. at 288.
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enforcers, although First notes the problems with such rights, including who
gets to make the decision and when.223
One reason to support a reduced state role has to do with limited state
resources, and thus competency, relative to the federal government. 24 An
additional justification involves the greater propensity for special interest
capture of state enforcers relative to federal enforcers.225 Such limitations on
the part of the states may hurt optimal antitrust enforcement. States lack the
resources of federal enforcers in terms of budget and antitrust expertise.226
Moreover, states may be more likely to put local parochial interests ahead
of national consumer welfare. 227 These factors increase the possibility of
bad decision making in terms of what kinds of cases to bring. States have
incentives to piggyback onto national cases because the cases are high pro-
file and generate political rewards to the state AGs. 2" How much state in-
volvement adds in such cases is debatable. 29
In terms of institutional resource allocation, state involvement in fed-
eral enforcement of mergers or single-firm conduct cases may increase
coordination costs for potential resolution of the legal issue. 230 Central en-
forcement therefore may reduce compliance costs.
An alternative view is that state law is a substitute for federal en-
forcement, particularly for single-firm conduct. If we believe that cases
such as the NY Attorney General's investigation of Intel, which resulted in
a suit prior to the FTC suit against Intel, are representative of a larger trend,
states may be stepping into what they view as a federal enforcement gap:In
some areas, states do the sort of work that falls through federal cracks, such
223 Id. at 290-91.
224 See Robert Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
877, 888-90 (2003).
225 Posner, supra note 218, at 940-4 1.
226 Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 225, at 887-90; see also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H.
Angstreich, Multinational Merger Review: Lessons from Our Federalism, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 227-
28 (2000); Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Bal-
ance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047, 1072-73 (1990) ("[States should not challenge] specified exception-
ally large, truly national transactions, and transactions that primarily do not affect that state [in view of a
state's limited resources].").
227 Ginsburg & Angstreich, supra note 227, at 228.
228 See Posner, supra note 218, at 940-4I.
229 It is hotly contested whether the states added much in the Microsoft litigation. See Harry First,
Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004,
1032-34 (2001); see also Posner, supra note 218, at 940-42 (arguing for a decreased role of the states in
antitrust enforcement). Microsoft, however, may have been an exceptional case. Michael DeBow, State
Antitrust Enforcement: Empirical Evidence and a Modest Reform Proposal, in COMPETITION LAWS IN
CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 267, 268 (Richard A. Epstein & Mi-
chael S. Greve eds., 2004).
230 For example, the state role in the Microsoft litigation was costly. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra
note 225, at 878 ("[The state antitrust enforcement] lengthened the lawsuit, complicated the settlement
process, and increased both legal uncertainty and litigation costs.").
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as localized cartels and dominance cases."' States have better knowledge of
these subnational markets.23 As with general arguments regarding federal-
ism,233 state antitrust enforcement allows for greater experimentation across
policy choices. 34
G. Antitrust Versus Sector Regulation
Recent Supreme Court decisions in Credit Suisse Securities (USA)
LLC v. Billing235 and Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko236 concern how antitrust interacts with sector regulation competi-
tion issues. Sometimes regulators pursue antitrust objectives and antitrust
enforcers pursue regulatory objectives. Major deregulatory initiatives, such
as telecommunications or transportation, affect antitrust policy. The interre-
lationship of institutional choice on competition issues between antitrust
enforcers and sector regulators remains understudied quantitatively. 237
Overlapping regulation effectively means that there are multiple regu-
lators and each impacts the development of a particular sector. 23" When
231 See Kathleen E. Foote, State Antitrust Enforcement, in 2 ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 2009
(50TH ANNUAL) 747, 757-59 (2009).
232 Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673,
679-81 (2003).
233 For the Supreme Court's explanation for federalism, see, for example, John F. Manning, Fede-
ralism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2028
(2009).
234 First, supra note 220, at 295.
235 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
236 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
237 Much of the time, there is an endogeneity problem with measuring the impact of antitrust law in
sector regulation. This limits potential empirical projects. There are two possible cases that I identify in
which empirical work can be done to measure the impact of competition policy in which there is not the
sector regulation/antitrust overlap. These are (I) the extent (penetration) of cable television; and (2) the
choice of both-parties-pay in mobile services (i.e., the opposite of calling-party pays). Both developed
exogenously with respect to fixed-wire telephony. The first is a reflection of the degree to which gov-
ernments avoided building and protecting national broadcast services. The second is as a result of a
historical accident. To my knowledge, there is no academic work that studies the competition issues in
either circumstance.
238 When the sector regulator and antitrust agency have divergent views, it is difficult to measure
the impact of how much change one agency caused and not the other. A series of case studies underta-
ken by antitrust agencies provide some limited guidance on areas of potential complementarity or substi-
tutability between competition agencies and sector regulation. See, e.g., INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN REGULATED SECTORS WORKING GROUP, SUBGROUP 1: LIMITS AND
CONSTRAINTS FACING ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES INTERVENING IN REGULATED SECTORS 2-7 (2004)
[hereinafter ICN LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS], available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.orguploads/library/doc378.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-
Operation & Dev., Global Forum on Competition: Roundtable on Bringing Competition into Regulated
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concurrent jurisdiction exists, collaboration between sector and antitrust
authorities may not always be easy. Concurrent powers with sector regula-
tors may make it more difficult for antitrust agencies to create and maintain
a competitive environment in regulated sectors. Remedies available and
approaches to the creation of a competitive market may vary between sector
regulators and antitrust agencies. The task may be even more difficult in
dynamic markets where the market forces and regulations may evolve in
ways that are not predictable, such as in telecommunications.239 The prob-
lem of inconsistent decisions for the same conduct when there is not an
appropriate division of labor between sector regulator and antitrust authori-
ty may complicate efforts to create a more efficient competition system.24°
Public choice helps to explain how sector regulators are likely to be
captured by special interests.24' The interests that affect sector regulators are
more concentrated than those in antitrust242 and therefore more successful in
their efforts to capture regulators. In this sense, the sector regulators are
more likely to be captured and will behave more politically than antitrust
agencies.
Interest groups have an advantage in crafting policy for two reasons.
First, there are informational costs to political participation.43 Individuals
need to determine their interests. To do so, they must expend resources.
Such expenditure for information can be significant, especially when the
benefit is small for an individual consumer.2" Because information itself is
a public good, markets are suboptimal at generating information.245 Infor-
mation costs limit the ability of parties to participate effectively in the legis-
lative process.
The second participation cost is the cost of political mobilization.2'
Once interests are properly identified, political forces must be mobilized to
fight for legislation. This creates free-rider problems for public goods such
Sectors, in 2005 GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION passim (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/0/41635848.pdf.
239 See ICN LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS, supra note 239, at 9-10.
240 DAMIEN GERADIN & MICHEL KERF, CONTROLLING MARKET POWER IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ANTITRUST VS SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 23 (2003).
241 See Todd J. Zywicki, Dir., Office of Pol'y Planning, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Competition Policy
and Regulatory Reform: Means and Ends, How Should Competition Policy Transform Itself? Designing
the New Competition Policy 9 (Nov. 20, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/031120
zywickijapanspeech.pdf.
242 Sokol, supra note 109, at 134.
243 See Cooper, Paulter & Zywicki, supra note 99, at 1100.
244 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216 (1961); George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGM'T SCI. 3, 11 (1971).
245 F. M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 7
J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 98-101 (1993); see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
79 (1988) ("There are some goods that either will not be supplied by the market or, if supplied, will be
supplied in insufficient quantity.").
246 Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, supra note 99, at 1101.
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as laws of general societal benefit, like antitrust.247 Each individual has an
incentive to shirk on his organizational responsibility because someone else
can do his work for him.2 48 This makes majority groups unlikely to be as
effective as smaller groups with lower organizational costs.
249
These informational and organizational costs make it possible for a
well-organized interest group to push for legislation that will benefit the
group instead of society at large .2 " Because of lower informational and
organizational participation costs, these groups tend to be effective in their
rent seeking. Rent seeking in the antitrust setting creates immunities from
antitrust or shifts regulatory intervention to sector regulators more prone to
capture than antitrust enforcers. Firms may have strong political clout to
restrict competition. 251' These firms have an incentive to shape government
policy to be receptive to their needs through policies that facilitate anticom-
petitive restraints rather than the needs of consumers as a whole.252 In both
regulated and unregulated sectors, firms may try to curry favor with gov-
ernment to raise barriers to prevent new entry or to raise rivals' costs. 253 In a
recent article, Professors Dogan and Lemley conclude that antitrust and the
use of generalized courts are more efficient than regulatory agencies be-
cause generalized courts are less likely to pursue regulatory gaming strate-
gies.21 Sector regulation and antitrust enforcement overlap in many re-
spects. Such overlap creates the potential for inconsistency between these
two institutions, as well as increased fear of regulatory capture.
247 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 14-16, 21 (2d ed. 1971); ICN LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS, supra note 239, at 21.
248 See OLSON, supra note 248, at 14-16.
249 See id. at 57, 165-67.
250 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213
(1976).
251 See, e.g., Vladimir Capelik & Ben Slay, Antimonopoly Policy and Monopoly Regulation in
Russia, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES 57, 84
(Ben Slay ed., 1996).
252 Sokol, supra note 109, at 128-31.
253 This can take the form of creating pricing schemes to appeal to political allies or paying em-
ployees inflated salaries to mobilize a constituency that would be highly interested in influencing gov-
ernment. Richard A. Posner, The Effects of Deregulation on Competition: The Experience of the United
States, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 7, 10 (2000).
254 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 47, at 686 ("Economic theory teaches that antitrust courts are
better equipped than regulators to assure efficient outcomes in many circumstances. Public choice
theory and long experience both suggest that agencies that start out trying to limit problematic behavior
by industries often end up condoning that behavior and even insulating those industries from market
forces.").
[VOL. 17:41092
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1092 2009-2010
ANTITRUST, INSTITUTIONS, AND MERGER CONTROL
H. International Antitrust
Increasingly, antitrust has an international dimension. In a sense, the
issue of international governance in antitrust is one of global antitrust fede-
ralism. 255 At what level of governance are most antitrust decisions best
made? If there are significant spillovers of substantive antitrust harm that
individual countries cannot reach, then global antitrust institutions may be
more effective than domestic ones.256 One area in which international anti-
trust institutions have some potential effect is in cross-border anticompeti-
tive conduct. The second area is with regard to coordinating antitrust deci-
sion making as to enforcement and policymaking. A third area is the con-
vergence around global standards for antitrust liability.
The coordination problems in antitrust are familiar to those who study
coordination game theory issues and, in particular, the "battle of the sexes"
game. 257 The issue in such coordination games is that multiple Nash equili-
bria exist that would create mutual gains for the parties so long as they re-
main consistent in their decision making, but unlike the "driving game," in
the battle of the sexes there are substantial differences in which coordina-
tion strategy each side will prefer.258 In the antitrust context, the coordina-
tion problems are how to share information in cross-border cartel cases or
cross-border merger analysis.259 Coordination issues also include how to
coordinate leniency requests in cartels and the time sequence of merger
review filings.2 6 Coordination and increased harmonization across antitrust
jurisdictions have the potential to reduce costs for both agencies and private
parties.
For coordination problems, institutional analysis is largely based on
information costs and which institution will be more likely to have better
information to create effective solutions. Antitrust enforcement suffers from
information costs both in situations of cross-border conduct and in purely-
domestic cases where one agency has less expertise than another in remedy-
ing anticompetitive conduct, or less expertise concerning a competition
advocacy issue. Any one antitrust agency has more substantive information
available to it on the firms, firm behavior, and markets within its jurisdic-
255 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1781, 1781-82 (2000).
256 D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International
Antitrust in a Global GildedAge, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 118 (2007).
257 See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 209-14 (2009) (describing the "battle of the sexes" game theory model).
258 Id. at 196-209 (describing the "driving game" game theory model).
259 Andrew T. Guzman, International Competition Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 418,437-38 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2007).
260 Id. at 433-34.
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tion than an agency from a different country.26' When antitrust agencies
increase the exchange of information, this reduces information costs across
jurisdictions. Some information exchange on firms, markets, and firm con-
duct may occur informally through meetings of regulators via soft law insti-
tutions and the establishment of personal relationships among counterparts
in different jurisdictions. 262
Substantive global antitrust concerns involve different legal and eco-
nomic approaches to the types of conduct agencies find anticompetitive and
the burdens of proof that the parties must meet. On an international level, a
key concern is when one of the major powers in antitrust, the European
Union or the United States, has a lower standard for a finding of wrong-
doing than other countries. The lower standard effectively operates as the
global standard because remedies often have global implications. 263 Even if
the United States and the European Union have a similar substantive ap-
proach, if other jurisdictions have vastly different analytical approaches,
some of these approaches may still create increased costs for doing business
in a given jurisdiction.
There are now more than one hundred antitrust agencies across juris-
dictions worldwide. 2' These include established antitrust agencies in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"),
whose members include countries such as in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Germany. They also include large develop-
ing jurisdictions-such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia-and either very
small or lesser developing jurisdictions-such as Mauritius, Jersey, Zam-
bia, and Honduras.265 These agencies have different abilities based on their
underlying legal, economic, and political systems and their levels of institu-
tional development. Nearly all agencies discuss antitrust in the context of
efficiency.26 What exactly "efficiency" means varies across jurisdictions.267
These differences in substantive approach lead to the possibility of different
outcomes for the same behavior across jurisdictions.
261 John J. Parisi, Counsel for European Union Affairs, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Cooper-
ation Among Antitrust Authorities §§ Ill(B)(3), 11(C) (May 19, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911 update.shtm.
262 In other cases, information exchanges may be formalized through agreements across agencies.
263 William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Con-
vergence or Divergence?, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU: FIFTY YEARS ON FROM THE TREATY OF
ROME 317, 317 (Xavier Vives ed., 2009).
264 See Member Directory, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx (last visited June 27,
2010).
265 id.
266 Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT'L LAW. 15 1,
152 (2009).
267 Id. at 153.
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1. Soft Law
Some of international governance is through "soft law" institutions.
Soft law utilizes best practices across jurisdictions to set global benchmarks
for appropriate antitrust systems.268 Best practices allows for flexibility
across agencies and countries to implement these practices based upon a
country's unique social, legal, political, and economic background.269
Soft law antitrust institutions have changed many countries' antitrust
systems toward internationally-accepted best practices. However, there are
a series of tradeoffs in the decision-making process of soft law governance.
These institutions do well in overcoming coordination problems. The
OECD and the International Competition Network ("ICN") have developed
distinct roles in coordination.270 It may be that the best institutional choice is
not one or the other, but using each one in the area of its relative institution-
al strength. Both seem to do less well in overcoming substantive disagree-
ments within antitrust as to conduct.
Two modes of soft law institutions exist-transgovernmentalism 27t and
transnationalism. 272 There has been a move to greater transgovernmental
governance. Professors Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain this go-
vernance as "sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different gov-
ernments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the
cabinets or chief executives of those governments. 273 In the antitrust con-
text, this form of governance exists through the OECD Competition Com-
mittee.274 Competition Committee members meet on a regular basis to dis-
cuss issues in antitrust. Agency heads and other senior agency officials un-
dertake these discussions; and this gathering of agency experts creates an
epistemic community.275 This community allows for the sharing of ideas
and experiences. Over time, countries shift their antitrust policies to the
norms created by the OECD. For example, the OECD put forward a set of
recommendations on cartel enforcement.276 The OECD member countries
268 Sokol, supra note 257, at 97.
269 Russell W. Damtoft & Ronan Flanagan, The Development of International Networks in Anti-
trust, 43 INT'L LAW. 137, 146 (2009).
270 Sokol, supra note 257, at 97-102, 105-15.
271 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997).
272 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in BRINGING
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed.,1995).
273 Robert Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organiza-
tions, 27 WORLD POL. 39,43 (1974).
274 Sokol, supra note 257, at 97-102.
275 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in
KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION 1,3 (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992).
276 Competition Committee, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Best Practices for the Formal
Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations, in HARD
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have implemented these recommendations. 77 This helps to explain, in part,
how cartel enforcement is stronger now in terms of detection and punish-
ment than at any previous point in antitrust history around the world.
2 78
Another OECD mechanism to diffuse norms is the process of peer re-
view. A peer review is a diagnostic of the strengths and weaknesses of a
country's antitrust system.279 Peer reviews cover a number of issues. After
providing for a background on the antitrust system of a country, they en-
gage in a critical analysis of substantive issues, such as merger control, ho-
rizontal and vertical agreements, and monopolization. 0 A second element
of the review is to analyze the institutional setting of antitrust. This includes
the enforcement structure and practices for the agency, the role of the judi-
ciary, resources, priorities, and international issues. 8 ' After an analysis of
substantive and institutional issues, the peer review provides conclusions
and policy options. 2 Other agencies then comment upon the peer review.283
This process allows for agencies to offer constructive policy criticism to
one another. Bad policies subject an agency to shaming by its peers.2" This
is the mechanism by which peer reviews are supposed to create com-
pliance. 85 Though this shaming mechanism may be effective in some cir-
cumstances, there has not been sufficient repeal of antitrust immunities
among countries, nor does this appear to be an antitrust agency priority. 86
A more direct method to diffuse norms is through technical assistance.
Increasingly, the OECD provides technical assistance, training, and out-
CORE CARTELS: THIRD REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998 COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
Annex 2 (2005) [hereinafter OECD HARD CORE CARTELS], available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/l/35863307.pdf, Competition Committee, Org. for Econ. Co-
Operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core
Cartels, in OECD HARD CORE CARTELS, supra, Annex 1.
277 OECD HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 277, § 1.1.
278 John M. Connor & Yuliya Bolotova, Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis, 24 INT'L
J. INDUS. ORG. 1109, 1135 (2006).
279 D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency Capaci-
ty, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2009).
280 See, e.g., DIEGO PETRECOLLA, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COLOMBIA - PEER
REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 18-34 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/32/49/44110853.pdf.
281 Id. at 37-49.
282 Id. at 57-64.
283 See, e.g., FABRIZIO PAGANI, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PEER REVIEW: A TOOL
FOR CO-OPERATION AND CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF AN OECD WORKING METHOD 7 (2002), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/16/1955285.pdf.
284 Sokol, supra note 280, at 1085.
285 See, e.g., Sokol, supra note 257, at 97-98.
286 Sokol, supra note 109, at 148.
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reach to developing countries.287 It has established competition centers in
Central Europe and East Asia to coordinate programs regionally. 288 It also
cosponsors a yearly conference in Latin America and undertakes work in
the Western Hemisphere, such as projects in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile on
bid rigging.289
Global governance institutional design has taken on an additional di-
mension-that of transnational governance. 2 ° Transnational governance is
distinct from that of transgovernmental governance because non-state actors
are involved in the decision-making process. The antitrust institution that
adds this non-governmental dimension is the ICN. Unlike the OECD, the
ICN includes practitioners and academics from both developing and devel-
oped world countries in its meetings. 29' Also unlike the OECD, the ICN
operates virtually, without any headquarters or permanent staff.21 Conse-
quently, members and advisors of the ICN do the work themselves rather
giving it to the ICN staff.293 This limits opportunities for free-riding and
creates a greater sense of ownership over work product. These work prod-
ucts include the creation of manuals for mergers and cartels that provide
techniques to improve agency enforcement.
To reduce coordination costs, the ICN has created a series of best prac-
tices on a number of different issues. These recommended practices involve
a multistep process. First, agencies and non-governmental advisors take
stock of existing practices.294 Then, the group analyzes existing practices to
find commonality.295 Finally, the ICN creates recommended practices on
what seems to be the most effective. 296 These globally benchmarked prac-
tices are then absorbed by agencies around the world in a way that fits with-
in the local context and institutional setting.
Soft law harmonization has its limits. When antitrust agencies apply
the same "harmonized" standards, it may lead to alternative outcomes in
practice.297 Countries have many of the same substantive provisions in their
antitrust laws (e.g., limitations on unilateral and coordinated conduct) but
287 See, e.g., 2009 OECD Capacity Building/Outreach Events, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,3343,en 403825994038295841926735 1 1 1 1,00.html
(last visited June 27, 2010).
288 Sokol, supra note 257, at 100.
289 Sokol, supra note 91, at 268-69.
290 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 264 (2004) (describing transnational
networks).
291 Sokol, supra note 257, at 106-09.
292 Id. at 108.
293 id.
294 Id. at 110.
295 id.
296 Id.
297 Fox, supra note 267, at 163-64.
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apply these laws differently.29 The process of harmonization may also
create opportunities for strategic behavior. There may be cases where coun-
tries increase their switching costs prior to harmonization in an effort to get
other countries to be elastic in changing their own systems to comport with
harmonization.2'
The shape of soft law compliance and agenda is a function of power
asymmetries. Should the European Union and United States not put their
resources and efforts into soft law organizations to combat public restraints,
their lack of participation would compromise the ability of any antitrust soft
law organization to be effective. In some ways, the power dynamics specif-
ic to soft law's ability to address antitrust public restraints may be more
severe than that of hard law. Soft law is most effective at cost reduction
when the relevant costs involve information and coordination. For example,
antitrust soft law organizations have become increasingly effective in re-
ducing the costs associated with merger review and cartels.3" There is no
serious disagreement as to the pernicious effects of cartels or the fact that
multiple, overlapping merger-control systems create increased compliance
costs. In substantive areas of law, antitrust soft law organizations may face
implementation problems where disagreement exists, particularly between
the United States and the European Union.3"'
2. Hard Law
The alternative international governance mechanism to soft law is hard
law. Hard law relies upon formal law to bind countries.3 2 The World Trade
Organization ("WTO") is an example of a hard law institution that could
address competition matters. The benefit of hard law is the binding effect.
This is also its primary cost. Should the wrong global standard be set, this
might create suboptimal antitrust laws across jurisdictions around the
world.0 3
A number of works have analyzed the limitations of the WTO and bi-
lateral and regional free trade agreements to reach a global standard in anti-
298 See Fox, supra note 114, at 16 (describing why nations' antitrust policies may still differ de-
spite a harmonization of antitrust rules).
299 Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Legal Harmonization 4 (George
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-40, 2005), available at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/workingpapers/05-40.pdf.
300 Sokol, supra note257, at 121.
301 Fox, supra note 267, at 163-64.
302 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT' L ORG. 421, 421 (2000).
303 John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy ofInternational Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 549, 552 (2003).
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trust.3" Overall, these works suggest that the WTO is presently not the best
institution with which to push for global antitrust change." 5 One important
dynamic at the WTO level is that power dynamics between the major pow-
ers in the international trade arena produce the binding law.3 6 Even though
the WTO requires unanimity, the major powers shape the trade agenda and
the substantive rules. While the number of major powers at the WTO level
has recently increased to include countries such as China and Brazil without
support of the European Union and the United States, the WTO will not
create new rules, including in the area of competition policy. Currently,
there is no appetite to create additional binding WTO rules in competition
policy.
30 7
3. Worldwide Enforcer?
Outside of global governance, there is an alternative international
force to the United States as a unilateral global antitrust enforcer. There is
the European antitrust alternative. We might prefer a regime in which we
rely upon foreign judgments because we believe that there is a system of
global underdeterrence. 38 The effect of European Commission ("EC")
competition law enforcement on U.S.-based multinationals has increased in
recent years.39 To what extent are EC decisions global in their reach be-
cause they might be more restricting than the United States' enforcement
decisions? Is there decision making by the lowest common denominator?
The developments in Europe have potential repercussions in the Unit-
ed States in terms of the type of behavior businesses will engage in and the
global nature of such changes to a business's behavior. To what extent are
U.S. firms relying on EC public enforcement against competitors? These
questions have not yet been answered, but are necessary to think about (and
ideally to test empirically) in undertaking a comparative institutional analy-
304 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1545 & n.134 (1998); Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of Interna-
tional Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN J. INT'L L. 207, 229-34 (2003); Sokol, supra note 257, at 81-97;
Sokol, supra note 280, at 1084-87; Sokol, supra note 91, at 241-52; Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M.
lacobucci, National Treatment and Extraterritoriality: Defining the Domains of Trade and Antitrust
Policy, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 230, at 152, 171; Diane P. Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 309, 312-
15 (2005).
305 Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 199-201 (2005); McGinnis, supra note 304, at 551-52.
306 Andrew Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of
Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 591-92 (2005).
307 Sokol, supra note 257, at 50-5 I.
308 Gal, supra note 101, at 1-2.
309 Geradin, supra note 6, at 207-08.
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sis. Anecdotally, it seems as if some firms are bringing attention to the EC
because they can get favorable results there as opposed to the United
States.31 If this holds true generally, it would suggest that the EC plays a far
larger role in the conduct of U.S.-based firms vis-A-vis its U.S.-based com-
petitors than previously assumed in the institutional analysis of the U.S.
antitrust system.
Antitrust enforcement has become a global phenomenon. This interna-
tional aspect can be explored through soft law institutions, which aim to set
broad, global goals, or with hard law institutions, which create binding legal
rules. An alternative to global governance could involve a worldwide anti-
trust enforcer; current candidates for this position include the United States
and the European Union.
III. CASE STUDY: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN MERGER CONTROL
A. Introduction
This Article undertakes a case study of merger control in an attempt to
operationalize the comparative institutional analysis of Part II. Merger re-
view is an area in which there is a lot of "action" in terms of the volume of
matters, but also one with a relatively small number of agency challenges
and judicial decisions.311 Because courts decide so few merger cases, the
case context provides little insight into the larger decision-making process
by the parties and their lawyers. Merger review is also an area in which
issues of private versus public rights of action come into play, as well as
issues of federalism, global federalism, and antitrust versus sector regula-
tion.
Merger review functions as a constant work in progress in terms of
improving its predictive abilities.3"' Antitrust institutions respond to these
changes and to changes in the law's application of merger economics.1 3
Both sets of changes affect the comparative institutional competencies for
merger review. As institutions shift in their capacity to respond to these
310 Transcript of Responses to Qualitative Survey (on file with author).
311 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HART-SCOTI-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2008 1 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/hsrreport.pdf (reporting that
while 1,726 transactions were reported under the HSR Act in 2008, the FTC only challenged 21 of these
mergers).
312 William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal
Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 129, 131 (2009) (explaining the evolution of merger
control).
313 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Updating the Merger Guidelines: Issues for the Upcoming Workshops 1 (Nov. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/25 I 858.pdf.
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changes, their relative strengths in terms of administrability and outcomes
also shift.
Merger review is full of presumptions that academics, judges, and
agency officials make about policy and the nature of business."4 These pre-
sumptions permeate antitrust case law and the Merger Guidelines3"5 as to
substance, administrability, and economic behavior." 6 However, oftentimes
the empirical basis for many of these presumptions is limited or incomplete.
With limited case law in mergers, agency conduct might differ from exist-
ing case law.317
Yet, it is precisely the broad set of behaviors in antitrust that scholars
for the most part ignore-those that involve antitrust decision making. De-
cision making is fundamental to institutional analysis.3"' Decision making in
the context of this Article means what firms actually do with their legal
advice and how outside counsel convey risks and rewards to their clients,
which in turn shapes client behavior. This area is very important, as it in-
corporates not merely cases, but also a reading of the "tea leaves" of regular
agency interactions, speeches by agency officials, an understanding of the
current use of the Merger Guidelines, the interplay of the DOJ and the FTC
together, and the interplay of international, federal, and state enforcement.
Data collection limitations hamper discovery of patterns of firm behavior,
and neither academics nor policymakers have a strong sense of how parties
actually respond to government enforcement, to the role of judges, or to
other, various institutional~actors.
It is very difficult to create formal models of firm behavior that quanti-
fy the risk/reward assessment of undertaking a merger, estimating antitrust
risk as part of a transaction, dropping a proposed deal, or completing a deal
at a certain price based on the risk. Much of merger-related work entails
counseling clients at various points in a deal process and meeting with
agency staff and leadership, which are not tasks that can be coded through
314 Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century,
38 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 513-16 (2007) (criticizing the influence of rational-choice theory among
antitrust lawyers and judges).
315 Id. at 516.
316 Robert H. Lande & James Langenfeld, From Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution of Federal
Merger Policy, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 5, 5; Gregory J. Werden, Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor,
Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control 5-6 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 10-14, 2010), available at http:papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1612282.
317 For example, questions remain as to the legal treatment of efficiencies in merger analysis. See,
e.g., Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty:
Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 547 (2007) ("The overall picture of current merger
enforcement practice is, therefore, murky. In some cases the analysis of uncertain events is vague and
unspecified, while in others the analysis handles uncertainty by eliminating unlikely events from consid-
eration. There is a tendency to focus on 'the' most likely outcome. The agencies are particularly likely
to be dismissive of events that they do not project to take place in the very near future.").
318 KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 3-5.
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the number of filings, second requests, or case counts.319 Though there are
some good case studies about particular mergers,32 ° oftentimes these are
written by interested parties. It is unclear if such studies are representative
of the larger decision-making process or if the litigated cases are somehow
distinct from the larger population of total merger filings or even of filings
not made because of merger concerns. Similarly, public discussion of mer-
ger control by officials or top practitioners does not focus on the mundane
"plain vanilla" merger filings.321 The merger sessions of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") Antitrust Section Spring Meeting rarely discuss a
merger that gets cleared within 30 days. 22 Instead, they focus on the high-
profile mergers that seem to have greater significance to agency practice
and/or case law.323
These conferences focus on important cases for good reason. Lots of
decision making happens as a result of cases decided by the Supreme Court,
the courts of appeal, and the district courts. 324 Decided cases affect the strat-
egy for firms beyond those of the parties involved.325 They impact the types
of cases to bring and not to bring. Yet, decided cases may be unrepresenta-
tive of all cases. This is important because if policy recommendations are
made on decided cases only, mistaken inferences are likely to guide policy
due to the lack of representativeness.326
Much of counseling in the merger process surrounds inferences that
lawyers make about the current meaning of litigated cases as the agencies
choose to view them. Agencies have a gatekeeper function in terms of the
kinds of transactions that might be approved or challenged. The stakes are
319 Transcript of Responses to Qualitative Survey (on file with author).
320 These are primarily high-profile litigated cases. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Efficiencies and
High Concentration: Heinz Proposes to Acquire Beech-Nut, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION:
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 150, 153, 168 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, eds.,
4th ed. 2004); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Econometric Methods in Staples 17-18 (Princeton Univ. Program
in Law & Pub. Affairs, Working Paper No. 04-007, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstract id=529144 (examining the use of econometric evidence in the 1997 Staples/Office-
Depot merger litigation).
321 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 58TH ANTITRUST LAW SPRING MEETING 5 (2010),
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-spring/10/pdf/ATSprMtl0_web.pdf (listing a panel
discussion on "Vertical and Conglomerate Merger Enforcement Under U.S. and EC Law: Standing
Ovation or the Sound of One Hand Clapping?" that discussed recent high-profile cases).
322 See id.
323 See id.
324 Fredrick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, The Trouble with Cases 1-2 (Harvard John F. Kenne-
dy Sch. of Gov't, Faculty Research Working Paper RWP09-025, 2009), available at
http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=395.
325 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49-
50 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
326 Id.
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high for merging parties to challenge the agency's reading of case law, and
such a challenge can take a year or longer.327
A number of factors influence the decision-making process of firms on
a particular business decision to initiate merger discussions and ultimate
merger agreements. These include market dynamics,328 uncertainty, 329 fi-
nancing amount and financing time window,33° personalities and overall
quality of the business decision makers,33' in-house attorneys,332 outside law
firms,333 agency staff34 and leadership,335 and the quality of the judge that
might need to adjudicate a merger case.336 All these factors play a role in the
larger decision-making process. The multiple actors involved means there is
often no clear-cut answer to explain firm decision making in the antitrust
merger setting. While it will be fairly easy to predict the risk/reward tra-
deoff of Coke announcing that it might try to acquire Pepsi,337 many other
situations are less clear.
In light of the opaqueness surrounding merger control decision mak-
ing, there is a larger discourse of merger analysis. Discussions on how both
antitrust and market forces work in practice create a discourse, which has
important ramifications on policy.338 Who controls discourse can shape the
327 This risk/reward calculation of challenging an agency's decision making gives the antitrust
agencies significant power in the merger review process.
328 Lois M. Shelton, Merger Market Dynamics: Insights into the Behavior of Target and Bidder
Firms, 41 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 363, 381 (2000); Flavio Toxvaerd, Strategic Merger Waves: A
Theory of Musical Chairs, 140 J. ECON. THEORY 1, 20 (2008).
329 AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (1994);
Vivek Ghosal & Prakash Loungani, The Differential Impact of Uncertainty on Investment in Small and
Large Businesses, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 338, 338 (2000); Jonathan P. O'Brien, Timothy B. Folta &
Douglas R. Johnson, A Real Options Perspective on Entrepreneurial Entry in the Face of Uncertainty,
24 MGMT. & DECISION ECON. 515, 515 (2003).
330 Sokol, supra note 257, at 60.
331 Dinara Bayazitova, Matthias Kahl & Rossen Valkanov, Which Mergers Destroy Value? Only
Mega-Mergers 29 (Oct. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1502385.
332 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 292 n.143 (1984) (discussing the relative benefits and costs of certain in-house counsel
functions).
331 C.N.V. Krishnan & Paul A. Laux, Legal Advisors: Popularity vs. Performance in Acquisitions
1-2 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.buec.udel.edu/laux/Prof/Lawyers 070402.pdf.
334 Sokol, supra note 280, at 1082-83; Sokol, supra note 98, at 582-83.
335 Sokol, supra note 98, at 590.
336 Baye & Wright, supra note 59.
337 Surely lawyers for Coke and Pepsi would advise against such a merger, while the antitrust
enforcers would move to block it (and most probably would succeed in doing so).
338 Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 108, 110 (Michael J.
Shapiro ed., 1984) ("[Discourse] is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the
power which is to be seized."); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Lan-
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policy agenda among academics and practitioners.339 If one can control and
frame the discourse of antitrust, one can create momentum to affect actual
antitrust policy. 4' As Wang Chung sang, "[t]he words we use are strong,
they make reality."34' Practitioners and academics shape the discourse of
antitrust at a number of different levels including through articles, hearings,
written testimony, comments, and speeches. 42
Current officials understand this important signaling effect and the use
of discourse to create policy.343 As an example of how discourse shapes
policy, Christine Varney stated in her confirmation hearings to head DOJ
Antitrust:
I think that what we've seen in the last eight years is that a lot of economic theory has been
used to inhibit prosecuting mergers and other activity that may be impermissible. And when
I'm talking about rebalancing economic theory, I'm talking about bringing new rigor to the
economic analysis that underpins any prosecution. As I said, I think what we've seen in the
sort of-in the shorthand-the Chicago school analysis is a real reluctance for government to
go forward and attempt to block mergers in the marketplace.
344
Varney paints the picture that acceptance of Chicago School beliefs pre-
vented sufficient antitrust enforcement under George W. Bush. If her view
of history is correct, then we would have needed to experience a shift in
enforcement under Bush that was distinct from enforcement under Presi-
dent Bill Clinton. Her view assumes that the Clinton administration's anti-
trust enforcement was somehow distinct from the Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush administrations that preceded, which used the Chicago
School approach.3 45 It also assumes that economic analysis was not rigorous
under Bush. As some of the existing empirical work and the surveys under-
guages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 352-54 (1992) (providing an
example of the power of discourse in the area of the official use of the English language).
339 See Foucault, supra note 339, at 110.
340 Kovacic, supra note 37, at 377 ("Shape understandings of the past, and you influence views
about what the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ought to do in
the future.").
341 WANG CHUNG, EVERYBODY HAVE FUN TONIGHT (Geffen Records 1986). How profound can
this song be when other lyrics include, "[e]v'rybody have fun tonight, ev'rybody Wang Chung tonight"?
The song hit number 2 on the billboard charts in the United States. It was a required song at any dance
function that year. Musical taste in the 1980s is even less clear than merger institutional analysis.
342 Kovacic, supra note 37, at 377.
343 See, e.g., Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Introduction of Philip Lowe and
Announcement of Joint FTC/DOJ Project to Modernize the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1 (Sept. 22,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/O90922mergerguideleibowitzremarks.pdf
(announcing the beginning of an effort to revise the FTC's and DOJ's Horizontal Merger Guidelines
while introducing a conference speaker).
344 Executive Nominations: Hearing on the Nomination of Christine Varney before the S. Jud.
Comm., 11 Ith Cong. (2009) (response of Christine Varney to question by Senator Coburn).
345 Kovacic, supra note 37, at 377-82 (critiquing the "pendulum" view of antitrust and offering an
evolutionary explanation of antitrust development).
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taken for this Article suggest, such an interpretation rewrites history some-
what to further Varney's larger political message of the need for a reinvigo-
rated DOJ Antitrust Division.
A focus on discourse leaves any understanding of merger control in-
complete. It is not possible to undertake a good institutional analysis based
on only a few cases brought or not brought. What does the world really
look like, and what do private practitioners, agency staff, and academics
really think? How much of existing commentary by practitioners and aca-
demics is merely spin? Moreover, after a while, how much do personal
views become a function of internalizing client/government positions? A
person's personal beliefs may be biased by a few personal experiences or
by high-profile agency decisions.3" Moreover, they might bias their beliefs
based on a number of behavioral devices such as availability heuristics347
and motivated reasoning.348
This Article undertakes a survey of antitrust practitioners precisely to
weed out some of these biases to create a more informed institutional analy-
sis. In the aggregate, some biases noted above might disappear with enough
survey data. Moreover, an anonymous survey allows those practitioners
who, at least publicly, may be limited in their ability to speak freely due to
client concerns to open up and describe their potentially-opposite personal
views. Anonymity allows for an honest conversation about the role of the
DOJ, FTC, state and international antitrust enforcers, other regulators, leg-
islators, private parties, and the judiciary without concern for retribution.
B. Brief Overview of Modern US. Merger Control History
The Merger Guidelines serve as the guiding force in U.S. merger poli-
cy.349 Comparative institutional choice must be weighed with the impact of
the Guidelines in mind because of their importance. Prior to the Merger
Guidelines, populist tendencies drove U.S. Merger Enforcement.35°
346 William E. Kovacic, Review of Antitrust Stories, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 241, 251-52
(2008) (book review) (discussing the limitations of first person narratives in antitrust).
347 JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 153-55 (4th ed. 2008); Norbert Schwarz & Leigh
Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct
Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 326, at 103, 103.
348 Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 980, 995-96 (2009); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 72-73, 90-108 (2004); Ziva Kunda, The Case for
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480-81 (1990).
349 Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust
Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 772 (2006).
350 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1966).
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Changes in merger enforcement based on economic analysis began
with former U.S. Assistant Attorney General Don Turner's 1968 Merger
Guidelines.35' By today's economic standards, the 1968 Merger Guidelines
had significant limitations because of their structural emphasis. 52 Yet
judged by the 1O economics of that time, the 1968 Merger Guidelines made
a significant contribution. They pushed economic analysis to the forefront
of the merger process.353
Other changes shaped merger policy between the 1968 Merger Guide-
lines and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. In case law, the important turning
point occurred in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.3" This case
marked the beginning of competitive-effects analysis.355 In the case, the
Supreme Court considered factors that suggested that concentration alone
would not impair competition significantly.356 The Court suggested that
competitive effects mattered for merger analysis.357 At the time of the deci-
sion, General Dynamics was not viewed as the path-breaking decision that
it is today.35 8 However, it had a significant impact soon thereafter in the
development of case law and policy.359
Congress's passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 constituted another important change. The Act allowed the
antitrust agencies to review mergers prior to consummation by requiring
parties to file their proposed mergers for review." It also gave the agencies
351 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,101, available at http://www justice.gov/atr/hmerger/l 1247.pdf [hereinafter 1968 MERGER
GUIDELINES].
352 See DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J. JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 598-99 (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing the concentration standards).
... See Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years,
ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 61, 61 ("With the benefit of hindsight, the field of industrial organization
and the enforcement of antitrust were in crisis in the 1960s. Price-theoretic reasoning, with emphasis on
monopoly and the real and imagined consequences of barriers to entry, carried the day."). They also
paved the way for the incredibly important transformation of the 1982 Merger Guidelines. See generally
Oliver E. Williamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice:--In Perspective 1 (June
4, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/ 1257.pdf (providing
a history of this process). However, economists in both agencies were still relatively marginalized in the
1960s. Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics and Antitrust in MBA Programs: What's Thought, What's
Taught, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2003) ("As late as the 1960s, however, economists at both
enforcement agencies were generally 'second class citizens' and outside the mainstream of decision-
making and policy influence.").
34 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
355 Id. at 501-02 (explaining that uncommitted reserves were indicative of a firm's ability to com-
pete in the future in coal rather than historic share of sales).
356 Id. at 509-10.
151 Id. at 511.
358 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 238.
359 Donald F. Turner, Observations on the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Merger Guide-
lines, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 308-09 (1982).
360 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
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better information, included in the filing, with which to determine the com-
petitive effects of a proposed merger.36' During this same period, the agen-
cies began to hire young economists trained in the latest 10 thinking.36 2
These economists improved the quality of agency merger analysis.
The emphasis on economic analysis363 became further embedded in the
1982 Merger Guidelines.3" Even though the DOJ issued the 1982 Merger
Guidelines by itself, the FTC responded the same day with its FTC State-
ment on Horizontal Mergers.36 The importance of the 1982 Merger Guide-
lines cannot be overstated. These Guidelines updated the 1968 Merger
Guidelines toward a more modern economic understanding.3" The 1982
Merger Guidelines deemphasized the structural presumption in merger re-
view."'
The 1982 Merger Guidelines introduced the hypothetical monopolist
test as the paradigm with which to undertake merger analysis.368 It provided
guidance as to which mergers the DOJ might challenge.369 Introduced as
part of the 1982 Merger Guidelines to replace the C4 concentration ratio,37
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index provided better guidance for parties to
understand market definition and market power issues. "' Another important
effect of the 1982 Merger Guidelines was the use of the Merger Guidelines
in shaping case law. The 1982 Merger Guidelines moved antitrust policy
beyond where the case law was at the time, in terms of rebuttable presump-
tions, to focus on the market concentration of the merging firms. 372
361 Marian R. Bruno, Assistant Dir., Premerger Notification Office, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Hart-
Scott-Rodino at 25 (June 13, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/brunohsr25.shtm.
362 Williamson, supra note 354, at 6-7 (explaining the importance of developing young staff
trained in economic analysis).
363 Id. at 4-7 (providing a history of this process).
364 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/1I 248.pdf [hereinafter 1982 MERGER
GUIDELINES].
365 Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Statement on Horizontal Mergers, reprinted in 42 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP., June 17, 1982, at 12.
366 William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618,
622-30 (1983) (articulating the basis of the 1982 Merger Guidelines).
367 David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, Twenty Years of Merger Guidelines En-
forcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 280-81 (2003) (explaining the
evolution of the 1982 Merger Guidelines in FTC merger analysis).
368 Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopol-
ist Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254-59 (2003).
369 Id. (providing an overview of the development of the paradigm).
370 The DOJ and the FTC used to measure market concentration using the "four-firm concentration
ratio" or "C4 concentration ratio," which looked to the market shares of the top four firms to determine
concentration. See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 350, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1982).
371 See Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71
CAL. L. REV. 402, 427-28 (1983) (providing an early critique of HHI because it might mean less en-
forcement than under CR4); Hillary Greene, supra note 350, at 788-96.
372 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 238.
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Only in existence for two years, the DOJ revised the 1982 Merger
Guidelines in 1984."'3 In comparison to the 1982 Merger Guidelines, the
modifications in 1984 were relatively minor. The 1984 Merger Guidelines
provided additional changes in five areas:
First, the market definition test was refined to ensure that 5 percent was not a rule (for eva-
luating the hypothetical), and the Guidelines hypothetical was generally calibrated to the
price at which the product in question currently trades. Second, the structural analysis was
expanded to emphasize the potential importance of nonstructural factors . . . . Third, the
Guidelines clarified the treatment of foreign competition to ensure that the analysis was ana-
logous to domestic competition. Fourth, the revision indicated that the DOJ would give "ap-
propriate weight to efficiencies in all relevant cases." Finally, the Guidelines indicated that
failing divisions would be judged according to standards similar to those applied to failing
firms.
374
The 1984 Guidelines thus solidified a Chicago School approach to merger
analysis. 75
The 1992 Merger Guidelines 376 were an important revision to the 1982
and 1984 Merger Guidelines. The 1992 Merger Guidelines introduced an
analytical framework that provided a methodology for working through
whether or not a proposed merger might be anticompetitive.377 The five
steps of this analysis, based on the sections of the Guidelines, are: (1) mar-
ket definition, measurement, and concentration; (2) competitive effects; (3)
entry; (4) efficiencies; and (5) failing firm/division. This analytical frame-
work shifted merger analysis from market concentration to competitive
effects.375
It was not until the 1992 Merger Guidelines that unilateral effects
theories became important to merger analysis.379 Like previous Guidelines,
373 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,103, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/l1249.pdf [hereinafter 1984 MERGER
GUIDELINES].
374 Scheffman, Coate & Silvia, supra note 368, at 283-84.
375 Louis B. Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Pri-
vate Counseling or Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 575, 577-78
(1983).
376 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0 (rev.
1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
171 Id. §§0_0.1.
378 Paul T. Denis, Advances of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Analysis of Competi-
tive Effects, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 479, 503-04 (1993).
379 Paul T. Denis, The Give and Take of the Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 51, 53 (although noting that more recently coordinated effects analysis
has been reinvigorated by the Commentary); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competi-
tive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43, 43 (Paolo Buccirossi
ed., 2008); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects?, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 33-45 (2003). On the importance of coordinated effects and mavericks, see
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the 1992 Merger Guidelines allowed for the incorporation of new economic
learning.38 ° Some areas in which the guidelines had a particularly important
impact included entry and uncommitted entry.3"' The 1997 revisions to the
Merger Guidelines incorporated efficiencies into merger analysis. The
agencies began to challenge mergers in courts using evidence relating to
efficiencies.382
C. Bush Antitrust Enforcement
The perceived decline in antitrust enforcement under the Bush admin-
istration and its influence is perhaps the major institutional issue facing
merger policy in the United States.383 It impacts the relative strengths and
weaknesses of certain institutions (DOJ versus FTC, private versus public
rights of action) and has been the primary focus of antitrust discourse for
the past three years. 3m4 To what extent antitrust enforcement of the Bush
years was a function of continuity versus how much was a structural break
from the Clinton years remains one of the most controversial issues in anti-
trust policy.
1. Baker and Shapiro
In 2007, Jonathan Baker and Carl Shapiro released the first version of
their "Reinvigorating Merger Enforcement" for the Kirkpatrick Conference
on Conservative Economic Influence on Antitrust Policy, held at George-
town University Law Center in April 2007.385 The larger paper addressed
many complexities in merger enforcement generally-their source, nature,
and how to solve them. What caught everyone's attention was the critique
of Bush antitrust enforcement. Baker and Shapiro's work had an immediate
impact in the academy, among antitrust practitioners, and within the broad-
er non-antitrust community. More than any other work, it has shaped anti-
trust discourse in the United States since 2007. Its influence is evident in
Jonathan Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under
the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 135, passim (2002).
380 Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the
Merger Guidelines, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 195 (2003).
381 Id. at 198-205 (providing discussion of these issues).
382 William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficien-
cies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 231-35 (2003).
383 See, e.g., Andrea Agathoklis, In Their Own Words: Predicting Enforcement Under Varney and
Leibowitz, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 5, 5-6.
384 Id.
385 The paper ultimately appeared in final form as a chapter in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 40, at 235.
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the popular press,386 in the Obama antitrust platform,3"7 and in the early
speeches of Obama's antitrust leadership at both agencies."
Baker and Shapiro claimed there was under-enforcement in mergers
under Bush generally and particularly so under the Bush DOJ."9 There are
two bases of support underlying this claim. The first is their historical quan-
titative analysis of the merger review process.3 Based upon the number of
challenges, as a percentage of adjusted HSR filings (updating the Leary
merger study of 2002"9'), merger enforcement was significantly lower than
under previous administrations.392 To translate the percentages into actual
cases, Baker and Shapiro claim that for the 2006 and 2007 rates to be in line
with historic numbers, the antitrust agencies would have needed to chal-
lenge an additional twenty-four mergers per year (with a further breakdown
of an additional fifteen challenges at the DOJ and nine at the FTC).393
A second basis of support for the claim of Bush under-enforcement is
qualitative. Baker and Shapiro interviewed twenty Chambers-ranked394 anti-
trust partners in DC. Many respondents suggested that the "'likelihood of
successful agency review for the merging firms' for a given horizontal
merger is sharply higher now (March 2007) than it would have been ten
years ago (when Joel Klein ran the DOJ and Robert Pitofsky headed the
FTC)." '395 Baker and Shapiro seem to have chosen Chambers-ranked practi-
tioners at least implicitly because elite practitioners in mergers might think
differently than non-elite practitioners, perhaps due to deal flow and sophis-
tication of practice.
386 See, e.g., David Lawsky, EU's Gain is U.S. Loss in Influence on Antitrust, REUTERS, Oct. 28,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL2549299720071028; Steven Pearlstein, For Con-
sumers, the Raw Deal, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/17/AR2007041701820.html.
387 See Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust Institute 1-
2 (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/pres0l.ashx (follow "Read
Senator Obama's Statement on Antitrust here" hyperlink).
388 Leibowitz, supra note 344; Christine Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era 5-14 (May 12, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf.
389 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 235.
390 Id. at 244-47.
391 Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST
L.J. 105 (2002).
392 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 246.
393 Id. at 246-47.
394 Chambers ranks antitrust practitioners via interviews of clients and peers. It seems to be the
most important ranking of lawyers around the world.
395 Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 29, 30 (emphasis added).
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2. Harkrider
Baker and Shapiro were not the sole critics of Bush merger policy un-
dertaking empirical work. John Harkrider analyzed 213 transactions that
resulted in second requests during the period of 1996 to 2006."9 He utilized
a probit estimation to analyze these transactions for changes across admin-
istrations and across the DOJ and the FTC.397 He found that for second re-
quests reviewed by the Bush DOJ, transactions were 24 percent less likely
to have been challenged than under the Clinton DOJ or FTC.398 This con-
trasted with the Bush FTC, where second request transactions were not less
likely to have been challenged."' An open question from his study is
whether the change of enforcement between these two periods is a function
of over-enforcement in the earlier period or under-enforcement in the later
period. °'
3. Limitations to These Studies
In this Subsection, I identify the various limitations to the Baker and
Shapiro and Harkrider studies. The purpose of detailing the limitations to
the above studies is not to diminish these important works. Rather, it is to
suggest how some of the assumptions and inferences to be drawn from such
works may be more limited than the role that these works have assumed in
antitrust discourse. These limitations also justify the need for the surveys
that I undertook to provide a fuller picture of the relative successes and
weaknesses of merger policy in recent years and to explain these outcomes
in terms of strengths and weaknesses of broader institutional arrangements.
a. Different Industries
The DOJ and the FTC cover different industries, except for cases that
go through the clearance process."° Whether an agency makes a second
request, attempts to a block a deal through preliminary injunction, or grants
clearance depends on: (1) which agency has the most competence in the
merging industry sector, and (2) the discretion of the agency staff and lea-
396 John D. Harkrider, Antitrust Enforcement During the Bush Administration-An Economic
Estimation, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 43, 46.
'9' Id. at 43, 45.
398 Id. at 43.
399 Id.
400 Id. at 47.
401 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 134.
11112010]
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1111 2009-2010
GEO. MASON L. REV.
dership. Each agency specializes within certain industries.' When certain
industries are "hotter" than others, the number of cases that an agency sees
could be a function of which industry the agency investigates, as well as the
amount of resources the agency has to more fully investigate transactions
based upon deal flow. Staff within these merger "shops" may be more or
less aggressive than in other shops.4"3
b. Other Empirical Work Yields Alternative Results
Traditionally, has there been much of a shift in the priorities and en-
forcement between administrations? One FTC study that reviewed the Clin-
ton and George H.W. Bush administrations' antitrust records did not find a
difference regarding standards across the political divide."° A study by
Malcolm Coate concludes that FTC merger policy has remained constant
across both Republican and Democratic administrations over the past twen-
ty years."5 His analysis shows that the only significant change in FTC poli-
cy has been in the use of efficiencies, as tracked by the Merger Guide-
lines.4" Coate also finds that by the mid- to late-1980s, there is no evidence
of politics playing a role in merger enforcement. 7 Similarly, academic
work by Ghosal finds that merger control has been apolitical since the end
of the Ford administration. 4°" In yet another study, Coate and Heimert
claim-based on confidential data reports-that there has been little change
in terms of the types of efficiency claims that merging parties make or the
treatment of such claims by FTC staff during the past ten years. 4°" There is
no similar DOJ study.
402 Id.
403 The more interesting things to measure would be mergers that go through a clearance process
through both of the agencies. This would be the natural experiment. However, there is not enough data
to determine what the "but for" would be-would the other agency have acted differently?
404 Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The
Horizontal Merger Review Process 1996-2003, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 531, 564 (2005).
405 Malcolm B. Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush: Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement at the Federal
Trade Commission 24 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1314924 ("Little evidence can be found to suggest
that the enforcement regime changed [across Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations] in response to
either political control or the specific wording of the Merger Guidelines.").406 Id. at 17-18.
407 ld. at 18-19.
408 Vivek Ghosal, Economics, Politics, and Merger Control, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANTITRUST THEORY AND EVIDENCE 125, 148 (Jay Pil Choi ed., 2007).
409 MALCOLM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, MERGER EFFICIENCIES AT THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 1997-2007 vi (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergereficiencies.pdf.
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c. Different Levels and Types of Merger and Acquisitions
Activity
The level of merger control activity is not a good indicator for the
quality of antitrust enforcement. Mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") activi-
ty levels were different in the 1990s than in the 2000s."' Overall, merger
activity occurs in waves.41' What is not clear is whether, beyond overall
numbers, there were differences in the types of M&A across industries. The
differences in horizontal overlaps reported on the initial HSR filings vary
over time and, hence, the opportunities to bring merger challenges equally
vary. According to Former FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, overlaps were
higher under Clinton than under Bush.1 2 On a related point, some industries
may go through waves of consolidation (such as telecommunications in the
1990s) that may make "apples to apples" comparisons difficult to achieve.
Baker and Shapiro counter that Muris's recasting of the horizontal
overlaps is not quite apple to apples.413 They argue that Muris's overlaps
were overly broad, based on SIC and NAICS codes. 4 These codes do not
correspond with the actual relevant markets involved in horizontal overlap
cases." 5 Of course, it is not clear to what extent horizontal overlaps from
previous administrations were based upon antitrust relevant markets either.
Therefore, even an actual difference might mean that Clinton's antitrust
horizontal overlaps are either too large or too small. Of course, this assumes
that overlaps were different in the DOJ than in the FTC.416 Most of the
questions of rate and the nature of overlaps will remain unknown because
of data limitations.
d. Different Number of HSR Filings
One important explanation for the change in the total number of filings
involves changes in HSR filing requirements, particularly the increase in
the reporting threshold to $50 million in 2001.417 The threshold for filing
410 See Timothy J. Moris, Facts Trump Politics: The Complexities of Comparing Merger Enforce-
ment over Time and Between Agencies, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 37, 38.
411 RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN THE AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-1956 4 (1959);
Ramon Fauli-Oller, Takeover Waves, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 189, 189 (2000).
412 See Muris,supra note411, at38.
413 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 396, at 30-31.
414 The SIC and NAICS codes provide industry definitions that enable the agencies to classify
mergers and measure market concentration during the merger review process. North American Industry
Classification System Main Page, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics (last
visited July 25, 2010).
415 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 396, at 30-31.
416 Id. at 31.
417 See Muris,supra note4l 1, at 37.
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has changed substantially such that the total number of mergers and second
requests as a percentage of total mergers is not similar.48 Even given these
changes, if one examines the percentage of second requests to enforcement
actions of each agency (something akin to field goal percentage of shots
made to shots taken) during the Bush years (fiscal year 2002 to January 20,
2009), then the DOJ rate looks similar to previous administrations.4 9
e. Not Enough Data Points in the Baker and Shapiro
Qualitative Study
Baker and Shapiro only interviewed Chambers practitioners in tiers
one through three, and only in the DC market.4 2' There are a number of li-
mitations to such interviews. With such a small sample of respondents, the
personalities of the individual lawyers and their particular biases may be at
play, particularly with regard to limitations on their deals. Further, there
may be representativeness problems between the sample and other elite
practitioners not included in the survey.
The number of deals in which these elite practitioners were directly
involved may be too low overall to be representative of all deals, or even all
important deals. It may be that certain merger shops within the DOJ or FTC
are overrepresented. The practitioners responding to the survey may be
more likely to see deals in certain industries, rather than others, based on
the mix of existing clients or on the backgrounds of the partners as DOJ or
FTC alumni.
f. General Data Limitations
Some level of transparency on mergers exists, as the agencies provide
data on merger activity and investigations to Congress.42' However, this
data is reported in the aggregate. The types of evidence and arguments to
which the agencies are receptive vary over time.
Although there is not much information from the DOJ on these issues,
there is some at the FTC. Early in the Merger Transparency Project, the
FTC held discussions with the DOJ on data studies.422 The Agencies jointly
418 See id.
419 llene Knable Gotts & James F. Rill, Reflections on Bush Administration M&A Antitrust En-
forcement and Beyond, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 91, 116 (2009) ("[The DOJ rate] was substantial
and well within the historic range of prior administrations.")
420 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 247.
421 E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 312.
422 DOJiAntitrust: Merger Enforcement Workshop Information (February 17-19, 2004), U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/publiclworkshopsmeworkshop.htm (last visited July 25,
2010).
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released an enforcement data report.423 The FTC followed with the Merger
Data summarizing both enforced and closed cases.424 The DOJ never up-
dated this. A reasonable person might conclude that the DOJ was unable to
assemble data on closed cases. With only a single decision maker, the DOJ
has less need for formal analysis, and thus cases may close when one per-
son decides that the merger is not anticompetitive. Written records might be
scarce. The FTC needs a majority of Commission votes to challenge a mer-
ger,425 so analysis is much more formalized. Given that files exist, coding is
just a commitment of resources.
g. Cheap Consents
Former FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger had more cheap consents426
during her tenure than other FTC chairmen. If the difference in enforcement
actions between Pitofsky and Steiger has to do with a difference in the val-
ue of cheap consents as part of enforcement, then the underlying numbers
that Baker and Shapiro have used do not allow for true "apples to apples"
comparisons across administrations. 427 Similarly, the threshold for settling
cases at the DOJ may have shifted from the earlier period to the Bush pe-
riod.428
h. Changes in Case Law, Agency Practice, and Transparency
Merger case law of decided cases changed between the Clinton and
Bush administrations,429 and these decisions constituted setbacks for agency
enforcement. Changes in case law affect the agencies' ability to get future
wins in court.43° Agency leadership may not be willing to bring cases if it
knows with enough certainty that it will lose such challenges. One impor-
423 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL
YEARS 1999-2003 1 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/201898.pdf.
424 COATE & HEIMERT, supra note 410; Coate & Ulrick, supra note 405.
425 Malcom B. Coate & Fred S. McChesney, Empirical Evidence on FTC Enforcement of the
Merger Guidelines, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 277, 278 (1992).
426 Former FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris describes a "cheap consent" as a case that an agency
settles in which both the agency and the party have invested less effort. Muris, supra note 411, at 37.
Muris provides the example of "a gerrymandered, small market in a large transaction," explaining that
"[t]he parties may grumble, but accept a settlement as a 'tax' on their merger." Id.
427 Id.
428 Based on practitioner comments.
429 The most important such case was the setback DOJ suffered in United States v. Oracle Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
430 William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor
Plaintiff, 82 IOWA L. REV. 127, 135-36 (1996) (explaining that case law development shapes the differ-
ences in agency win totals in court).
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tant case during the Bush years that shifted the government's ability to win
a merger challenge in court followed from the DOJ loss in
Oracle/Peoplesof.431
Changes in case law affect the total number of cases. "Under-
enforcement" in mergers is in part a function of the ability to get wins be-
fore courts. Pitofsky laments that "the decline of antitrust enforcement
against mergers between direct rivals ('horizontal mergers') [under Bush] is
the most pronounced and unfortunate effect of the influence of Chicago
School economics. '432 Moreover, Pitofsky was one of the biggest critics of
Reagan's antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, the Pitofsky-led FTC of the
1990s did not reach the 1970s levels of FTC enforcement.433 Since Pitofsky
was hostile then and now to the Chicago approach, something else must be
at play to explain how Pitofsky's numbers looked similar to those of pre-
vious administrations. This is partially due to case law that was less sympa-
thetic to strong enforcement.434 Empirical work suggests that the dramatic
change in merger enforcement began in 1974, the same year that the Su-
preme Court decided General Dynamics.435
Other institutional issues might be at play in terms of case counts. The
increased use of FTC administrative proceedings to address merger issues
simultaneously with court action, which became pronounced at the end of
the Bush administration,436 represents an institutional shift to use the power
of the FTC as distinct from the DOJ. This may create a different set of dy-
namics for practitioners in their decision-making process of whether and
when to settle or abandon a deal with the FTC vis-A-vis the DOJ.437
One problem in addressing claims of potential under-enforcement is
that there are limits on transparency. To have a better sense of what the real
world of merger control looks like, one needs to know: who makes the ini-
tial HSR filing; which lawyers and law firms represent the merging parties;
the particular staffers at the agencies assigned to the transactions; the par-
ticular horizontal overlaps in individual HSR filings; and the theories that
the parties used before the government in particular cases. Some lawyers
may be more prone to second requests than others.43 It may be that some
lawyers appear in more cases with second requests because of greater spe-
431 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1]75-76.
432 HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 40, at 233.
433 See Ghosal, supra note 409, at 146-48.
434 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 1-10.
435 Ghosal, supra note 409, at 146-48.
436 Brennan & Pugh, supra note 156, at 29.
437 As Commissioner Rosch explained in a speech, "Congress concluded that it was in the public
interest to grant this judicial authority to the Commission instead of to the federal district courts." J.
Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, A Peek Inside: One Commissioner's Perspective on the
Commission's Roles as Prosecutor and Judge II (July 3, 2008), available at
http:llwww.ftc.govlspeecheslrosch/O80703nera.pdf.
438 According to my discussions with both current and former DOJ and FTC staff.
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cialization. Alternatively, some lawyers may be more prone to second re-
quests as a function of trust (or lack thereof) with the agencies.439 Other
lawyers may simply be more skilled than others in advocating their position
regardless of the facts. The same may be true with economic experts hired
by the parties to support their positions. The reason why some deals receive
second requests more than others might be a function of the agency staff.
Sometimes a particular merger shop might be more or less prone to second
requests or to challenge a deal.'
In a number of ways, transparency on merger issues has increased. In-
creased transparency can shape the raw numbers of case filings, second
requests, deal abandonments, settlements, and court challenges. Increased
transparency in merger control includes a series of publications in 2002 and
2003 on the merger review process." Additional efforts culminated in the
2006 joint DOJ/FTC Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 2
Greater transparency by the agencies may have contributed to a better sense
of what deals might face investigation. In important matters where the DOJ
decided not to challenge a proposed merger, such as in the XM/Sirius or
Maytag/Whirlpool mergers, the DOJ released a statement explaining the
rationale for allowing the deal to proceed without a challenge." 3 Increased
transparency has reduced uncertainty.'0 Consequently, certain types of
mergers may not be attempted or certain investigations may be settled earli-
er or with upfront divestitures suggested because of a better idea of what
arguments will prevail.
Finally, it may be that the major point of contention over a transaction
may have shifted to earlier in the HSR process. The critical point of negoti-
ation between the parties and the agencies may no longer be before the
courts or with agency leadership. Instead, it may occur at the agency staff
level. The standards for winning a preliminary injunction against merging
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerfaq.shtm (last visited July 25, 2010); FTC Initiates "Best Practices Analy-
sis" for Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/bcfaq.shtm
(last visited July 25, 2010); Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition On
Guidelines for Merger Investigations, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/12/bcguidelines0212l l.htm (last visited July 25, 2010); Statement of the
Federal Trade Commission 's Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices03401.shtm (last visited July 25, 2010).
442 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/Commentaryon
theHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf
443 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
on its Decision to Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc.'s Merger with Sirius
Satellite Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08
at 226.html.
444 Transcript of Responses to Qualitative Survey (on file with author).
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parties changed during the Bush administration,"5 and the relevant stan-
dards for second requests and challenges alike affect the merging parties'
decision-making calculus."6 Consent decrees are far more the norm rather
than court challenges." 7 The kinds of remedies that the agencies might seek
and the types of arguments that the agencies may be more or less prone to
accept may have changed between the Clinton and Bush administrations
and across agencies. This may affect the total amount of mergers filed and
challenged.
D. Methods of Current Study
The current study aims to move beyond some of the traditional data
limitations to develop a more informed view of merger control. By doing
so, it is possible to undertake a more nuanced comparative institutional
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the merger system. The limit of
practitioner views is that oftentimes they prove unsystematic and unverifia-
ble.4" To address these concerns, I attempted to create a more systematic
way of reaching a broader set of practitioner experiences that make up the
decision-making process. I do so using two survey instruments. Each sur-
vey respondent was contacted twice for both types of surveys. I contacted
all respondents by e-mail. This survey has collected as much data as possi-
ble and has minimized selection bias."9 Respondents in the qualitative and
quantitative web surveys overlap but are distinct.
The first survey was a quantitative online survey of antitrust practi-
tioners. Additionally, I created a qualitative survey of elite antitrust practi-
tioners, as measured by Chambers rankings, that averaged thirty-five mi-
nutes per practitioner in asking specific questions as to their practice and
issues that emerge from it based on their particular expertise. This second
survey was not anonymous in that I selected practitioners because of their
expertise (although the actual responses were coded so as to preserve the
anonymity of respondents).
Social scientists have recognized the value of combining quantitative
and qualitative work.45° I use both because of the limits of asking close-
445 See FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
446 Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, ANTITRUST, Fall
1995, at 4, 4 ("Consent decree settlements resolving ... Antitrust Division challenges to proposed
acquisitions and other conduct are now much more the rule than the exception.").
44' See id.
448 Kovacic, supra note 313, at 133-34.
449 GARY KING, ROBERTO. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC
INFERENCE IN QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 23 (1994); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 99 (2002) (explaining the importance of properly selecting observations).
450 Sidney Tarrow, Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science, 89 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 471,472 (1995) (citing KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra note 450).
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ended questions that do not allow for development of the rich complexity of
antitrust merger issues.
This Article represents an attempt to understand antitrust compliance
as it is practiced. The quantitative survey was sent via e-mail to various
ABA antitrust list serves in August 2008 and followed up with a reminder
in September 2008. The survey was for private lawyers in the United States
to respond to thirty-five questions related to antitrust and their backgrounds.
The survey data (both qualitative and quantitative): (1) uses summaries
of the data collected on antitrust to learn about what is really happening in
terms of institutional strengths and weaknesses in the merger control
process; and (2) uses the findings on merger control to suggest applications
of institutional analysis in antitrust more broadly. Causal inferences can
also be drawn from the data regarding merger control. First, the DOJ was
not less aggressive in enforcement relative to historic standards for over
half of the respondents. For nearly half of the respondents, there was a
small change "at the margins.""45 Second, there was no change in enforce-
ment levels between the Clinton FTC and Bush FTC. These research ques-
tions both contribute to existing knowledge in the area of merger control
and have implications for merger practice through potential improvements
to its institutional structures.452 Though previous studies examined merger
control under the Bush administration, this is the first such study that uses
survey data to explain whether the current institutional structures of merger
control are effective and whether there was decreased aggressiveness on the
part of the Bush DOJ.
I tested the data with a number of hypotheses. The quantitative survey
is more limited because of the number of questions specific to mergers (the
survey included cartel and non-cartel enforcement questions as well). The
following hypotheses were tested:
(1) There was less merger enforcement under Bush from the DOJ;
(2) There was less merger enforcement under Bush from the FTC;
(3) The analytical quality of judges on antitrust issues has improved
relative to ten or twenty years ago;
(4) Greater transparency by the antitrust agencies has improved busi-
ness decision making;
(5) The merger process is too costly for firms;
451 The use of the term "at the margins" is important. Baker and Shapiro correctly suggest a change
at the margins may be enough to make a relative difference in merger enforcement. Indeed, most anti-
trust changes with effects occur at the margins. However, it is not a seismic shift in enforcement, as
antitrust discourse has labeled it, if slightly over half of respondents felt no shift at all and most of the
remainder felt only a small shift.
452 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Ctu. L. REV. 1, 55 (2002) (suggesting
that research design must have both academic and real world importance). Section 6 of their article
explains selection bias and efforts made to minimize it in the two survey instruments. Id. at 76-80.
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(6) International merger control has improved in terms of process;
(7) International merger control has improved in terms of substantive
analysis employed by non-U.S. agencies;
(8) State merger control is a net loss in national mergers;
(9) Private rights are a net loss in merger control; and
(10) Sector regulation is a net loss in merger control.
Future research into this area could examine longitudinal data. Such
data would explain temporal changes in enforcement and reactions by firms
to such enforcement. Unfortunately, this was the first such study, so such
longitudinal data does not exist.
1. Web-Based Quantitative Survey
Web-based surveys have become increasingly used for data collec-
tion.4"3 A number of law and economics professors (both antitrust profes-
sors and survey methodology professors) reviewed earlier versions of the
survey to ensure facial validity of the survey questions. Current DOJ and
FTC staff who previously worked in private practice pretested the survey
questions. As a result of these efforts, I modified, added, or dropped a num-
ber of questions.
The data for this study comes from an online survey, which was
launched at www.surveymonkey.com. The survey sample is 234 expe-
rienced antitrust lawyers from a survey population of 1,203 practitioners."
The survey instrument asked thirty-four questions and was composed of
three sections: mergers (business combination of two or more firms), cartels
(illegal price fixing among two or more competitors), and non-cartel en-
forcement (primarily issues of monopolization by a single firm).
The web-based survey was a list-based survey sent to a closed set of
potential respondents of target individuals (ABA Antitrust Section Mem-
bers). The survey was a probability survey in that every member of the
ABA antitrust section listserv had an equal chance of being selected. Some
studies suggest that internet-based surveys have similar response rates to
paper-based surveys.455 Web response rates range from 7 percent to 44 per-
cent." 6 My response rate of 19 percent falls within this survey range.
453 DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS 8 (2d ed. 2006).
454 This number is based on removing foreign practitioners, government practitioners, law school
students, non-lawyer economic consultants, and others from the membership lists of the listservs.
455 Philip Ritter et al., Internet Versus Mailed Questionnaires: A Randomized Comparison, 6 J.
MED. INTERNET RES. 1, 6 (2004). But see Pam Leece et al., Internet Versus Mailed Questionnaires: A
Randomized Comparison (2), 6 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 30, 38 (2004) (suggesting lower response rates
from internet based surveys).
456 MATTHIAS SCHONLAU, RONALD D. FRICKER, JR. & MARC N. ELLIOTT, CONDUCTING
RESEARCH SURVEYS VIA E-MAIL AND THE WEB 20 (2002).
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The survey used "radio buttons" rather than drop down pick lists be-
cause radio buttons are less prone to non-responsiveness and accidental
answer changes.457 Answers were based on questions one through five to
create mean responses to survey questions.
2. Descriptive Findings of the General Practitioner Survey
Survey question one asked "[i]n the past two years, what percentage of
all of your professional legal time on matters is merger related?" Of those
that answered for whom the question was applicable, for 52 percent of res-
pondents, it was between 0-20 percent of their work. For 19 percent of res-
pondents, merger work was between 21-40 percent of their work. For the
remaining 29 percent, it was 41 percent or more of their work.
The next survey question, question two, asked "[i]n the past two years,
how many proposed mergers (from early thoughts about the proposed deal
to the point of just before an HSR filing) were you personally (at any stage
of the process) consulted by the parties that required an HSR filing?" The
purpose of this question was to capture all potential merger-related activity
by practitioners that would not necessarily be included in the government-
released amount of HSRs filed, and to see how many practitioners had a
significant merger practice in terms of deal volume. Of those respondents
for whom the question was applicable, 46 percent were personally involved
in one to five deals, whereas the remainder had more than five such deals.
Question three followed up on question two. It asked of those pro-
posed mergers in question two, "how many of the deals were abandoned
(rather than restructured) primarily on antitrust grounds as part of the risk-
reward calculation of doing the deal prior to HSR filings?" The idea behind
this question was to gauge how much antitrust risk factors impeded poten-
tial mergers. For most respondents, the question was not applicable. For
those who did respond, the vast majority (89 percent) reported it happened
one to five times during the two-year period. Question four also followed
up by asking "[w]hat is the percentage of these abandoned deals as a per-
centage of all of your number of deals for merger work?" Of those who
responded for whom the question was applicable, 84 percent said that such
abandoned deals encompassed between 0 and 20 percent of their total mer-
ger work. The remainder responded that it happened more frequently.
In question five, the survey asked respondents "[o]f those HSR filings
that were made, how many of the deals were abandoned (as opposed to
restructured) after filing because of antitrust concerns?" For most respon-
dents, this question was not applicable. For those respondents for which the
457 Benjamin Healey, Drop Downs and Scroll Mice: The Effect of Response Option Format and
Input Mechanism Employed on Data Quality in Web Surveys, 25 SOC. SC. COMPUTER REV. 111, 111
(2007).
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question was applicable, 96 percent stated that it happened one to five
times. The remainder responded that it happened more frequently. Question
six put question five into context by asking about the frequency of such
outcomes to total deal work. It asked "[w]hat is the percentage of these
abandoned deals as a percentage of number of deals of your merger work?"
For the respondents for whom the question was applicable, 95 percent ans-
wered that it was not more than 20 percent of their total merger work. The
remainder stated that it was greater than 20 percent.
Question seven focused on the costs of merger control in regard to
competition and over-deterrence. It asked, "[h]ow often do you think, on
the matters that you personally have worked on, that the U.S. antitrust re-
gime deters mergers that would not be anticompetitive (not including the
cost of delay)?" Of those who responded for whom the question was appli-
cable to their practice, 5 percent answered that it was frequent, 24 percent
answered often, whereas 70 percent answered never. This suggests that
most antitrust enforcement decisions undertaken are sound, even according
to the lawyers that represent the merging parties. The results were very in-
teresting as between those that answered "often" and "never." Statistical
analysis of these responses in Subsection 3, infra, sheds light on the nature
of these differences.
The purpose of question eight was to gauge the Baker and Shapiro
claim that Bush antitrust merger enforcement needed reinvigoration. Ques-
tion eight asked, "[w]hat is your perception of the current merger enforce-
ment by U.S. federal antitrust agencies?" For those that found the question
applicable to their own practice, 39 percent found that current practice (at
that time, under the Bush administration) was efficiency enhancing, 32 per-
cent found that current agency practice was neutral, and 30 percent found
that current practice was efficiency degrading. With only 30 percent of res-
pondents believing that Bush antitrust was efficiency degrading, this wea-
kens the basis of the Baker and Shapiro claim of Bush under-enforcement.
Questions nine and ten asked about the effectiveness of the antitrust
agencies on merger issues under Bush in historical context vis-a-vis en-
forcement ten and twenty years ago. Ten years prior to the survey (i.e.,
1998) coincided with the aftermath of the FTC v. Staples, Inc.458 case. That
case was a landmark decision because of its use of econometric analysis
and the application of a credible evidence standard for efficiencies.459 In
terms of analytical shifts during that same time, one milestone was the
FTC's 1996 report, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in
458 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
459 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of
Pricing in FTC v. Staples, 13 INT'L. J. ECON. Bus. 265, 277 (2006).
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the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace.' The report articulated the need
to consider issues of magnitude and probability in its merger efficiency
analysis. 1 Roughly the same percentage of respondents thought that mer-
ger enforcement was significantly or moderately efficiency enhancing ten
years prior (i.e., 1998) while 20 percent found the opposite to be true. This
suggests that there has been a small increase in the number who find merger
enforcement to be less efficiency enhancing now than before.
When asked about the quality of merger enforcement twenty years
prior to the survey (i.e., 1988), 19 percent responded that it was either sig-
nificantly or moderately efficiency enhancing, while 26 percent thought the
opposite. One important change between ten and twenty years prior to the
survey was the 1992 Merger Guidelines. These questions on perception
suggest that practitioners believe that the 1992 Merger Guidelines have
improved the quality of merger analysis.
The final merger-related question went to the issue of merger costs.
The question asked, "[i]n your personal experience in terms of the internal
costs of antitrust merger review (time spent on lawyer hours, internal client
hours, economic experts hours, etc.), is the U.S. merger-review process
more costly now than ten years ago?" Of respondents for whom the ques-
tion was applicable, 76 percent responded that the cost of mergers had in-
creased, 12 percent responded that costs had remained constant, and 12
percent believed that merger costs had decreased.
The survey used a number of questions to identify the characteristics
of respondents. Some of these questions explored potential ideological bias,
as the questions had a subjective element to them. Among respondents, in
presidential elections, 38 percent tended to vote Republican, 58 percent
voted Democratic, and 4 percent voted "Other." To determine antitrust
ideological bias, the survey asked about the respondent's views on antitrust
economics and asked the respondent to identify himself as either Chicago
School (43 percent) or Post-Chicago School (57 percent). That so many
respondents self-identify as both Democrats and post-Chicago in their
orientation strengthens the validity of the findings that the quality of merger
analysis under Bush, as measured in questions eight to ten, was efficiency
enhancing or neutral, as opposed to Pitofsky's lamentation.462
Some of the bias of respondents might have to do with the number of
years of practice that they bring to their understanding of antitrust. Of those
that responded to the survey, 4 percent identified as having practiced for
460 1 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21 ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW
HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1996), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_vl .pdf(addressing changes in the high tech marketplace).
461 Id. at 27.
462 Perhaps the deciding factor is not political or economic ideology but that sixty-seven respon-
dents primarily represented the defense side of antitrust enforcement. Lawyers may believe their clients'
positions.
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one to five years, 12 percent as having practiced five to ten years, 24 per-
cent with a practice of eleven to twenty years, 25 percent as practicing
twenty-one to thirty years, and 36 percent as practicing thirty-one or more
years.
An antitrust practitioner's type of work might lead to various biases in
terms of what he believes to be the frequency and the type of antitrust en-
forcement occurring nationally. The survey distinguished between in-house
and law firm practitioners. No respondents identified as exclusively in-
house plaintiff, and a mere 1 percent identified as in-house primarily plain-
tiff. On the defense side, 3 percent of respondents identified as in-house
exclusively defense, while 9 percent of respondents identified as in-house
primarily defense. Law firm practitioners constituted the remainder of res-
pondents to the survey. 1 percent identified as exclusively plaintiff, and 6
percent as primarily plaintiff. 13 percent of respondents identified as law
firm exclusively defense, while 67 percent identified as primarily defense.
Previous government experience might also shape the way that practi-
tioners feel about government antitrust enforcement. The survey asked
"[p]rior to private practice, have you ever worked as an attorney for the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Federal Trade Commission[,] or
for a State antitrust enforcer on antitrust matters?" 32 percent responded
yes, and 69 percent responded no.
Another factor that might affect a respondent's subjective responses
would be the breadth of work that they see based on the position that they
hold within their law firm. A more senior person might have oversight over
a significant number of people even though their ability to spend time on
any one particular matter might be more limited. 57 percent of respondents
identified themselves as a Partner, 20 percent as Counsel/Of Counsel, 12
percent as an Associate, and 12 percent as "Other."
3. Statistical Analysis of the General Practitioner Survey
The web-based study employs cross-tabulations to identify the rela-
tionship between independent and dependent variables and to determine
whether the factors made a difference by comparing differences between
groups. Z tests are used to compare the proportions from two groups to de-
termine if they are significantly different from one another.46 3 Since most of
the variables have more than two groups, the Bonferroni method' is used
to adjust the significance values of the Z tests for multiple comparisons.
463 Z-Test-Basics and the Different Z-Tests, EXPER[MENT-RESOURCES.COM,
http://www.experiment-resources.com/z-test.html (last visited July 25, 2010).
464 Sture Holm, A Simple Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure, 6 SCANDINAVIAN J.
STAT. 65, 68 (1979).
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In attempting to run regression analysis on the practitioner survey data
results, I found that almost all of the independent variables were not signifi-
cant. Given this problem, I used cross tables.65 Most questions did not
show significant group differences. After I combined some categories,
some groups' sample sizes were still too small to make a group comparison,
such as question five ("Of those HSR filings that were made, how many of
the deals were abandoned (as opposed to restructured) after filing because
of antitrust concerns?") and question six ("What is the percentage of these
abandoned deals as a percentage of number of deals of your merger
work?"). The results can be found in Appendix B to this Article. The fol-
lowing sub-subsections address merger-related questions using cross tables.
a. Question Two: "In the past two years, how many proposed
mergers (from early thoughts about the proposed deal to
the point ofjust before an HSR filing) were you personally
(at any stage of the process) consulted by the parties that
required an HSR filing? "
According to lawyers' answers about the number of proposed mergers
requiring a HSR filing, on which lawyers were personally consulted by the
parties in the past two years, I divided the lawyers into three groups: one to
five proposed mergers ("group A"), more than five proposed mergers
("group B"), and not applicable ("N/A") ("group C"). Compared to group A
lawyers, group B lawyers are significantly more likely to spend more than
40 percent of professional time on merger-related matters. In addition, the
proportion of group B lawyers who have six to ten years of practice expe-
rience is greater than the proportion of group A lawyers with six to ten
years of practice experience.
465 For statistical analysis, larger samples are better than smaller samples (all other things being
equal) because larger samples tend to minimize the probability of errors, maximize the accuracy of
population estimates, and increase the generalizability of the results. So sample size is very important
for regression analysis. Since Multiple Linear Regression ("MLR") runs every analysis on a different
sample, it requires the sample size to be adequate in each categorical level. As a rule of thumb, Peduzzi
et al. recommend that the smaller of the classes of the dependent variable have at least 10 events per
parameter in the model. See Peter Peduzzi et al., A Simulation Study of the Number of Events Per Varia-
ble in Logistic Regression Analysis, 49 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1373, 1373 (1996). The reason for
this is that with too small a class, any estimates generated may not be both reliable and unbiased esti-
mates of the qualities of a larger universe of antitrust practitioners. The practitioner survey data results
did not fit this rule very well. First, the goodness of fit test in the regression analysis assumes that for
cells formed by the categorical independents, all cell frequencies are >1 and no more than 20 percent of
cells are < 5. However, for question two in the data, 57 percent of cells are <5. So the data does not meet
this requirement. Second, when I ran the models, I always got high parameter estimates, which may also
signal inadequate sample size. I tried to combine levels of some variables and rerun the models, but the
results were still not good.
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Similar to group A lawyers, more than half of group B lawyers have
over eleven years of practice experience, currently handle primarily defense
at a law firm, have a current title of "Partner," and have never worked as an
attorney for the DOJ Antitrust Division, the FTC, or a State antitrust en-
forcer on antitrust matters.
b. Question Seven: "How often do you think on the matters
that you personally have worked on that the U.S. antitrust
regime deters mergers that would not be anticompetitive
(not including the cost of delay) ?"
Lawyers who work on antitrust matters are asked how often-based
on the matters that they have worked on personally-they think the U.S.
antitrust regime deters non-anticompetitive mergers. Based on their answers
about the frequency, lawyers are divided into four groups: frequently/often
("group A"), sometimes ("group B"), seldom/never ("group C"), and N/A
("group D"). It is not surprising that most of lawyers in group C who sel-
dom/never think that their past experiences indicate that the U.S. antitrust
regime prevents mergers that would not have anticompetitive effects. Com-
pared to group C, group B lawyers are more likely to think the current mer-
ger enforcement by U.S. federal antitrust agencies is moderate-
ly/significantly efficiency degrading. The group comparison results indicate
that there is no other significant difference among group A, B, and C.
4. Qualitative Interviews of Elite Practitioners
Qualitative methodology has some advantages over quantitative me-
thods. Qualitative methods allow for more contextualized data. 4' They also
provide for a more detailed examination of issues through closeness to
people and the daily issues that they confront. Qualitative interviews pro-
vide for greater interaction and the study of dialogue understandings of
phenomena.467 Specific to the antitrust merger study, the qualitative inter-
views provided greater depth in exploring outcomes of respondents, as
compared to the quantitative survey, and the ability to evaluate evolving
antitrust enforcement.
From August to September 2009, I completed 117 phone interviews of
Chambers-ranked antitrust specialists located in California, Florida, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and
466 Jeff Goodwin & Ruth Horowitz, Introduction: The Methodological Strengths and Dilemmas of
Qualitative Sociology, 25 QUALITATIVE Soc. 33, 44 (2002).
467 See BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER: WHY SOCIAL INQUIRY FAILS AND
How IT CAN SUCCEED AGAIN 83 (Stephen Sampson trans., 2001).
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Washington, DC. There are 319 Chambers-ranked antitrust practitioners in
those states. 6" This was a response rate of 37 percent for the qualitative
survey of elite practitioners. Both the number and geographic scope of prac-
titioner responses were significantly greater than the Baker and Shapiro
interviews.
The qualitative interviews of elite antitrust practitioners were intended
to determine if the general survey reflected the same sort of concerns that
elite practitioners faced in practice. Elite practitioners are more likely to
have client matters that represent the more difficult cases decided "at the
margins," and they are more likely to deal with cutting-edge issues in mer-
ger analysis and agency responses to novel theories.
I conducted each of the interviews by myself. I took notes during all
interviews. All interviews were phone interviews. Each of the interviews
began with close-ended questions regarding employment background. The-
reafter, the qualitative interviews took an "Interview Guide" approach. This
approach utilizes open-ended questions with similar questions across inter-
viewees. The Interview Guide approach uses an outline of issues that will
be covered and where the order or working can be changed flexibly during
the conversation to guide the discussion. 69 The order and flow of questions
varied somewhat due to the answers provided. I pretested the survey in
summer 2009 among current DOJ and FTC staff that had prior private prac-
tice experience and among antitrust law professors.
In this study, the qualitative survey conversations only went into detail
on merger analysis if the practitioner spent at least 40 percent of their time
on merger-related work. This cutoff was to ensure that practitioners who
responded had expertise on merger issues.
5. Qualitative Interview Findings
a. Hypothesis One: There Was Less Merger Enforcement
Under Bush from the Department of Justice
The results are ambiguous. A little over half of respondents stated that,
in their practice, they experienced no change in enforcement from Clinton
to Bush. Of the remaining roughly half of respondents, on the margins, DOJ
enforcement was less aggressive specifically when it came to the use of
468 CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, CHAMBERS USA: AMERICA'S LEADING LAWYERS FOR BUSINESS 391,
607, 785,976, 1260, 1558, 1822, 1951,2083 (2008).
469 The disadvantage to this approach is that some data comparisons will be difficult because
different respondents respond to questions that are not all the same. On qualitative interview methodol-
ogy, see generally STEINAR KVALE, INTERViEWS: AN INTRODUCTION TO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
INTERVIEWING 144-46 (1996) (discussing qualitative interview methodology); MICHAEL QUINN
PATTON, QUALITATIVE EVALUATION AND RESEARCH METHODS 283-89 (2d ed. 1990).
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efficiency or entry arguments. Some deals that should have gone to a
second request did not. Other deals that went to a second request that might
have been challenged were not. This seemed to be particularly true for three
to two mergers and sometimes even for two to one mergers. Part of the
change on the margins was attributed to a shift in DOJ leadership under
Tom Barnett, though some of the practitioners believed that the shift hap-
pened earlier under Hew Pate.
In terms of whether there was a "sharply higher" rate of success of
merger clearance against the DOJ (to use the Baker and Shapiro language),
only three practitioners believed that there was a sharply higher success
rate. I asked about a sharply higher success rate in the following context. If
an elite practitioner thought that there was a sharply higher success rate, as
a good business counselor to clients, they would actively suggest that their
clients and/or the corporate partners at their firm do deals because the
chances of success were better. In nearly all cases, elite practitioner respon-
dents did not actively suggest that their firm's transactional partners or their
clients create deals that they otherwise would not have thought to do based
on their perception of sharply less antitrust scrutiny by the DOJ.
A number of practitioners believed that Oracle/Peoplesoft chilled the
DOJ's appetite to challenge mergers. Part of this had to do with the percep-
tion that the DOJ did not have a strong litigation team even if they found a
case that they wanted to try because there had been so little litigation at the
agency. Some suggested that morale suffered at the DOJ as more aggressive
case handlers at the agency were frustrated by front office reluctance to
support these cases. In some instances, the practitioners believed that this
created a chilling effect within the agency that made staff less likely to rec-
ommend aggressive enforcement in cases on the margins.
A slight majority of practitioners felt that there was no change because
the particular industries in which they had clients had the same staff as dur-
ing the Clinton years and that those staffers were equally aggressive under
Bush. Some economists assigned to particular industries were just as ag-
gressive under the Bush DOJ as they were during the Clinton years.
As between the DOJ and the FTC, practitioners felt that there was a
difference in enforcement, although for reasons different than those given
by Baker and Shapiro. The big issue for differences in the enforcement
record of the agencies was attributed to their disparate institutional struc-
tures. Respondents generally believed that regardless of administration, it is
more difficult to get a deal through the FTC than the DOJ because of the
dynamics among agency staff, front office leadership, and the Commission-
ers. Certain Commissioners have particular issues of interest which inter-
jects additional deal complexity. Adding to the dynamics of FTC agency
decision making was the particular mix of Commissioners under Bush.
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b. Hypothesis Two: There Was Less Merger Enforcement Un-
der Bush from the FTC
Baker and Shapiro claim that there was less enforcement at the FTC
under Bush, although this was less pronounced than the decline in merger
enforcement at the DOJ."' They make the point that the FTC challenged
mergers at roughly the historical rate during Muris's tenure.47" ' The shortfall
occurred when Deborah Platt Majoras was Chairman. The overwhelming
majority of practitioners believed that FTC merger control remained con-
stant between the Clinton and Bush years.
Uniformly, respondents did not have firsthand experience of reduced
enforcement in mergers under the Bush FTC. Practitioners overall gave
Chairmen Muris and William Kovacic very strong marks for their leader-
ship and intellectual abilities. The dynamics within the Commission seemed
to change after Majoras left the Chairman position. Many respondents
viewed Commissioner Tom Rosch as a wildcard Commissioner. Moreover,
most respondents believed that Rosch had significant influence over Com-
missioners Jon Liebowitz and Pamela Jones Harbour.
Practitioners also mentioned that particular merger shops within the
FTC pushed for more scrutiny on deals than others. Data backs up these
observations. The FTC provides industry-specific tables in the Merger Re-
trospective Reports 1996-2003, 1996-2005, and 1996-2007. The tables
break out oil, .chemicals, grocery, and pharmaceutical data. These tables
show that, in some areas (such as the oil industry), there is enforcement at
lower levels of concentration.
472
c. Hypothesis Three: The Analytical Quality of Judges on
Antitrust Issues Has Improved Relative to Ten or Twenty
Years Ago
Respondents expressed mixed feelings on judicial quality. A strong
majority of practitioners stated that the overall quality of analysis had im-
proved, but that the quality remained highly variable. Most of the practi-
tioners mentioned that not all judges had the analytical ability to compre-
hend antitrust cases. Practitioners also noted that some of the judges per-
ceived to be "smarter" overall and/or with antitrust experience were at
times involved in poor quality decisions if they were too busy to devote
sufficient time to the antitrust issues in the case.
470 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 244-51.
471 Id. at 246.
472 FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1996-2005
7-13 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/08/04083 Ihorizmergersdata96-03.pdf.
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Respondents did not provide uniform answers as to why it was that
judicial quality had improved. Some suggested that it was judicial training
programs in law and economics. Others suggested that it was favorable case
law (pro-defendant) that meant that judges were more effective. The more
plaintiff-side work that a lawyer did, the more concerned the lawyer was on
the ideological impact of Republican-appointed judges. According to plain-
tiff-lawyer respondents, Republican appointees decided cases "incorrectly"
when they made pro-defense decisions. Defense side respondents showed
similar bias in claiming improved judicial quality stemming from judicial
understanding of complex issues when it meant pro-defense outcomes. This
strong belief in judicial variance on antitrust matters supports the recent
empirical work of Baye and Wright discussed earlier in this Article.
d. Hypothesis Four: Greater Transparency by the Agency Has
Improved Business Decision Making
The survey results indicate a divide between those practitioners within
the beltway and those outside the beltway. Those practitioners outside the
beltway whose firms did not have a DC office or who themselves were not
frequently in DC for merger discussions with the agencies (in nearly all
cases NY practitioners) indicated the existence of an insider community on
merger issues, which had better day-to-day understandings of subtle shifts
in language and practice at the agencies. This seems to be due to a revolv-
ing door between law firms and the agencies at both junior and senior levels
and to regular repeat interactions with the agencies. For outsiders to this
group, some believed that they could get enough information by reading
agency official speeches and following latest developments from agency
releases and court cases. Others believed that there was not enough transpa-
rency, particularly at the individual case level. A number of respondents
believed that the DOJ has not been as forthcoming with information as the
FTC.
Transparency is an important issue in the area of merger control, and a
number of practitioners discussed its importance. How much transparency
is sufficient? This question led to a wide variety of responses. The variation
may be due to the fact that too much transparency might be viewed as bad
for antitrust lawyers. After all, antitrust lawyers bill at premium rates pre-
cisely because of the great complexity of their work. If others could repli-
cate it, then it would not be as valuable to clients.
Current FTC Chairman Jon Liebowitz recently stated, "[f]rom my
perspective, the current Guidelines do not explain clearly enough to busi-
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nesses how the agencies review transactions." '473 At some fundamental level
this will always be the case. In a specialized area of complex regulatory
law, there are whatever guidelines an agency (or in our case agencies) will
promulgate and then small groups of insider lawyers who will have enough
repeat business to really understand the meaning of the guidelines via their
agency contacts. For others, the guidelines will remain unclear unless the
agencies create a 600-page set of merger guidelines. Sometimes too much
transparency by government has drawbacks.474 The language of the Merger
Guidelines is difficult to comprehend because it is written for antitrust ex-
perts rather than for lawyers generally or laymen. A 600 page set of guide-
lines written in plain English would allow non-elite practitioners without
lots of agency interaction to better understand the meaning of the Merger
Guidelines. However, such a set of Guidelines would be impractical and
potentially counter-productive because it would not provide enough flex-
ibility.
Perhaps the lack of plain language clarity creates a problem for judges
rather than for practitioners or non-lawyer business executives. As the
Guidelines recognize, the judiciary plays a role in enforcing merger law.475
However, who is the end user of the Guidelines? Is it the firms practicing
before the agencies, or is it judges? If the Guidelines have a purpose for
judges, there is an important institutional issue at play as there has not been
a merger case before the Supreme Court for many years.476
These questions lead to a meta-question. Is the law Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, or is it the Guidelines as defined by the agencies at any given
time? Many respondents believe that when talking to the agencies, the Mer-
ger Guidelines are only the starting point in a conversation, whereas the
same agencies in their court documents press the importance of the lan-
guage of the Guidelines because the courts are likely to accept the Guide-
lines in support of their rulings.
In this sense, the Merger Guidelines have become somewhat of
precedent for courts. As economic ideas have been adopted by the guide-
lines, courts have shifted their rulings in favor of such ideas.4 77 The agencies
recognize this and may use the Guidelines strategically to get support for
473 Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws 3 (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090924fordham
speech.pdf.
474 Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885, 902-14 (2006) (noting the
limits of government transparency).
475 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 377, § 0.01.
476 Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 866 (1997) ("[T]here has not been a substantive Supreme Court merger decision..
since 1974....").
477 Greene, supra note 350, at 775-77 ("[T]hese guidelines have acted as a stealth force on the
development of antitrust merger law.").
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their positions from the courts once Guidelines are adopted, even when the
case law does not support such positions.4 71
A number of respondents mentioned the importance of the recent
"FTC at 100" self-study as a transparency-creating device for business
counseling purposes. Respondents were positive about the FTC self-study's
goals. 479 Some questioned whether the self-study would lead to changes
under a Democratic administration.
e. Hypothesis Five: The Merger Process Is Too Costly for
Firms
Overwhelmingly, practitioner comments focused on the high cost of
agency merger review. These concerns echo those raised by the business
community and suggest that merger costs have increased because of e-
discovery and overly-large second requests.4"' The amount of data required
to comply with discovery has increased the cost of mergers. Respondents
suggested that second requests typically reached the $4 million to $8 mil-
lion range.
That respondents focused on the increased costs of second requests
suggests that changes by the agencies to limit these costs have met only
limited success. Agency attempts include the FTC 2006 Merger Process
Reforms and the DOJ 2006 Merger Process Initiative Amendments. 481 Most
respondents suggested that they were convinced that DOJ and FTC staff do
not go through all of the data. One practitioner summarized, "I know from
my days at the FTC that sometimes rows of boxes go unopened."
A problem that practitioners emphasized was the overly large number
of custodians whose documents must be produced. Another problem was
the actual time involved in fulfilling a second request. Second requests
seemed to be shorter for some as a result of their "repeat business" and the
consequent trust that they build up with agency staff.
Technological changes constitute one explanation for increasingly
large second requests. Because of e-mails and other electronic documents,
478 Paul T. Denis, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Revision: A Draftsman's Perspective, ANTITRUST
CHRON., Dec. 2009, at 1, 5.
479 WILLIAM E. KoVACic, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO
OUR 2ND CENTURY 13 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/01/ftcl 00rpt.pdf.
480 AMC REPORT, supra note 152, at 162 ("The burdens of second requests are high and increas-
ing."); William Blumenthal, Overenforcement in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request Process, in THE
ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 15, 26 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996).
481 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division Announces Amendments to Its 2001
Merger Review Process Initiative (Dec. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2006/220302.pdf, Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Reforms to the Merger Review Process 2 (Feb. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/O2/mergerreviewprocess.pdf.
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companies can collect far more data now than in past years. Another factor
is that the agency demand for data has increased, as the agencies undertake
more econometric analysis.482 Economic analysis seems to have become the
victim of its own success. On a number of these issues, practitioners did not
suggest solutions (other than fewer custodians) that would fundamentally
fix the problem.
One problem that a number of respondents mentioned is clearance.
Clearance is not an issue in many mergers. However, most practitioners
believed that when a clearance battle emerges, it raises a potentially signifi-
cant problem. As one practitioner recounted, "It is not a problem except
when it is and when it is, it is a big problem." Clearance battles between the
two agencies, over which agency will review the merger, add to increasing
costs for mergers by creating deal delays for the merging parties.483 Clear-
ance battles create additional business uncertainty for clients and do not
give clients the thirty-day comfort that they want.4" On the margins, a
number of practitioners mentioned that this creates problems for financing
some deals. The turf battle, respondents believed, could have been solved
with the ill-fated clearance deal of 2002.485 Some respondents confided they
were glad that clearance was not solved in 2002 because they had better
personal contacts in one agency than the other and because the clearance
deal would have meant a loss in their client-billable matters.
f. Hypothesis Six: International Merger Control Has Improved
in Terms of Process
Respondents reported that one problem in merger review has been the
number of jurisdictions that require a filing even when the merger effects
will be minimal. This adds to the cost of the transaction, especially given
that a number of practitioners complained of overly-high filing fees. As of
2009, there are 115 jurisdictions worldwide that have some form of merger
control." 6
The rapid growth and sheer number of jurisdictions involved in merger
control has had an impact on the practice of a number of the respondents.
482 AMC REPORT, supra note 152, at 165.
483 Id. at 134-35.
484 After the merging parties complete an HSR filing, the antitrust agency reviewing the merger
typically takes thirty days to decide whether to challenge the merger. If a clearance battle ensues, this
increases the likelihood of a second request because the antitrust agencies waste time fighting the clear-
ance battle instead of investigating the merger, and the agency who ends up doing the review runs out of
time under the thirty-day window. AMC REPORT, supra note 152, at 130.
485 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC and DOJ Announce New Clearance Procedures for
Antitrust Matters (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/clearance.shtm.
486 J. MARK GIDLEY & GEORGE L. PAUL, WORLDWIDE MERGER NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
(2009).
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Most respondents felt that the process of merger control, in terms of notifi-
cations, has improved significantly in the past few years. They tended to
suggest that this is a result of soft law efforts headed by the ICN and the
OECD. As a result of these efforts, both developed and emerging antitrust
jurisdictions have changed their practices to be in greater compliance. 487
In the wake of GE/Honeywell,488 the soft law institutions improved
coordination across jurisdictions. The ICN created Guiding Principles for
Merger Notification and Review Procedures in 2002 and followed up with
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures in
2005.489 Early work that tracks implementation of these principles reports
success in implementation around the world.49 Similarly, the OECD
created best practices for coordination and cooperation in merger review.49'
Recent ICN work has focused on notification thresholds for mergers
and has encouraged benchmarking.492 ICN released a report on notification
based on the responses to a survey of twenty-one jurisdictions that had re-
vised their reporting regimes in recent years. The report highlighted effec-
tive strategies for jurisdictions looking to revise their notification thre-
sholds.4 93
The ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures
suggests a six-month period for second reviews. 9" More and more transac-
tions around the world seem to be conforming to this recommended prac-
tice. However, some practitioners expressed concern that on important
transactions the period is longer. Respondents noted that enforcers appear
to be coordinating second requests more than before and sharing more in-
formation. This has reduced redundancies in the international merger re-
view process. In a purely European context, some practitioners complained
487 J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the ICN's Recommended Merger
Practices: A Work-in-(Early)-Progress, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2005, at 1, 2.
488 See generally, Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped-A Story
of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds.,
2007) (providing detail of the proposed merger).
489 See MERGER WORKING GROUP, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES (2005), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf.
490 J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the International Competition
Network's Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures: Final Report, 5 BUS. L. INT'L
110, 111-12 (2004); Rowley & Campbell, supra note 488, at 1-2.
491 OECD HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 277, at 3.
492 RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES, supra
note 490, at passim.
493 MERGER WORKING GROUP, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, SETTING NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS FOR MERGER REVIEW 3-13 (2008), available at
http://www.internationaleompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc326.pdf.
494 RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES, supra
note 490, § 4A.
[VOL. 17:41134
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1134 2009-2010
ANTITRUST, INSTITUTIONS, AND MERGER CONTROL
about divergence on the part of national competition authorities on merger
process for multijurisdictional filings.
g. Hypothesis Seven: International Merger Control Has
Improved in Terms of Substantive Analysis Employed by
Non-US. Agencies
Overall, practitioners were positive about convergence on substantive
merger issues, although less positive than on procedural issues such as noti-
fication. ' Respondents suggested an improvement in the quality of Euro-
pean Commission substantive analysis. Nevertheless, they also felt that
decision making at the lowest common denominator (the strictest regime)
can kill deals even when such deals do not create anticompetitive harm as a
result of the merger. The lower standard becomes the global standard.496
Divergent opinion on mergers is not a typical problem. As one practi-
tioner put it, "[s]ubstantive antitrust merger standards across jurisdictions
generally don't matter because most of the time, particularly the easy cases,
agencies will get it right. When it comes to hard cases, it really matters, and
most agencies get the substantive economic analysis wrong." Respondents
believe that setbacks in court such as Airtours,497 Schneider,49 and Tetra
Pack4 have forced the Commission to back up ideas with economic analy-
sis. Respondents also note that the creation of the position of Chief Econo-
mist at the Directorate General for Competition has institutionalized eco-
nomic analysis and improved substantive merger control at the Commis-
sion.
For those practitioners who have significant contact with Asian anti-
trust enforcers, all expressed concern over the quality of substantive Chi-
nese enforcement. However, they all noted that the merger regime is young
in China and may improve with time.5" A few suggested that the OECD,
the ABA Antitrust Section, and direct technical assistance on the part of
495 In terms of soft law convergence, the ICN has proposed a set of recommended practices for
merger analysis. Id. at passim. More recommended practices for merger analysis are under evaluation.
Thus far the Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis adopted to date cover: (1) the framework for
merger analysis, (2) the use of market shares, (3) entry and expansion, (4) competitive effects analysis:
overview, (5) unilateral effects, and (6) coordinated effects. As these were just adopted in 2009, they
have yet to be fully integrated into the thinking of many competition agencies around the world. Id.
496 Geradin, supra note 6, at 203-10.
491 Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
498 Case T-310/01, Schneider Elec. SA v. Commn, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071.
499 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BVv. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381, affd in part, Case C-12/03P,
2005 OJ C82/1 (ECJ).
500 Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications,
6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 477, 480 (2009) (examining the limits of Chinese merger control).
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various antitrust agencies have ameliorated some of the worst potential
problems that might have emerged from China."'
h. Hypothesis Eight: State Merger Control Is a Net Loss for
National Mergers
Respondents viewed state enforcement as highly variable. They felt
that most state merger enforcement, at best, piggybacked federal enforce-
ment efforts. Respondents believed that state enforcement efforts created
increased transaction costs for deals.
Overall, the vast majority of practitioners felt that there was a role for
state antitrust enforcement. However, they noted that state level involve-
ment should be limited to those cases in which there was a local impact that
federal enforcers would not otherwise investigate. These comments echoed
some of the concerns raised generally about state enforcement addressed
earlier in the Article.
i. Hypothesis Nine: Private Rights Are a Net Loss in Merger
Control
Antitrust laws and legislative history provide a dual enforcement role
for public and private enforcement, including enforcement in the merger
area." 2 Given the gradual transformation of antitrust law, private rights play
a smaller role in mergers than they do in price-fixing or single-firm conduct
cases. Very few practitioners surveyed dealt with private rights in the mer-
ger process with any regularity. The small number of practitioner-
respondents (all defense side) who addressed this issue believed that private
rights are a net loss to merger review. °3
By elevating the antitrust injury requirement for challenging mergers,
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc."°4 and Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colorado, Inc 505 have made it far harder for competitors to sue for Clay-
501 Sokol, supra note 280, at 1084 (providing a descriptive analysis of technical assistance efforts);
D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge Through Technical Assistance and Capacity
Building, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 233, 235-36 (2009) (providing a quantitative analysis of tech-
nical assistance efforts).
502 Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives
and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 1-12 (1995).
503 But see id. (advocating stronger private rights in merger control).
504 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
505 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
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ton Section 7 violations.5° Yet recently, a number of private party claims
have been made during the pendency of merger filings, including claims
against Anheuser-Busch/InBev and Pfizer/Wyeth.1 7
Some private suits emerge after the fact as well °sO An empirical void
remains in this area. What remains unclear from the reports is what hap-
pened after the injunction was granted. Most of these cases involved ex ante
complaints, and few of them are recent. There are few recent cases in which
private plaintiffs have succeeded and secured relief where the DOJ or the
FTC failed to act, or where there was a government suit and the court re-
warded additional relief" Most private cases now involve customer-
plaintiffs because antitrust injury has proven to be a serious obstacle to the
competitor suits.
Customers have some probability of blocking a merger, though how
great this is has yet to be empirically studied. Even in these cases, custom-
ers may be interested in a payoff to withdraw their complaints. They may
not really want to stop the merger. Merger litigation is very expensive, and
one would guess that serious challenges would not be made unless the
plaintiffs expected a significant payoff. It might be a little easier if the
plaintiff is only seeking injunctive-as compared to monetary-relief, but
not much more so. Even if the odds of success are relatively low, if the
benefits from success would be more than the cost of litigation, it may be
worth the effort by plaintiffs. If a plaintiff can obtain at least a temporary
injunction, or can impose costs on its competitors, these have peripheral
benefits.
506 See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 484-89 (offering the first articulation of the antitrust injury doc-
trine); see also Page & Lopatka, supra note 431, at 129 ("[C]ourts have interpreted the doctrine so
strictly that competitors and takeover targets can never establish standing to challenge mergers.").
507 In Ginsburg v. InBev NVSA, 649 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Mo. 2009), a group of beer consumers
and purchasers challenged the proposed merger of defendant domestic beer manufacturer with defendant
foreign corporation. Id. at 945-46. Plaintiffs claimed that the proposed merger violated Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, because it eliminated defendant foreign corporation as a "perceived" and
"actual" potential competitor in the U.S. beer market. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
pleadings, and their motion was granted. Id. The lawsuit was dismissed. Id.; see also Ginsburg v. In-
vBev SA/NV, No. 4:08CV01375 JCH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93636, at *18 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2008)
(showing how, when the same plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in the case, it was denied). In
Golden Gate Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-09-3854 MMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111862 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009), the plaintiffs were a number of pharmacies that filed suit to stop the
merger of the two pharmaceutical companies, asserting that the merger would be a violation of the
Clayton Act. Id. at *2-3. The court found for the defendant on all claims. Id. at *21-22.
508 Most of these are settled. Practitioners who were interviewed can think of only a handful.
Transcript of Responses to Qualitative Survey (on file with author).
509 See, e.g., AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 1999); New England
Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First DataBank, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Mass. 2009); Bon-
Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
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j. Hypothesis Ten: Sector Regulation Is a Net Loss in Merger
Control
Respondents uniformly believed that antitrust should play a role in
mergers of regulated industries. They expressed concerns with the types of
"public interest" conditions to mergers that sector regulators create. Many
believed that sector regulator demands were nothing other than interest
group-based rent seeking. A number of respondents suggested that on com-
petition issues, antitrust enforcers should be the sole reviewers of mergers
in regulated industries for competitive effects.
6. Potential Limitations to the Surveys
a. Potential Selection Bias
The survey measures opinions by people who work in antitrust mer-
gers. They are proxies not only of experts in the field, but also of the so-
phisticated clients that they represent."' Selection bias occurs when a re-
searcher chooses the wrong set of individuals to study."' Selection for the
quantitative survey was based upon membership of ABA antitrust section
committee e-mail listservs. It may be the case that not all antitrust practi-
tioners are members of the ABA Antitrust Section and that all members of
the Section are not members of various committee listservs. However, the
listserv is by far the most accurate and comprehensive list of people with
serious antitrust experience and interest relative to Martindale Hubell"' or
to looking through law firm websites around the country, where claims of
antitrust "expertise" may be as much advertizing as actual expertise.
There may be a selection bias if people self-select into the listserv.
They may be younger (more tech savvy). The listserv seems representative
of the underlying antitrust attorneys based on the general population of anti-
trust attorneys and the antitrust section. If the assumption is that most
people who are involved in the antitrust section are also most of the people
involved in antitrust (something that most ABA Section of Antitrust offic-
ers with whom I spoke believe), there may not be a significant selectivity
bias.
510 Lois A. Weithom, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application ofAtkins v. Virginia, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1203, 1222-25 (2008) (explaining the importance of good measurement techniques).
511 Christopher Winship & Robert D. Mare, Models for Sample Selection Bias, 18 ANN. REV. Soc.
327, 328 (1992).
512 Martindale Hubbell is really an advertising service in which someone can be a self-proclaimed
"expert" with a single case in a substantive area of law. It is not uncommon to see practitioners list at
least ten areas of "expertise."
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b. Potential Sampling Bias
Sampling bias might be a concern because some groups may have
been over-represented or under-represented in the survey. The survey has
the potential for sampling bias based on the lack of data on the non-
respondents to the survey. For law firm practitioners, sampling error in
terms of lack of internet use is not a significant problem."3 After all, law
firm lawyers are on call to their clients twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week, and it is not clear that non-respondents are any different than res-
pondents. This also overcomes potential age bias overall in web surveys." 4
It may be that my data sample did not measure the right kinds of
people. The practitioner survey may not be representative because it was
administered via the internet. This is less of a problem with the current sur-
vey than with internet surveys generally. Unlike the overall U.S. popula-
tion, antitrust law firm practitioners are internet savvy because of client
demand. However, respondents would need to have the time to answer the
questions for thirty minutes, answer honestly, and assume that case deci-
sions and antitrust policy are right on their merits and not because they sup-
port client positions. Another way that the survey in question overcame the
problem of sample bias is that by interviewing a large number of survey
respondents, it was more difficult for bias results to push a position that
would give advantage to a particular viewpoint.
c. Potential Response Rate Bias
There might be a difference in those people who respond versus those
who do not respond to surveys. People interested in responding (especially
those that bill at high rates) will respond if they are interested in the topic. "
Even in surveys with low response rates, if the survey follows proper re-
search methods and analysis, the low response rate should not affect the
validity of the inferences."1 6 As one article argues, "[m]ost current research
shows that lower response rates do not have nearly as much of an effect on
survey results as might have been thought .... [Such rates] don't seem to
513 JENNIFER C. DAY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2003 8-9 (2005) (explaining the limitations of internet based surveys for the population as a
whole).
514 Kieren Diment & Sam Garrett-Jones, How Demographic Characteristics Affect Mode Prefe-
rence in a Postal/Web Mixed-Mode Survey of Australian Researchers, 25 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV.
410, 411-14 (2007) (finding that web respondents were more likely to be young, male, middle income,
and IT savvy).
515 Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Surveying Difficult Populations: Lessons Learned from a National
Survey of State Trial Court Judges, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 287, 288 (2001).
516 B.K. Atrostic et al., Nonresponse in U.S. Government Household Surveys: Consistent Meas-
ures, Recent Trends, and New Insights, 17 J. OFFICIAL STATS. 209, 223-25 (2001).
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seriously harm the quality or the representativeness of the data." ' Indeed,
bias can be introduced just as easily in high-response rate surveys as low-
response rate ones." 8 Non-response rates seem to be less of a problem than
previously thought. Recent research suggests similar results for both high
and low response rates." 9
The survey literature suggests that busy people are more unlikely to
undertake surveys than those that are less busy. 20 However, other work
suggests that busier people might be over-represented in surveys."' One of
the assumptions in probability sampling, to draw an unbiased set of infe-
rences from the survey population, is that all segments of the survey popu-
lation have an equal chance at measurement. When some people do not
respond, this non-responsive group may bias the survey results. 22
CONCLUSION
Institutions are messy, as are interinstitutional arrangements. Malfunc-
tions that affect one institution tend to appear in all institutions. Each of the
formal antitrust institutions has problems in its ability to create a system
that is administrable and effective in reducing anticompetitive conduct.
More theoretical work on comparative institutional analysis in antitrust
needs to be undertaken, as well as more empirical work to test these as-
sumptions. Complicating policy prescriptions further is that antitrust institu-
tions are constantly adapting. What may work now may not work later. This
suggests that comparative institutional analysis needs to be a continuing
process. Based on the current institutional setup for merger control, a num-
ber of conclusions emerge.
Overall, there has been an increasing convergence, based upon soft
law institutions, in both merger procedures and substantive analysis across
countries. This convergence has reduced the costs associated with merger
517 Frank Newport, Looking Closely at Survey Response Rates, GALLUP POLL (Jan. 6, 2003),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/751 0/looking-closely-survey-response-rates.aspx.
518 Robert M. Groves, Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys, 70 PUB.
OPINION Q. 646, 665 (2006).
519 ROBERT M. GROVES ET AL., SURVEY NONRESPONSE 120-22 (2002); Richard Curtin, Stanley
Presser & Eleanor Singer, Changes in Telephone Survey Nonresponse over the Past Quarter Century,
69 PUB. OPINION Q. 87, 96-97 (2005).
520 ROBERT M. GROVES & MICK P. COUPER, NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS
122 (1998).
521 JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS AMERICANS
USE THEIR TIME 63 (1997).
522 AM. AsS'N FOR PUB. OPINION RES., STANDARD DEFINITIONS: FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASE
CODES AND OUTCOME RULES FOR SURVEYS 5 (6th ed. 2009), available at
http://www.aapor.orglHome.htm (search "standard definitions"; then follow "2009 Standard Defini-
tions" hyperlink).
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review globally, increased business certainty, and potentially increased the
quality of agency analysis in mergers. The exact contours of where there
should be a more global, rather than domestic, response to merger control is
not clear and may be situational. Generally, there seem to be too many
countries involved in merger control where their links to the deal are te-
nuous. A future article might suggest institutional mechanisms to overcome
this problem.
A significant set of institutional problems concern U.S. domestic insti-
tutional choice. There seems to have been some divergence in recent years
between the DOJ and the FTC, although not as extreme as articulated with-
in the dominant antitrust discourse. That there are two federal antitrust
agencies with different substantive standards for preliminary injunction,
different levels of intensity of merger enforcement, and different institu-
tional designs remains a potential problem. These problems appear funda-
mental. The best institutional solution may depend in part on the optimal
level of antitrust enforcement desired. The FTC seems to be capable of a
stronger level of enforcement based on broader standards. The answer to
the question of what particular agency structure is optimal is beyond the
scope of this Article.
Generally, the ability of the judiciary to understand antitrust merger
cases seems to have improved. Unfortunately, the judiciary remains highly
variable in its decision making. In the U.S. context, either a specialized
antitrust court or more effective use of ALJs by the FTC might lead to bet-
ter outcomes. However, these solutions do not overcome the ultimate need'
to have a non-specialized court review decisions.
The current use of private rights seems not to be particularly effective
in the merger context. State enforcement, though useful, seems at times to
be redundant and increases costs too often when the states could instead
focus on more local cases, which the federal enforcers do not touch. Sector
regulation of merger control based on competition concerns seems to be
redundant at best and efficiency reducing at worst because of increased
capture by sector regulators.
Overall, institutional analysis provides a mechanism to better weigh
the potential costs and advantages to antitrust institutional design. This Ar-
ticle focused on merger control as an area in need of institutional analysis.
The analysis suggests that the current system is overly burdensome for ei-
ther strong or weak antitrust enforcement. The next stage of institutional
analysis is to think about the optimal level of antitrust in merger control and
design an institutional structure based upon the optimal level to make the
institutions complementary to their purpose.
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APPENDIX A-i: MERGERS
Question Count Percent
Q1. In the past two years, what 0-20% 115 49.6%
percentage of all of your pro- 21-40% 42 18.1%
fessional legal time on matters 41-100% 63 27.2%
is merger related? Not applicable 12 5.2%
Q3. Of these proposed mer- 1-5 87 3 8.2%
gers, how many of deals were 5+ 11 4.8%
abandoned (rather than restruc- Not applicable 130 57.0%
tured) primarily on antitrust
grounds as part of the risk-
reward calculation of doing the
deal prior to HSR filings?
Q4. What is the percentage of 0-20% 108 47.8%
these abandoned deals as per- 21-100% 20 8.8%
centage of all of your number Not applicable 98 43.4%
of deals for merger work?
Q5. Of those HSR filings that 1-5 48 21.6%
were made, how many of the 6-10 1 .5%
deals were abandoned (as Not applicable 173 77.9%
opposed to restructured) after
filing because of antitrust
concerns?
Q6. What is the percentage of 0-20% 99 44.6%
these abandoned deals as a 21-100% 5 2.3%
percentage of number of deals Not applicable 118 53.2%
of your merger work?
Q7. How often do you think, Frequently 9 4%
on the matters that you perso- Often 40 18%
nally have worked on, that the Never 116 52%
U.S. antitrust regime deters Not applicable 60 27%
mergers that would not be
anticompetitive (not including
the cost of delay)?
Q8. What is your perception of Efficiency-enhancing 75 34%
the current merger enforce- Neutral 61 27%
ment by U.S. federal antitrust Efficiency-degrading 57 26%
agencies? Not applicable 30 13%
Q9. How would you answer Efficiency-enhancing 81 36%
question eight based on en- Neutral 39 18%
forcement ten years ago Efficiency-degrading 46 21%
(1998)? Not applicable 56 25%
QI 0. How would you answer Efficiency-enhancing 42 19%
question eight based on en- Neutral 27 12%
forcement twenty years ago Efficiency-degrading 62 28%
(1988)? Not applicable 91 41%
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Q11. In your personal expe- More 124 55%
rience in terms of the internal Neutral 21 9%
costs to a merger (time spent Fewer 19 8%
on lawyer hours, internal client Not applicable 60 27%
hours, economic experts hours,
etc.) on antitrust merger re-
view by merging firms, is the
U.S. merger review process
more costly now than ten years
ago?
Note:
- These percentages were calculated after first removing those for whom the question
was not applicable.
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APPENDIX A-2: DEMOGRAPHIC
Question Count Percent
Q30. In presidential Republican 61 38.6%
elections I more often Democratic 92 58.2%
than not vote: Other 5 3.2%
Q31. The antitrust eco- Chicago School 65 42.2%
nomics views closest to Post-Chicago School 89 57.8%
my own are:
Q32. Years of practice: 1-5 6 3.7%
6-10 19 11.6%
11-20 39 23.8%
21-30 41 25.0%
31+ 59 36.0%
Q33. You currently have In-house: Exclusively plaintiff 4 2.5%
the following type of In-house: Primarily plaintiff 1 .6%
practice: In-house: Primarily defense 15 9.3%
Law firm: Exclusively plaintiff 1 .6%
Law firm: Primarily plaintiff 10 6.2%
Law firm: Exclusively defense 21 13.0%
Law firm: Primarily defense 109 67.7%
Q34. Prior to private Yes 52 31.7%
practice, have you ever No 112 68.3%
worked as an attorney for
the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, Fed-
eral Trade Commission
or for a State antitrust
enforcer on antitrust
matters?
Q35. Your current title is: Partner 93 57.1%
Counsel/Of Counsel 32 19.6%
Associate 19 11.7%
Other 19 11.7%
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APPENDIX B-1: CROSSTABLE 1
I divided the lawyers into three groups: one to five proposed mergers ("group A"), more than
five proposed mergers ("group B"), and not applicable ("N/A") ("group C").
Groups
Question 1-5 Mergers 5+ Mergers N/A(group A) (group B) (group C)
N N N
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Q1. In the past two 0-20% 55 (71%) B 8 (9%) 51 (77%) B
years, what percen- 21-40% 13 (17%) c 28 (32%) c 1 (2%)
tage of all of your
professional legal 41-100% 9 (12%) 52 (59%) AC 2 (3%)
time on matters is Not applicable 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 12 (18%)
merger related?
Q8. What is your Efficiency enhancing 29(40%) c 38(44%) c 8(13%)
perception of the Neutral 24(33%) 23(27%) 14(22%)
current merger
enforcement by Efficiency degrading 17(23%) 23(27%) 17(27%)
U.S. federal anti- Not applicable 3(4%) 2(2%) 25(39%) A B
trust agencies?
Q9. How would Efficiency enhancing 33(45%) c 38(44%) c 10(16%)
you answer ques- Neutral 12(16%) 16(19%) 11(17%)
tion eight based on
enforcement ten Efficiency degrading 18(25%) 16(19%) 12(19%)
years ago (1998)? Not applicable 10(14%) 16(19%) 30(48%) AB
Q10. How would Efficiency enhancing 17(23%) 15(17%) 10(16%)
you answer ques- Neutral 14(19%) c 10(12%) 3(5%)
tion eight based on
enforcement twenty Efficiency degrading 20(27%) 31(36%) C 11(17%)
years ago (1988)? Not applicable 22(30%) 30(35%) 39(62%) A B
Q30. In presidential Republican 26(46%) 26(36%) 9(31%)
elections I more Democratic 28(50%) 44(60%) 20(69%)
often than not vote:
Other 2(4%) 3(4%) 0(0%)
Q31. The antitrust Chicago School 21(38%) 34(46%) 10(40%)
economics views Post-Chicago School 34(62%) 40(54%) 15(60%)
closest to my own
are:
Q32. Years of 1-5 3(5%) 1(1%) 2(6%)
ractice: 6-10 3(5%) 15(20%) A 1(3%)
11-20 13(23%) 20(26%) 6(19%)
21-30 13(23%) 19(25%) 9(29%)
31+ 25(44%) 21(28%) 13(42%)
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Q33. You currently
have the following
type of practice:
In-house:
Exclusively olaintiff
2(4%) 1(1%) 1(3%)
In-house: 0(0%) 1(1%) 0(0%)
Primarily plaintiff
In-house: 9(16%) 6(8%) 0(0%)
Primarily defense
I-aw firm: 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(3%)
Exclusively plaintiff
Law firm: 2(4%) 1(1%) 7(24/) A B
Primarily plaintiff
Law firm: 5(9%) 12(16%) 4(14%)
Exclusively defense
Law firm:
Primarilv defense
38(68%) 55(72%) 16(55%)
Q34. Prior to pri- Yes 20(35%) 28(37%) c 4(13%)
vate practice, have
you ever worked as No 37(65%) 48(63%) 27(87%) 
B
an attorney for the
Department of
ustice Antitrust
Division, Federal
Trade Commission
or for a State anti-
trust enforcer on
antitrust matters?
Q35. Your current Partner 30(53%) 44(59%) 19(61%)
itle is: Counsel/Of Counsel 13(23%) 15(20%) 4(13%)
Associate 4(7%) 12(16%) 3(10%)
Other 10(18%) 4(5%) 5(16%)
Notes:
- Superscripts are used to indicate statistical significant group differences.
- N means total counts.
- Due to rounding, the percentages for Appendix do not necessarily equal 100.
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APPENDIX B-2: CROSSTABLE 2
Groups
Frequently- Seldom-
often Sometimes never N/AQuestion (Group A) (Group B) (Group C) (Group D)
N N N N
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Q1. In the 0-20% 2(22%) 11(28%) 53(46%) 45(75%) ABC
past two 21-40% 3(33%) 11(28%)) 26(22%)" 2(3%)
y e a r s , w h a t T _3 _- . 7 2( %percentage of 41-100% 4(44%) D 18(45%)" 37(32%)" 2(3%)
all of your Not 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 11(18%)
professional applicable
legal time on
matters is
merger re-
lated?
Q8. What is Efficiency 1 (11%) 11(28%) 58(50%) D 5(9%)
your percep- enhancing
tion of the Neutral 3(33%) 12(30%) 34(29%) 12(21%)
current mer- Efficiency 5(56%) 17(43%) C 22(19%) 13(22%)
ger enforce- degrading
ment by US Not 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(2%) 28(48%) C
fe d e ral an ti- ap pli cabl e
trust agen- applicable
cies?
Q9. How Efficiency 2(22%) 15(38%) 54(47%) 10(18%)
would you enhancing
answer ques- Neutral 1(11%) 8(20%) 21(18%) 9(16%)
tion eight Efficiency 4(44%) 12(30%) 22(19%) 8(14%)
based on degading
enfoycee Not 2(22%) 5(13%) 19(16%) 3 0 (53%) Bcten years ago a pi a l
(1998)? applicable
Q10. How Efficiency 0(0%) 8(20%) 28(24%) 6(11%)
would you enhancing
answer ques- Neutral 1(11%) 6(15%) 16(14%) 4(7%)
tion eight Efficiency 4(44%) 16(40%) D 33(28%) 9(16%)
based on degrading
enforcement
twenty years Not 4(44%) 10(25%) 39(34%) 38(67%) B c
ago (1988)? applicable
Q30. In presi- Republican 3(43%) 14(45%) 39(41%) 5(22%)
dential elec- Democratic 3(43%) 16(52%) 55(57%) 17(74%)
tions I more
often than not Other 1(14%) 1(3%) 2(2%) 1(4%)
vote:
Q31. The Chicago 5(71%) 18(55%) 34(37%) 8(38%)
antitrust eco- School
nomics views Post- 2(29%) 15(45%) 58(63%) 13(62%)
closest to my Chicago
own are: School I I
2010] 1147
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Q32. Years of 1-5 0(0%) 1(3%) 4(4%) 1(4%)
practice: 6-10 2(29%) 3(9%) 12(12%) 1(4%)
11-20 3(43%) 8(24%) 22(23%) 6(24%)
21-30 2(29%) 9(27%) 23(24%) 6(24%)
31+ 0(0/o) 12(36%) 36(37%) 11(44%)
Q33. You In-house: 0(0/) 0(0%) 4(4%) 0(0%)
currently have Exclusively
the following plaintiff
type of prac- In-house: 0(0%) 1(3%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
tice: Primarily
plaintiff
In-house: 1(14%) 4(12%) 8(8%) 2(9%)
Primarily
defense
Law firm: 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%0) 1(4%)
Exclusively
plaintiff
Law firm: 0(0%) 1(3%) 3(3%) 6(26%) C
Primarily
plaintiff
Law firm: 0(0%) 2(6%) 17(18%) 2(9%)
Exclusively
defense
Law firm: 6(86%) 25(76%) 64(67%) 12(52%)
Primarily
defense
Q34. Prior to Yes 2(29/) 15(45%) 28(29%) 6(24%)
private prac- No 5(71%) 18(55%) 69(71%) 19(76%)
tice, have you
ever worked
as an attorney
for the De-
partment of
Justice Anti-
trust Division,
Federal Trade
Commission
or for a State
antitrust en-
forcer on
antitrust mat-
ters?
Q35. Your Partner 4(57%) 19(59%) 56(58%) 13(52%)
current title Counsel/Of 0(0%) 7(22%) 23(24%) 2(8%)
is: Counsel
Associate 3(43%) 3(9%) 10(10%) 2(8%)
Other 0(0%) 3(9/o) 8(8%) 8(32%) c
Notes:
- Superscripts are used to indicate statistical significant group differences.
- N means total counts.
- Due to rounding, the percentages for Appendix do not necessarily equal 100.
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